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Abstract
In 1965 the New Order Government took office in Indonesia, following years 
of severe economic turmoil. Since then the Indonesian economy has performed well, 
owing much to large oil export revenues and appropriate economic policies. This 
thesis presents a study of the Indonesian economy focused on three main themes: aid, 
the public sector and the real exchange rate (RER). In particular, we emphasise aid 
effectiveness on fiscal behaviour and on the RER.
The thesis is organised in five chapters. Chapter 1 presents a synthetic 
overview of the main episodes in Indonesian economic history. Chapter 2 reviews 
theoretical and empirical issues on aid. Chapter 3 presents a dynamic model of 
government behaviour aimed at assessing aid’s impact on fiscal budget and on other 
real variables in the Indonesian economy. Following Heller’s seminal contribution 
(1975) and White’s new insights (1993), we insert the government sector into a 
simple macroeconomic framework: a constrained utility maximising framework 
which allows for feedback effects through higher income and dynamic linkages. The 
model is tested for the Indonesian case over the period 1968-93 and the estimated 
parameters are used to carry out a simulation exercise. We conclude with a positive 
assessment of aid giving, provided it is given in loans. Loans are found to encourage 
tax collection, public and private investment and consumption.
Exchange rate management has played a significant role in Indonesia as an 
instrument to ensure competitiveness during and after the oil boom. Chapter 4 
analyses the behaviour of the RER for the Indonesian rupiah and offers a theoretical 
and statistical background. Unit root testing has been extensively used to test for 
stationarity. We have consistently rejected the hypothesis of RER stationarity, except 
in those cases in which the full sample series have been used and/or two breaks have 
been allowed. Chapter 5 presents a modelling approach to RER determination. 
Following Edwards (1989), we present an econometric model of the RER and 
develop an extension of it in terms of the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM). 
Central to the analysis is the role of fundamentals, in particular aid and the price of 
oil, in determining the RER. The estimated parameters are then used to construct the 
equilibrium RER in order to study RER misalignment. Simulations are also carried 
out to investigate the impact of exogenous shocks and policy options on the RER. 
Results show that the Indonesian RER suffered from misalignment especially during 
the oil boom and until the early 1990’s. We also find that aid and the real price of oil 
do matter: both act as fundamental determinants of RER behaviour and contribute to 
RER stability, a finding confirmed by the simulation exercise. Interestingly, aid and 
government consumption appear to influence in differences and not in levels the 
RER.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents a study of the Indonesian economy focused on three main 
themes: aid, the public sector and the real exchange rate (RER). In particular, the 
emphasis is on the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid on government behaviour and 
the RER. We analyse the impact of aid on government behaviour using a dynamic 
fiscal response model, which is subsequently tested empirically for the Indonesian 
case. After the investigation of the statistical properties of the Indonesian RER, a 
model of RER determination is then discussed and tested econometrically.
The Role o f Aid.
The role which aid plays in influencing fiscal behaviour and the RER 
provides the logical link between the two issues. The analysis of the macroeconomic 
effectiveness of aid represents the underlying, though not exclusive, theme in this 
thesis. Over the past decades a number of studies have been focused on the 
macroeconomic impact of aid. Despite the fact that aid is commonly well understood to 
be a transfer of resources from donor to recipient countries whose economies are, 
generally speaking, underdeveloped, there is not yet a clear idea of what is the role of 
aid for the recipients’ economies. The basic question “Does Aid Work?” has been
1
central in almost all of the recent empirical literature1. Although this question seems 
simple, it needs to be qualified according to what might be the objective of aid policies. 
Aid effectiveness can be assessed in relationship to a whole range of targets for the 
recipients’ economies, such as the level and/or the growth rate of national income, its 
distribution, some measure of poverty alleviation. As a result, there is not a 
straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question of aid effectiveness.
In fact, the evaluation of the effectiveness of aid is a complex issue. It requires 
adequate theoretical support and conclusive evidence from empirical research. As for 
now, both the theory and the empirical research are unable to give an unambiguous 
answer to the problem of the impact of aid.
The ways in which aid effectiveness has been studied have essentially been 
either an evaluation of the micro-economic consequences of development projects or 
an analysis of the macro-economic impact of aid inflows from abroad. An interesting 
perspective on the so-called ‘micro-macro paradox’ is presented in Mosley (1986 and 
1987), the paradox being the co-existence of positive evaluations from the 
microeconomic level analyses and of ambiguous answers from the macroeconomic 
level evidence.
The theoretical and empirical literature on aid up to the early 1970’s was mainly 
concerned with the impact of aid on growth. Thereafter, the savings debate flourished. 
An important turning point is represented by the seminal work of Heller (1975) which
1 See Cassen (1986 and 1994) and Riddel (1987).
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introduced the fiscal response approach. From the late 1970’s up to the current days 
various approaches have been developed: aid and allocation (Maizels and Nissanke, 
1984; Gulhati and Nallari, 1988; McGillivray, 1989), aid and counterparts funds 
(Roemer, 1989; Bruton and Hill, 1990; Owens, 1991), aid tying (Levy, 1987; Jepma, 
1991; Morrissey and White, 1993 and 1994), aid and trade (Michaely, 1981; Van 
Wijnbergen, 1986b; Morrissey, 1991; Lahiri and Raimondos, 1994), aid and the real 
exchange rate (Edwards, 1988a and 1989; Wood, 1988; White, 1990; White and 
Wignaraja, 1991 and 1992), aid and fiscal response (Mosley et al., 1987, Gang and 
Khan, 1991), among the most relevant ones.
The purpose of this study is to investigate some of the channels through 
which aid influences the recipient’s economy. As mentioned above, we will 
concentrate our attention on fiscal response in the presence of aid inflows and on 
RER behaviour. The choice of focusing on the Indonesian economy will be briefly 
motivated below.
Why Indonesia ?
When General Soeharto took office in 1965, Indonesia was in economic and 
political turmoil. During the subsequent adjustment period, GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 7.5% from the early 1970’s until 1982, the oil boom era, much higher 
than the 2.7% average growth rate of the industrial countries over the same period.
3
Relative political stability and an institutional commitment by the government to 
pursue balanced budgets allowed for rapid economic growth along with substantial 
social gains. For instance, poverty incidence, that is the proportion of population 
living below the poverty line, declined from 60% in the early 1970’s to 14% in 1996 
and life expectancy rose from 47.6 years in 1970 to 60.2 years in 19922.
A period of slower growth followed the oil price shock of 1982-84 and the 
world recession* 1, with GDP growing at an average annual 3.6% In addition, 
accumulating external debt brought the debt ratio to GDP from 26.8% in 1980 to 
52.2% in 1990. The oil price crisis highlighted the existence of some structural 
problems. Indonesia was very dependent on oil revenues and the debt burden was 
amplified by international currency fluctuations.
The Indonesian government voluntarily undertook a package of adjustment 
policies, with the adoption of successive economic plans, starting from 1984. A 
series of macroeconomic measures, such as budget retrenchment, tax reforms and 
banking sector deregulation, resulted in financial stability, limited external 
imbalances and positive growth rates. Most importantly, the restructuring of the 
economy reduced the dependency from oil revenues. Although the debt service was 
high, with a peak of 40.2% of the debt service ratio to exports in 1988, the adoption 
of sound policies and of prudent borrowing strategies allowed Indonesia to still 
receive strong financial support from official agencies on concessional terms.
2 Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1996 and World Tables, various issues.
1 The average growth rate in the industrial countries between 1983 and 1992 was 2.8%.
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Moreover, foreign reserves and commercial bank credit lines were still widely 
available. These factors ensured Indonesia was not ranked within the group of highly 
indebted country with credit access problems.
The World Bank has recently included Indonesia among the ‘East Asian 
miracle economies’4: its remarkable economic performance over the past thirty years 
makes it an interesting case study.
The Role o f the Government.
The government has played an active role in Indonesian economic success, 
while receiving strong external financial support, which accounted for an average of 
24% of total fiscal receipts over the period 1965-93. It is therefore interesting to 
investigate to what extent fiscal behaviour has been influenced by aid inflows.
In particular, this research aims at assessing the impact foreign aid has had on 
the fiscal budget and other real variables in the Indonesian economy. A number of 
studies have developed the seminal contribution by Heller of modelling government 
behaviour in order to capture one of the channels through which aid could displace 
savings and hence negatively influence growth. Heller imposes an optimising 
framework on the simple Harrod-Domar set-up, which had since then been used to
4 See World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press.
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analyse the macroeconomic impact of aid, in order to model the impact of aid on 
taxation and government expenditure (and thus on public savings). The theoretical 
result of such model is twofold: on the revenue side, aid may reduce the government’s 
taxation efforts, while on the expenditure side, not all the aid inflow will be allocated to 
government investment, that is aid is fungible and is deflected away from investment 
and into consumption5.
Many empirical studies have adopted the core of Heller’s approach (see among 
others Gang and Khan, 1991; Khan and Hoshino, 1992; McGillivray and 
Papadopoulos, 1991). The important work by Mosley et al. (1987) incorporated the 
core of Heller’s approach in a wider model which includes also a production and an 
investment function, although they do not actually estimate a Heller type model. 
However, the empirical evidence based on the fiscal response approach is mixed.
Following White (1993), we insert the Government sector into a simple demand 
determined macroeconomic model. The inclusion of dynamic linkages and of static 
macroeconomic feedback effects in a fiscal response model highlights the complexity 
of aid’s impact. The contribution of our study to the literature is threefold, respectively 
from a modelling, an empirical and a methodological perspective. From the modelling 
point of view, three aspects are introduced: a) interaction between the objective 
variables in the utility function; b) static feedback effects, via a Keynesian like
5 The underlying value judgement is that increasing consumption is a ‘bad’. This issue is, however, 
open to debate.
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multiplier; c) dynamic effects, mainly through the investment function. From the 
empirical perspective, a time series econometric estimation is implemented and the 
impact of
temporary and permanent increases in foreign inflows are simulated. From the 
methodological point of view, the problems related to the choice of the dataset and to 
the empirical estimation techniques employed is emphasised.
Real Exchange Rate Behaviour.
Another important aspect of Indonesian economic history over the past thirty 
years is the exchange rate management as a policy instrument to support 
competitiveness. During the period under analysis, 1960-1993, Indonesia experienced 
five episodes of major nominal devaluation (1965, 1971, 1978, 1983 and 1986).
The hyperinflation crisis of 1965 caused a massive devaluation and the 
government gradually moved towards the dismantling of the then prevailing multiple 
exchange rate system. By 1969 the rupiah became freely convertible and its value 
remained pegged to the dollar until 1978. By 1971 the rupiah’s exchange value versus 
the dollar was 30% less than it was in 1969 and after a further 50% devaluation in 
November 1978 the Government opted for a tightly managed float regime. The rupiah 
was again devalued in March 1983 by 37% and more recently, in September 1986, by 
50%, when more flexibility was introduced in exchange rate management. The
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exchange rate regime remained a managed float regime pegged to the dollar, the yen 
and the Deutsche Mark until August 1997, when, following the recent turmoil in East 
Asian financial markets, the government decided to float the rupiah.
The real exchange rate is commonly used as a key indicator of the overall 
competitiveness of a country. The RER defined as the ratio of tradable to non-tradable 
prices, i.e. the trade theory defined RER, also signals long run intersectoral growth 
patterns, for instance the expansion of the tradable sector or the contraction of the 
agricultural sector.
The link between RER behaviour and economic performance has recently been 
emphasised in policy discussions and in the literature on economic development. In 
particular, the role of RER stability and of correct real exchange alignment is 
increasingly regarded as crucial in development strategies (Edwards and Ahamed, 
1986; Cottani, Cavallo and Khan, 1990; Edwards, 1988a, 1989 and 1994; Elbadawi, 
1992 and 1994; Harberger, 1986; Khan and Lizondo,1987; Pfeffermann, 1985; Pick 
and Vollrath, 1994; Serven and Solimano, 1992; White and Wignaraja, 1991 and 1992; 
Williamson, 1994).
RER stability reduces uncertainty and can thus result in attracting foreign 
capital and in stimulating domestic investments, given a greater confidence in the 
domestic and foreign business community in the country’s economic performance. 
Correct RER alignment results in internal and external equilibrium, for given 
sustainable macroeconomic conditions and economic policies, and can be conducive to 
greater equality.
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The consequences of misalignment can be critical for developing countries. In 
particular, overvalued exchange rates undermine the profitability of producing exports 
and import substitutes. Exports are hurt by reduced competitiveness. Incentives to 
produce import substitutes decline as relatively cheaper imports are stimulated, 
provided import restrictions are not imposed. If protection against imports is 
introduced, the costs to subsidise import completing industries can widen the fiscal 
deficit and resource allocation can be less efficient. Overvaluation, therefore, is 
particularly detrimental to export-led growth strategies. Widening current account 
deficits will be also reflected in increased borrowing requirements which exert 
pressures on the capital account and may worsen the external debt servicing burden. 
Another impxirtant effect of overvalued exchange rates is the negative impact on the 
agricultural sector. The decline in compietitiveness and in relative prices caused by the 
overvaluation reduces incentives for farmers to produce6. This has dramatic welfare 
effects, given the key role of agriculture in countries at the early stages of development.
RER misalignment occurs when nominal exchange rates are not allowed to 
adjust fully in response to changes in economic conditions, such as unsustainable 
monetary and fiscal policies, trade and capital controls, increasing domestic inflation 
and costs. Determining the correct RER alignment requires the introduction of an 
equilibrium concept, relative to which misalignment can be established and the 
appropriate piolicy adjustments undertaken. Therefore, it is necessary to define an
Agriculture usually does not enjoy the same level of protection as industry does.
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equilibrium level of the RER which reflects a country’s economic fundamentals. In 
practice, the quantification of RER disequilibrium is not easy. Purchasing power parity 
(PPP) theory provides a simple way to estimating misalignment. However, PPP 
underestimate the role of economic fundamentals and do not offer a reliable guide to 
policy makers. An alternative approach is proposed by Edwards (1989) who presents a 
modelling approach to equilibrium and disequilibrium RER focused on the role of 
domestic and external determinants of the RER.
Edwards’ model includes aid among the fundamental determinants of the RER. 
The role of aid can therefore be studied under a different perspective than the dynamic 
fiscal response model presented discussed above. It gives us the possibility of 
investigating how fundamental are aid and other macroeconomic variables, including 
the price of oil, for the Indonesian RER. Given that Indonesia is an oil exporting 
country, the impact of oil prices on the RER exchange rate is of particular relevance. 
This is why we have explicitly considered the real price of oil among the fundamental 
determinants of the Indonesian RER.
Structure o f the Thesis.
The thesis is structured in five chapters.
Chapter 1 presents a synthetic overview of the main episodes in Indonesian 
economic history since 1960. The whole period 1960 to the present has been divided 
into five periods: the turbulent years preceding the New Order Government of
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General Soeharto 1960-1965; the stabilisation period 1966-1972; the oil boom era 
1973-1982; the years of adjustment to external shocks 1982-1989; and the recent 
developments of the 1990’s. Structural changes following the oil boom are also 
discussed. A brief description of the Indonesian economy both from an historical and 
a comparative perspective precedes the discussion of each period in turn.
Chapter 2 represents a brief introduction to aid related issues. It offers a 
synthetic overview on definition and measurement problems. Recent trends in aid are 
then described, from both a world and an Indonesian perspective. Finally, a critical 
survey on the macroeconomic analysis of aid effectiveness is presented, with an 
emphasis on the aid-growth relationship and on the savings debate.
Chapter 3 analyses the impact of aid on the behaviour of the public sector and 
the feedback effects on the economy as a whole. We present and test a dynamic model 
of fiscal response to foreign aid in Indonesia. The chapter is organised in three 
sections. The first section presents a critical review of the literature on fiscal 
response. The second part describes the model and its implications. The third section 
discusses the empirical implementation of the model and the related data and 
estimation technique issues. It also presents results from a simulation exercise, 
carried out in order to study the effect that temporary and permanent increases in aid 
inflows have on fiscal behaviour and on the main macroeconomic variables. A 
conclusion highlights the main lessons from this particular study and proposes 
directions for further research.
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The result from our empirical study is that on impact aid has a weak negative 
effect. However, in the long run, once the intra- and intertemporal linkages described in 
the dynamic model have started multiplier processes, foreign inflows appear to 
influence the economy. In particular, grants, multilateral and bilateral aid negatively 
affect all fiscal variable as well as income and consumption. They reduce public 
consumption more than investment, thus exhibiting a pro-investment bias. On the 
contrary, loans encourage tax collection, public and private investment and 
consumption so that the whole economy benefits.
From the simulation exercise we also find, not surprisingly, that permanent 
increases in aid greatly amplify the effects of a temporary shock, namely beneficial 
effects from loans and negative effects from grants, bilateral and multilateral aid. These 
results are in contrast with the widespread negative assessment of aid’s impact on 
public budget and on the recipient economy.
Chapter 4 analyses the behaviour of the real exchange rate for the Indonesian 
rupiah and offers a theoretical and statistical background for the understanding of the 
RER. This chapter can be seen as deviating from the main theme, aid effectiveness, but 
it represents the first necessary step towards the empirical implementation of a model 
for RER behaviour, which is presented and discussed in the next chapter. The scope of 
this investigation, which is predominantly statistical, is also to contribute to the debate 
on whether RERs can be described as stationary processes or not.
The chapter starts with an overview of the theoretical issues underlying RER 
definition. It then focuses on the measurement of the Indonesian RER and offers some
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theoretical insights on measurement problems. The statistical behaviour on the 
Indonesian RER with an emphasis on unit root testing is analysed and final remarks 
conclude the chapter.
The Indonesian nominal exchange rate has systematically diverged from the 
RER, due to inflation above that of the rest of the world. As mentioned above, real 
exchange rates are commonly used as indicators for movements in international 
competitiveness: this practice needs to be qualified with respect to the informational 
content of RER indices. In this chapter we discuss theoretical and statistical issues 
related to the definition and measurement of the RER. The Indonesian RER is 
calculated and tested for stationarity. A series of unit root tests is then carried out using 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. Rolling, recursive, sequential and Perron 
type ADF tests are also implemented to allow for breaks in the RER behaviour. Most of 
the tests do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root, i.e. 
of non stationarity. Opposite results are obtained in two cases: ADF tests over the full 
sample (1960-1993) and ADF tests which allow for two breaks in the RER. Whether 
these conflicting results are essentially due to the hyperinflation of the early Sixties 
and/or to the inclusion of the two ‘Indonesian tailored’ breaks cannot be assessed with 
certainty. It is probably true that thirty-three years are too short a time span to ascertain 
the long run behaviour of the RER. As a result, our unit root test outcome must be 
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we feel more confident in relying on results 
from unit root tests carried out over a sub-sample which excludes the years 1960-1965.
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Chapter 5 presents two strictly related models for RER behaviour and their 
empirical application for the case of Indonesia. As mentioned above, the debate on real 
exchange rate modelling has recently flourished7, although there are relatively few 
studies on RER determination for Less Developed Countries. We start with the 
modelling approach proposed by Edwards. A brief description of his model and of its 
implications precedes the empirical time series estimation for Indonesia. We then 
present a modified version of Edwards’ model, an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) 
model, which represents a development of the concept of equilibrium RER. The ECM 
approach allows to fully capture short run dynamics in the RER as opposed to long run 
equilibrium movements. Once again the empirical estimation is implemented for 
Indonesia on a time series basis. The estimated parameters are then used to carry out a 
series of simulations in order to investigate the role of the fundamentals on RER 
behaviour over the period 1967-93. For instance, we consider what would have 
happened had the three oil price shocks of 1973, 1979 and 1982/84 not taken place, 
what has been the impact of the nominal devaluation episodes of 1978, 1983 and 1986, 
what has been the role of policy and of aid inflows. As for aid’s influence on the real 
exchange rate, the results from the econometric estimation and from the simulation 
exercise offer an interesting perspective. Aid is shown to significantly affect RER 
behaviour in differences and not in levels and to contribute to RER stability. It is 
important to note that this analysis on RER behaviour is not focused on the possibility 
of a Dutch disease effect caused by external shocks such as oil bonanza or aid inflows.
7 See in particular Williamson (1994).
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Sectoral issues are not considered; therefore, an interpretation in terms of the Dutch 
disease would be inappropriate. The focus is rather on the determination of the RER.
Final Remarks
The original idea for this thesis was to investigate the relationship between aid 
and growth. As the reading and studying of the literature progressed, we became aware 
of the complexity of the issue of aid effectiveness. Aid itself takes various forms: food 
aid, technical cooperation, grants, loans, as do its purposes and motives. Trying to find 
a straightforward answer to the question “Does Aid Work?” is a simplistic approach. 
There is no simple answer, but rather a series of answers to a series of questions which 
need to be analysed and confronted.
This thesis attempts to shed some light on issues related to aid effectiveness. In 
this research process, other problems are also raised and investigated. Finally, 
methodological aspects are considered, given their importance in refining heuristic 
procedures.
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CHAPTER 1
AN OVERVIEW OF THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY 1960 - 1997.
1.1. Introduction.
This chapter presents a synthetic overview of the main episodes in Indonesian 
economic history since 1960. The whole period 1960 to the present has been divided 
into five periods: the turbulent years preceding the New Order Government of 
General Soeharto 1960-1965; the stabilisation period 1966-1972; the oil boom era 
1973-1982; the years of adjustment to external shocks 1982-1989; and the recent 
developments of the 1990’s. A brief description of the Indonesian economy both 
from an historical and a comparative perspective precedes the discussion of each 
period in turn.
Indonesia has the fourth largest population in the world at 193.3 millions 
inhabitants in 19951 and its islands span an area comparable to that of Europe. After 
the economic and political turmoil of the early 1960’s and the subsequent adjustment 
period, GDP grew at a remarkable average annual rate of 7.5% from the early 1970’s 
until 1982, the oil boom era (see table 1.1.1), much higher than the 2.7% average 
growth rate of the industrial countries over the same period. Relative political 
stability and an institutional commitment by the Government to pursue balanced 
budgets allowed for rapid economic growth along with substantial social gains. For
1 World Bank estimate (World Bank, World Development Report 1996).
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instance, poverty incidence, that is the proportion of population living below the 
poverty line, declined from 60% in the early 1970’s to 14% in 1996 and life 
expectancy rose from 47.6 years in 1970 to 60.2 years in 19922.
The oil price shock of 1982-84 coupled with the world recession3 inaugurated 
a period of slower growth, with GDP growing at an average annual 3.6%, and of 
accumulating external debt, with the debt ratio to GDP rising from 26.8% in 1980 to 
52.2% in 1990. The oil price crisis highlighted the existence of some structural 
problems. Indonesia was very dependent on oil revenues and the debt burden was 
amplified by international currency fluctuations. The Indonesian government 
voluntarily undertook a package of adjustment policies, with the adoption of 
successive economic plans, Repelita 3 and 4, starting from 1984. A series of 
macroeconomic measures, such as budget retrenchment, tax reforms and banking 
sector deregulation, resulted in financial stability, limited external imbalances and 
positive growth rates. Most importantly, the restructuring of the economy reduced the 
dependency from oil revenues. Although the debt service was high, with a peak of 
40.2% of the debt service ratio to exports in 1988, the adoption of sound policies and 
of prudent borrowing strategies allowed Indonesia to still receive strong financial 
support from official agencies on concessional terms. Moreover, foreign reserves and 
commercial bank credit lines were still widely available. These factors ensured 
Indonesia was not ranked within the group of highly indebted countries with credit 
access problems.
2 Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1996 and World Tables, various issues.
’ The average growth rate in the industrial countries between 1983 and 1992 was 2.8%.
17
Thanks to the government ability to respond quickly to adverse external 
shocks, Indonesia is now included by the World Bank among the ‘East Asian miracle 
economies’4. The pattern of Indonesian economic growth is illustrated in the graph 
below: the early 1960’s economic uncertainty, the rapid expansion of the oil boom 
era and the recovery after the 1982-84 oil price shock.
Graph 1.1.1. Real GDP Growth 1961-1993. (Percentages)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
Table 1.1.1 offers an international perspective on Indonesia's performance in 
comparison with Mexico, Nigeria, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Mexico and 
Nigeria have been selected because they are, like Indonesia, two large oil-exporting 
developing countries. The other comparator countries, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand, have been chosen in order to offer a comparison with three neighbouring 
emerging South-East Asian countries.
While during the oil boom (1973-83) inflation in the three oil-exporting 
countries has been of a comparable level, in the subsequent period Indonesia
4 See World Bank, (1993), The East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press.
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experienced much lower inflation than Mexico and Nigeria. However, despite 
Indonesia’s success in stopping the early 1960’s hyperinflation, the persistence of 
chronic inflation compares Indonesia less favourably with the other Asian countries 
selected here.
Table 1.1.1. Comparative Macroeconomic Indicators.
Indonesia Mexico Nieeria Philippines Thailand Malaysia
Inflation % 
1972-82 17.9 18.3 15.4 13.7 10.6 6.7
1983-92 8.6 66.3 25.7 15.1 3.6 2.6
GNP per capita “ 
1970 80 730 170 220 210 390
1980 470 2460 1100 650 670 1690
1992 670 3470 320 770 1840 2790
Real Growth % 
1970-82 6.8 4.0 3.3 2.3 2.9 5.3
1983-92 3.4 -0.5 -2.3 -0.8 6.4 4.0
GDP Real Growth 
1970-82 7.5 6.1 4.5 5.4 6.8 7.7
1983-92 5.7 1.7 3.2 2.5 8.6 6.5
Exports/GDP % 
1970 13 6.2 8.9 21.5 15 41.9
1980 33 11.1 29.1 23.6 24.2 57.6
1992 29.3 12.6 39.1 29 35.7 78.4
F uel E x p o r ts /E x p o r t %
1980
1992
Terms of Trade b 
1970
71.7
33.4
46.6
66.9
29.8
147.8
93.1
95.8
43.6 175.6 172.2 139.3
1980 142.9 136.6 186 101.7 123.1 134.7
1992 92 119.5 84.5 104.7 91.2 94.3
Debt/GDP % 
1970 35 18.3 6.4 32.8 13 11.9
1980 26.8 29.5 9.6 53.5 25.8 26.9
1992 66.8 34.5 101.3 61.9 35.7 34.4
D eb t S e rv lc e /E x p o r t %
1992 32 44 29 28 14 n.a.
Life Expectancy' 
1970 47.4 61.9 41.2 57.2 58.4 61.6
1992 60.2 70.3 51.8 65.8 69.3 70.8
Sources: World Bank, World Tables, various issues and IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
various issues.
a: GNP per capita Atlas method, as calculated from the World Bank, 
b: 1987=100; US dollar based, 
c: Life expectancy at birth, years.
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GNP per capita is consistently lower in Indonesia than in the other countries, 
with the exception of Nigeria in 1992) during the period considered. However, it has 
grown at the highest rate during the oil boom and at a respectable 3.4% in the 
subsequent period. The fall in GNP per capita after the oil boom in Mexico and in 
Nigeria is a good indicator of the comparatively better management of the oil 
bonanza in Indonesia5. Real GDP growth rate figures show the good performance of 
Indonesia especially in comparison with Nigeria and Mexico after the oil boom.
Trade indicators demonstrate how the Indonesian economy shifted to non-fuel 
exports and maintained competitiveness in international trade despite the oil price 
fall of the 1980’s, contrary to what happened in Nigeria. Malaysia, however, stands 
as a threatening strong competitor, with a ratio of export to GDP of 78.4% in 1992.
As for debt indicators, these are a cause for worry not only for Indonesia, but 
also for Mexico, Nigeria and the Philippines. Nevertheless, two features of 
Indonesian external debt composition are noteworthy: the low proportion of short 
term borrowing, never exceeding 13.2% of total debt during the 1980’s, and the high 
proportion of debt on concessional terms, ranging between 36.4% and 26.9% of total 
debt throughout the 1980’s. These features coupled with high levels of exports, 
which provide readily available foreign exchange to service the debt, have helped 
Indonesia in its debt management in contrast to Mexico, which suffered a major debt 
crisis in 1982, and Nigeria, which faced strong threats of debt rescheduling after the 
1982-84 oil price shock.
5 For an interesting comparative study between Indonesia and Nigeria see Pinto (1987).
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Finally, all the countries experienced a rise in life expectancy at birth, which 
is a positive social achievement. Once again Nigeria has experienced the lowest 
improvement.
As a conclusion, Indonesia has performed well by almost all indicators. 
During the oil boom, the comparison with Mexico and Nigeria show similar 
achievements. In the next sub-period, Indonesia moved towards new strategies for 
development with results comparable to those of its neighbouring emerging Asian 
countries.
The Indonesian experience makes it an interesting case study. In particular, 
we will focus on fiscal and exchange rate policies in order to provide background 
information for the studies presented in the subsequent chapters. However, it is 
beyond the scope of the whole thesis to provide a comprehensive and detailed history 
of the Indonesian economy6.
1.2. From Chaos to the New Order: 1960-1965.
Following a bitter war for independence, in December 1949, nationalist and 
anti-colonialist feelings shaped policy regimes towards increasing interventionism 
and inward-oriented options. In 1958 President Soekarno inaugurated a period of 
“Guided Democracy and Guided Economy”, characterised by centralised power, 
direct state control on trade and production and extensive programs of nationalisation
6 There is a rich literature on the Indonesian economy written in English. The following references 
give excellent insights and information on the Indonesian performance during the past decades: 
Ahmed (1989 and 1993), Booth (1988 and 1992), Gillis (1984), Gillis and Dapice (1988), Hill (1996), 
McLeod (1997), Sabirin (1993), Thorbecke (1991 and 1992), Warr (1986 and 1992), Woo and 
Nasution (1989), Woo, Glassburner and Nasution (1994), World Bank (1993).
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of Dutch enterprises. A complex multiple exchange rate system was enforced, 
coupled with various trade restrictions and capital controls. Apart from the many 
changes in the naming, the following basic devices were incorporated: basic selling 
and buying exchange rates, a tax on exchange receipts, the export inducement 
certificate7 and taxes on foreign exchange sales. In addition, the official main 
exchange rate was fixed8. During the period 1960 to 1965 the combination of 
accelerating inflation, which peaked 635% in 1965 (see also table 1.3.3 and graph 
1.3.1.), increasing monetised government deficit (see graph 1.4.2.) and foreign debt9, 
unrealistic and overvalued multiple exchange rates, dwindling foreign exchange 
reserves, restrictive trade regulations and a shrinking export sector resulted in 
economic turmoil. The situation was further aggravated by the military confrontation 
with Malaysia, which had started in the early 1960s. By 1965 widespread political 
and social unrest resulted in a civil war and a coup attempt by the communists. The 
year 1965 marked the fall of Soekamo’s leadership and inaugurated the Soeharto’s 
era.
1.3. The Stabilisation Period: 1966-1972.
The new President, General Soeharto, inherited a chaotic economic situation 
plagued by hyperinflation and stagnant economic growth. Political and economic
7 Export inducement certificates were related to the issue of export certificates which could be then 
sold to importers to pay for their foreign exchange.
* Kanesa-Thasan (1966) argues that the effectiveness of the Indonesian multiple exchange rate system 
was also influenced by exogenous factors, such as the deterioration of Indonesia’s terms of trade.
9 Indonesia defaulted its foreign debt in 1965.
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stability were quickly restored thanks to an outward-oriented policy regime and the 
balanced budget law (enforced in 1967)10. Moreover, debt rescheduling and generous 
official assistance plans offered by international organisations and Western countries 
enabled the New Order government to overcome the debt crisis and to stimulate 
investment and growth. The table below shows the rapid increase of GDP growth 
from 0% in 1965 to 10.7% in 1972, following an erratic pattern in the early 1960’s. 
Table 1.3.1. Real Growth 1961-1972. (Percentages)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
T i  23  3 3  T9 0 0  23  2 3  ~ \  6 3  7 3  6 3  10.7
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
In order to manage the large fiscal deficits of the hyperinflation years, austere 
public expenditure measures were adopted, such as controlling current expenditure, 
halting the construction of government buildings and of various public propaganda 
industrial projects inherited from previous governments and reducing price subsidies 
to state enterprises. Despite the cuts in public investment, the larger weight of fiscal 
austerity fell on routine expenditure. As a matter of fact, the proportion of current 
expenditure on total government expenditure rapidly declined from 87% in 1968 to 
59% in 1972 to favour development expenditure. On the revenue side, domestic tax 
collection was intensified, after the dramatic fall in the tax ratio of the preceding 
years (from 13.7% of GDP in 1960 to 4.2% of GDP in 1966). These efforts led to a 
steady rise in the tax ratio from 7.2% in 1968 to 13% in 1972, as illustrated in graph 
1.4.2. Foreign aid rapidly became an important source for government financing.
10 Hal Hill (1996) correctly argues that the balanced budget rule is a fiction in economic terms. A 
slogan central to the New Order’s economic policy, the balanced budget law, simply dictates the balance 
between expenditures and revenues. Note, however, that aid and foreign borrowing are counted as 
revenues, although they actually finance the deficit.
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Prior to 1966, the extreme nationalism of Soekamo’s regime had strongly opposed 
any interference of the Rest of the World in the Indonesian economy". The 
underlying assumption was that there was an ‘Indonesian Economics’ which was 
unique and “defied the rules of conventional economics”* 12 13. The implication for 
foreign inflows had been prohibition or tight controls, which resulted in very limited 
foreign savings11. Table 1.3.2 shows the importance of aid for government finances 
during the pre-boom adjustment period (see also graph 1.4.1).
Table 1.3.2. Aid Inflows Ratio to Total Government Revenues 1967-197214. 
(Percentages)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
29A  Hf9 27~2 2T2 26j0 24~i
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
Thanks to the control over the budget deficit, which had been the major cause 
for the early 1960’s triple digit inflation, the government managed to quickly slow 
down inflation from 112.2% in 1967 to a low 4.4% in 1971, as illustrated in the 
graph and table below.
" An example of this attitude is the withdrawal of Indonesian from the International Finance 
Corporation in 1961. Indonesia rejoined the 1FC in 1968. Also, Indonesia joined the Asian 
Development Bank only in 1966 and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1967.
12 Gillis (1984). p.240.
13 The late Soekarno is known to have told Western countries “to go to hell with your aid” (Hill, 1996, 
pp.78-79).
14 Data refer to fiscal year data. This coincided with solar year for 1967 and 1968. Afterwards fiscal 
year begins 1st April. For the transition period January-March 1969 the aid ratio is 22%.
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Graph 1.3.1. Inflation 1961-1972. (Percentages)
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
Table 1.3.3. Inflation 1961-1972. (Percentages)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
95l 155.9 128.8 135.3 594.5 635.4 112.2 84.8 YhA ¡2~3 4A 6.4
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
Foreign exchange policy was set to reinforce the pro-export stance of the New 
Order and encourage foreign investment. Soeharto’s first foreign exchange 
intervention was an immediate large devaluation of the rupiah in 1965. Within three 
years the official main rupiah/dollar rate changed from .045 to 32615. A major reform 
of the exchange rate system took place between 1968 and 1971, during which the
15 It should be noted that in 1965 the new rupiah was introduced. The value of one new rupiah was set 
equal to 1,000 old rupiahs, so that the devaluation was actually from 45 old rupiahs to 326 new 
rupiahs.
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government gradually simplified the system and unified the exchange rates. In 
particular, in 1968 the import licensing system16 was abolished and trade and 
incentive regimes were subject to reforms, although tariffs remained largely 
unchanged. In 1969 the Indonesian rupiah became freely convertible and in 1971 
government controls on capital movements into and out of the country were 
practically abolished, except for some limitations on direct and portfolio investments 
through the domestic capital market.
At this stage of the foreign exchange deregulation process, two features are 
noteworthy. First, a degree of exchange restrictions were still enforced on the current 
account: exporters had to sell their foreign exchange export earnings to the banks, 
which in turn had to sell their foreign exchange to the central bank. Bank Indonesia. 
Secondly, capital account liberalisation had been implemented and capital into and 
out of the country was freely transferable. This departure from ‘conventional 
wisdom’17 in the policy sequencing of foreign exchange liberalisation, that is first 
current account and then capital account liberalisation, was motivated by the 
magnitude of the initial tightness and imbalance of the system. Also, domestic 
interest rate adjustment and inflation control were part of a comprehensive policy 
strategy, which included strict fiscal discipline, and help explain the Indonesian 
policy sequencing experience18.
16 Import licensing was a cause for great uncertainty for those domestic producers who used imported 
intermediate inputs. The importation of inputs was subject to an application with the authorities for 
buying the necessary foreign exchange. Foreign exchange controls could thus mean long waiting 
periods and even the rejection of the application. As a result the production was adversely affected.
17 See World Bank (1993), p.238.
18 For more details on capital account liberalisation in Indonesia see Sabirin (1993).
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1.4. The Oil Boom: 1973-1981.
The dramatic surge in oil prices inaugurated the oil boom era (1973-1981). The 
quadrupling of the price of oil in 1973 resulted in an unexpected and growing source of 
revenues for the government. In fact, oil revenues had started to rise since the late 
1960’s. In 1967 the ratio of oil revenues to total government revenues was 8% and 
grew subsequently to 14.8% in 1970, 20% in 1971 and 26.6% in 1972. A sudden jump 
in the absolute and relative importance of oil revenues occurred during the oil boom, 
from 1973 onwards, with peaks in 1974 and 1981, as shown in the table below and in 
graph 1.4.1. The side effects of this increasing reliance on oil revenues were on the one 
hand a fall in aid inflows and in the dependence on them, and on the other hand a 
decline in the efforts to intensify non-oil tax collection.
Table 1.4.1. Composition of Total Government Revenues: Oil Revenues, Aid 
Inflows and Non-Oil Tax Revenues (NOTR) Ratios to Total Government 
Revenues 1973-198119. (Percentages)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Oil 29.4 49.0 45.7 43.9 45.2 43.6 52.7 59.9 61.7
Aid 17.4 11.7 18.0 21.2 17.9 19.5 17.1 12.7 12.2
NOTR 53.2 39.3 36.3 34.9 36.9 36.9 30.2 27.4 26.1
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
Graph 1.4.1 illustrates the revenue structure of the Indonesian central 
government. The rising and large oil revenue ratio can be observed in contrast to a 
declining share of non-oil tax revenues during the oil boom era. This trend is visibly 
reversed in subsequent years (1983-1993). 19
19 Figures refer to fiscal year beginning 1st April.
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Graph 1.4.1. Revenue Structure: Aid Inflows, Oil Revenues and Non-Oil Tax
Revenues (NOTR) Ratios to Total Government Revenues 1960-93. (Percentages)
A id ;--------- Oil: ------------  NOTR:
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
The oil bonanza also fuelled the increase in the size of the government sector. A 
growing proportion of public expenditure, and especially of development projects, 
ended up being financed from oil revenues instead of from aid inflows. Between 1966 
and 1974, real government expenditure doubled, their ratio to GDP increasing from 
9.3% to 15.6%. This trend continued during the oil boom era: the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP ranged between a low 15.6% in 1973 and a peak 23% in 1981 (see 
graph below).
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Graph 1.4.2. Government Expenditures and Revenues Ratios to GDP 1960-93.
(Percentages)20
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
In addition, the decline in the ratio of current expenditure to total public 
expenditure, experienced in the early years of Soeharto’s government, continued 
throughout the oil boom period, from 62% in 1973 to 51% in 1981. This reflects the 
increasing concern of policy makers to investing in physical infrastructures, education, 
agricultural development and capital intensive industry. Notably, this did not result in 
fiscal imbalances due to the high compensating revenues and to the above mentioned 
balanced budget rule. The following graph illustrates how real government 
expenditures and revenues moved closely together throughout the oil boom. 20
20 Figures are proportionately adjusted for solar year.
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Graph 1.4.3. Real Government Expenditures and Revenues 1960-93. (Billion
Rupiahs at 1985 Prices)21
Despite its size, however, the government sector grew less rapidly after the 
Pertamina crisis, as can be seen in the table below.
Table 1.4.2. Government Expenditure Real Growth 1973-83. (Percentages)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
72/7 u ! 6 297 14~9 0 9  74 7 4  iTo 2L6 ^ 8  7)7
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
Pertamina, a large oil state company, incurred in a serious debt crisis in 1975 
following a series of scandals related to corruption episodes, an endemic plague of the 
Indonesian public sector. Pertamina defaulted its debt on the 20th of February 1975, the 
size of its debt being equal to about one third of GDP. Given the company’s 21
21 Figures are proportionately adjusted for solar year.
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involvement in the international credit market, not only was the government forced to 
assume the responsibility of Pertamina’s debt covering, but also state-owned 
enterprises were denied access to the international credit market. Nevertheless, as 
argued in Woo and Nasution (1989), this was a “blessing in disguise”. The government 
adopted a more cautious external debt strategy, which prevented excessive borrowing 
and debt crises in subsequent periods. Moreover, the commitment to the balanced 
budget rule and to the rescue of Pertamina imposed a tighter discipline on the 
expenditure side, on monetary policy and on budget transparency22.
As for foreign exchange policy measures, the shortage of international 
reserves23, an acceleration of inflation, the poor infrastructure of the economy, coupled 
with uncertainty over future trends and increasing instability in the rest of the world 
were among the determinants of the 10% devaluation in 1971.
Following the oil boom of 1973 Indonesia appeared to suffer from the Dutch 
Disease syndrome. While the oil sector was booming the performance of the non-oil- 
non-gas sector did not match the rapid growth of the whole economy (see next 
subsection). Moreover, the quadrupling of the price of oil, the subsequent rise in 
government revenues, combined with an accommodating monetary policy led to 
increasing inflationary pressures (see table 1.4.3. and graph below).
22 Pertamina’s operations were recorded off-budget.
23 Net official foreign exchange reserves, defined as official short-term assets less official short-term 
liabilities, had been negative since 1963 through 1971.
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Graph 1.4.4. Inflation 1972-1993. (Percentages)
I n r i s .
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
Concurrent causes of the resurgence of double digit inflation (31% in 1973 and 
40.6% in 1974) are a rice price crisis in 197224 and rising international inflation. Given 
a fixed nominal exchange rate, this caused a real exchange appreciation. The 
government became increasingly concerned about the loss of competitiveness of the 
non-oil-non-gas sector caused by an excessive reliance on the oil sector. Despite a 
healthy balance of payments and adequate international reserves the rupiah was 
‘surprisingly’ devalued in 1978 by almost 50% to help restructure the economy. 
Following this devaluation, manufactured exports rose sharply and international 
competitiveness was restored, even in the presence of inflation25. Part of the success of
24 Rice prices doubled within 5 months in 1972.
25 Warr (1992), however, argues that the impact of the 1978 devaluation on relative prices was smaller 
than the adverse effect of the oil boom on them in the preceding years. The devaluation was intended 
to offset, at least partly, the decline in relative prices brought on by the oil boom, but was subsequently 
slowly dissipated.
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this devaluation episode was also due to the government’s cautious management, as it 
coupled the devaluation with prudent fiscal and monetary behaviour in the years 
immediately preceding the devaluation.
Table 1.4.3 shows the persistence of chronic inflation and the spectacular 
growth of the Indonesian economy, which averaged 7.7% during the oil boom. It also 
illustrates how the easy monetary policy of the early 1970’s was interrupted by the 
Pertamina crisis in 1975. Money growth slowed down from 40.5% in 1974 to 24.3% in 
1978, the 40% devaluation year.
Table 1.4.3. Inflation, Money Growth (Ml) and Real Growth 1973-81. 
(Percentages)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Inflation 31.0 40.6 19.1 19.8 11.0 8.1 20.6 18.5 12.2
Money 42.4 40.5 33.0 28.8 25.3 24.3 35.8 48.3 29.2
Growth 11.4 6.8 5.6 6.5 8.8 8.4 5.8 8.5 7.2
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
1.4.1. Structural Change.
Following the 1973 oil boom the Indonesian economy experienced rapid 
growth and a series of structural changes. The direction of growth of the sectors’ 
contribution to GDP formation became an important issue for policy makers. From a 
long term perspective, the expansion of the oil sector at the expenses of a shrinking 
non-oil sector was not deemed desirable, since it would weaken the economy and lead 
to increased dependence on oil-price fluctuations. This issue is related to the Dutch 
Disease effect of a booming sector.
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The composite non-tradable biased structural adjustment of the economy is 
termed Dutch Disease26. Dutch Disease need not be necessarily brought on by a 
commodity boom. Capital inflows, and in particular aid, may also induce a real 
appreciation in the exchange rate. As they add to the recipient country’s spending 
capacity, spending and resource movement effects may happen. Therefore, pressure on 
the non-tradable sector to expand at the expenses of the tradable sector may emerge.
Table 1.4.1.1 and graph 1.4.1.1 illustrate the pattern of structural changes in the 
Indonesian economy. During oil boom era the agricultural share in GDP declined 
particularly quickly, despite rapid growth of agricultural output and intensive public 
investment in agriculture, and this trend continued through the following years, albeit at 
a slower pace. The increasing weight of the oil industry, the decline of the relative price 
of agricultural output, the slowdown of the land expansion frontier and of its cropping 
intensity may help explain this decline. Martin and Warr (1993) emphasise supply side 
factors such as capital accumulation and rapid technological change. The highly 
successful ‘green revolution’ backed by Soeharto’s New Order government27 since 
1966 promoted agricultural modernisation and increased yields and production. By 
stimulating technological change and capital accumulation, this resulted in pulling out 
labour from the agricultural sector and pushing it into other economic sectors. As a 
result, the decline in the agricultural sector compared to other sectors is the 
consequence of Indonesia’s overall economic development.
26 There is an extensive literature on Dutch Disease. Among the most authoritative studies we should 
mention Corden (1984), Corden and Neary (1982), Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1986) and Van 
Wijnbergen (1984 and 1986a).
27 Soheharto is keen on reminding his peasant origin (Hill, 1996, pp. 130-131).
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The contribution of service sector to GDP fluctuated during the oil boom era, 
and this is probably a reflection of the absolute and relative importance of the oil sector. 
However, its share is high and seems to follow a growing trend in the period following 
the oil boom.
The relative importance of the industrial sector (which includes mining, 
manufacturing, constructions and other industrial activities, both in the tradable and in 
the non-tradable sectors) exhibit a mixed trend, being strongly influenced by the 
weight of the mining sector and thus by oil price fluctuations. Therefore, it is useful to 
consider the behaviour of the manufacturing sector as more indicative of the industrial 
development of the Indonesian non-oil economy. This sector experienced a steady 
growth in its contribution GDP formation. However, figures on the manufacturing 
sector are not informative as for the size and trends of the tradable and the non-tradable 
sectors, since both are included in it28.
Table 1.4.1.1. Sectoral Growth. Growth Rates of Agricultural, Industrial, 
Manufacturing and Services Shares on GDP 1971-83. (Percentages)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Agriculture -0.9 -4.6 0.6 -3.6 -4.7 -2.0 -7.1 -2.5 0.7 -1.1 -2.6 1.5 -6.4
Industry -2.6 14.1 12.1 -0.8 -4.0 5.8 3.9 -4.0 -2.1 -0.3 -2.1 -7.4 6.2
Manufactures -3.4 8.9 6.5 7.7 5.7 2.7 5.3 7.5 10.5 13.7 0.9 0.9 14.5
Services 3.2 -7.5 -12.6
00 9.9 -4.2 1.9 6.7 2.0 1.1 3.9 7.2 -2.0
Source: World Bank, World Tables, various issues.
28 Complete time series data on the size and growth of the tradable and non-tradable sectors in 
Indonesia are not available.
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Graph 1.4.1.1. Structural Change. AGR: Agriculture Value Added to GDP; 
IND: Industry Value Added to GDP; MAN : Manufactures Value Added to 
GDP; SER: Services Value Added to GDP 1970-92. (Percentages)
O C R  s __________  I N »  s __________  N AN ■ ....................  S E R  s
Source: World Bank, World Tables, various issues.
In fact, the manufactures sector expansion was not accompanied by a matching 
rapid growth in manufactures exports. As mentioned above, the overvaluation of the 
real exchange rate damaged the competitiveness of Indonesian exports (see graph 
1.4.1.2). Figures in table 1.4.1.2 indicate the persistent low proportion in manufactures 
export in total exports and a decline in the non-oil-non-gas exports ratio29.
Table I.4.I.2. Composition of Exports. Manufactures Exports, Non-Oil-Non- 
Gas Exports (NONG) and Oil-Gas Exports Ratios to Total Exports 1971-83. 
(Percentages)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Manufactures 1.8 2.1 2.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 3.1 2.4 3.3 3.9 7.7
NONG 60.2 48.2 50.0 29.9 25.2 29.3 32.0 31.2 34.5 28.0 20.3 17.8 23.8
Oil-Gas 39.8 31.8 50.0 70.1 74.8 70.7 68.0 68.8 65.5 72.0 79.7 82.2 76.2
Source: World Bank, World Tables, various issues.
29 Non-oil exports include manufactures exports.
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Graph 1.4.1.2 illustrates the behaviour of the terms of trade and of the real oil 
price (unit value of oil exports deflated by import unit value price). The three marked 
jumps in Indonesian competitiveness in 1973, 1979 and 1984 are clearly associated 
with the oil price shocks. Given the large share of oil exports in total Indonesian 
exports during the oil boom era it is not surprising that the real oil price and the terms 
of trade moved so closely together. After the sharp decline in the oil price of 1982-84 
the terms of trade reflect rising manufactures exports so that the correlation with the oil 
price is less tight.
Graph I.4.I.2. Terms of Trade (TOT) and Real Oil Price 1960-93. (Index 
Numbers 1985=100)
TOT:---------  Oil Price:------
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues and 
World Bank, World Tables, various issues.
Academics generally agree that Indonesia suffered from an oil induced Dutch 
Disease; however, there is not consensus on its interpretation. In their analysis of 
Indonesia, Woo and Nasution (1989) emphasise the oil induced nature of the Dutch
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Disease. The oil sector is an enclave high capital intensive export sector with very 
limited linkages with the rest of the economy. Its growth was coupled with a nominal 
exchange rate fixed at 415 rupiahs per dollar and with inflationary resurgence. This 
caused a real exchange appreciation and thus loss of competitiveness, as illustrated in 
graph 1.4.1.2. As a result, the reallocation of resources, especially labour, among the 
economy penalised the tradable sector, particularly the labour intensive agricultural 
export sector. In contrast, non-tradable industries, benefited from the squeeze of the 
tradable sector. An indicator of the poor tradable performance was the deteriorating 
performance of non-oil exports relative to Malaysia and Thailand. During the period 
1973-78 annual growth rates were respectively 32% and 20%, compared to the 
Indonesian rate of 16%. The immediate acceleration in growth of non-oil exports after 
the 1978 devaluation is finally deployed as a proof of the Dutch Disease.
The focus on employment and resource shifting is made clear in Van 
Wijnbergen (1984). He develops a Swan-Salter type model to show that the oil bonanza 
benefited neither the tradable sector (i.e. Dutch Disease occurred) nor employment in 
the whole economy in countries such as Indonesia, United Kingdom, Egypt and Latin 
American oil-exporting countries. Excess demand for non-tradables resulted in real 
appreciation and in a subsequent draining out of resources from the tradable sector into 
the non-tradable one.
Usui (1996) also agrees on the timing of the 1978 devaluation. In his 
simulation exercise he shows how instrumental the devaluation has been in increasing 
manufacturing production, via a reversal of real exchange rate (RER) behaviour. He 
argues that without this devaluation the manufacturing sector would have seriously 
suffered from an overvalued RER. The government responded to the oil boom with a
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devaluation and budget surplus accumulation. These macroeconomic policy measures 
are deemed appropriate to contain and eventually avoid the Dutch Disease.
A critical voice comes from Warr (1986), who not only finds little evidence for 
the Dutch Disease syndrome in Indonesia, but also argues that the Dutch Disease was 
benign, a mild disease with some positive side effects. He emphasises the growth in 
size of the government sector and a monetary expansion at a greater rate than the real 
GDP growth. Coupled with the fixed exchange rate, this led to inflation and 
consequently to a decline in the tradable/non-tradable ratio. In the absence of the oil 
boom, massive balance of payments deficits and increasing foreign debt would have 
occurred. As a consequence, a devaluation should have been inevitable as early as in 
1975. In fact, the oil boom enabled the authorities to defer devaluation and to absorb 
petroleum revenues. Unlike other oil-exporting countries, Indonesia did not borrow 
heavily and avoided the worst problems of LCDs debt crisis in the early 1980’s. An 
explanation for this appears to be a more prudent attitude to borrowing of the 
government sector induced by the Pertamina Crisis in 1975. The unsuspected benefit of 
the imprudent borrowing and financial adventurous behaviour of Pertamina was to 
restrain borrowing abroad in the following years. In addition, Warr argues that 
manufacturing output continued to grow albeit at a slower pace, probably induced by 
the oil price shock. He thus admits that the expansion of the manufacturing sector was 
not dramatic, especially in comparison to other Asian countries. Moreover, the 
expansion of the government sector fell mainly on public investment, rather than on 
public consumption. Sensible public investment did not result in the waste of oil 
revenues.
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An interesting sectoral analysis is presented in Farmandesh (1991). In his study 
he compares the experience of Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria and Venezuela 
following the oil boom. He shows that in all cases it was the agriculture sector which 
suffered most, while both the non-tradable and the manufacturing sector expanded.
Pinto (1987) develops an interesting comparison with the Nigerian experience. 
The two countries were both heavily dependent on agriculture and primary sectors 
during the oil boom. He argues that Indonesia was more successful than Nigeria in 
avoiding serious economic disruption in the agricultural sector. Moreover, Indonesian 
exchange rate policy, market oriented strategy and conservative fiscal policy have 
successfully helped the country in the post-oil- boom adjustment period when 
compared with Nigeria30.
Other comparative analysis are offered in Gelb (1986)31 and Sherr (1989). Gelb 
stresses Indonesian success in strengthening non-oil sectors and in expanding national 
control over the economy when compared to most oil-exporting countries. Sherr 
compares agriculture performance in Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria and shows 
vulnerability of this sector to a Dutch Disease type of effect32.
30 For additional insights to policy responses to the oil price shocks and to debt management in 
Indonesia and Nigeria see Nyatepe-Coo (1993).
31 Another study by Gelb (1983) develops a multisector computable general equilibrium model to 
assess the oil windfalls consequences for and Indonesia-like economy. Comparative statics simulations 
show that consumers will gain from the oil boom. Distributional effects and domestic oil price policy 
are also analysed.
32 It is worth mentioning the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis by Benjamin et al. 
(1989) for the case of Cameroon. This alternative methodology is extremely powerful for the study of 
the sectoral impact of external (or even internal) shocks. In this paper, simulation of a CGE model 
demonstrates once again how the agricultural sector is the most likely to be hurt from an oil boom, 
whereas some of the manufacturing sector would benefit.
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1.5. Adjusting to External Shocks: 1982-1989.
The fourth devaluation in March 1983 followed the world recession of the early 
1980’s, which caused a deterioration of the trade balance, due to rising oil export 
values, but declining non-oil exports, partly because of the drop in world demand and 
partly because of loss of Indonesian competitiveness (see graph 1.4.1.2). International 
reserves fell and the government was left with no choice, but for a new devaluation of 
over 30%. In 1983 the devaluation was accompanied by a series of important policy 
measures, such as a banking sector deregulation package, a tightening of fiscal policies 
and a wide ranging tax reform. Starting from March 1984, successive five years 
economic plans33, Repelita 3 and 4, were inaugurated with the government’s 
commitment to adjustment34 and macroeconomic reforms. Essentially, the government 
adopted austere macroeconomic policies in order to achieve financial stability and 
stimulate the restructuring of the economy to reduce the dependency on oil revenues.
The banking system experienced a radical process of deregulation. This 
consisted of the following main elements: the removal of nearly all interest rate ceilings 
on state-owned banks’ deposits and loans (banks owned by the state controlled over 
80% of banks assets); the gradual reduction of state banks access to cheap funds from 
the central bank (which accounted for a large proportion of their funding); the 
dismantling of the pervasive control system on lending operations (which prior to the 
reform applied to all banks). In October 1988, the financial liberalisation process was
33 Five years economic plans, named Repelita, were first introduced in 1968.
34 Notably, the government underwent this adjustment program voluntarily.
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further enhanced by the removal of institutional and bureaucratic obstacles to 
competition in the banking industry, which had been previously closed to new entrant 
banks. Procedures for branch openings and foreign exchange and joint ventures 
licensing were simplified. As a result, competition among banks became tighter and 
fund mobilisation larger.
As for fiscal policy, budget retrenchment meant strict controls over government 
expenditure principally through a rescheduling, and deferring, of large capital and 
import intensive public investment projects and a curtailing of non-concessional 
import-related credits. Graph 1.5.1 illustrates the gradual decline in the weight of 
government investment on total investment since 1982 as opposed to its rising trend 
during the oil boom.
Graph 1.5.1. Composition of Investment 1960-93. (Percentages)
Private Investment:--------------
Sources: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues and IMF, 
and International Financial statistics, various issues.
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The tax system underwent a radical transformation aimed at reducing oil- 
revenues dependence and income tax evasion. In particular, the value added tax system 
replaced sales taxes, company and personal income tax rates were unified into three 
marginal rates, and land and building property taxes simplified. The results were 
successful: simplification made the tax system more enforceable and efficient and most 
importantly it became less reliant on oil tax revenues. Table 1.5.1 shows the steady 
increase in non-oil tax collection at the expenses of reduced weight of oil revenues. It 
also illustrates, however, that reliance on aid started to rise again, after the low aid 
ratios of the oil boom years (see also table 1.4.1). Despite its efforts, government 
finances still depend strongly on external sources (see also graph 1.4.1).
Table 1.5.1. Composition of Total Government Revenues: Oil Revenues, Aid 
Inflows and Non-Oil Tax Revenues (NOTR) Ratios to Total Government 
Revenues 1982-89. (Percentages)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Oil 56.9 52.0 53.8 48.8 28.9 37.3 28.9 29.5
Aid 13.5 21.2 17.9 15.6 26.3 22.8 30.3 24.7
NOTR 29.6 26.8 28.3 35.6 44.8 39.9 40.8 45.8
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
The Government managed to reduce the external imbalance, although the debt 
service was still rising, due to the upcoming maturity of existing debt. It should be 
noted that the adoption of such sound policies and of prudent borrowing strategies 
allowed Indonesia to receive strong financial support from official agencies on 
concessional terms. Moreover, foreign reserves and commercial bank credit lines were 
still widely available. These factors contributed Indonesia not being ranked within the 
group of highly indebted country with credit access problems.
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The managed float foreign exchange regime was further liberalised, as exporters 
were no longer required to sell their foreign exchange export proceeds to the banks and 
the banks in turn to resell these to the central bank. The tight control over the fiscal 
budget contributed to the success of the 1983 devaluation. As can be seen in table 1.5.2 
GDP growth rates and the weight of the manufacturing sector increased rapidly after 
1986, reverting the negative trend of the preceding two years (see also graphs 1.1.1 and 
1.4.1.1).
Table 1.5.2. Real GDP Growth and Composition of Exports. Manufactures 
Exports, Non-Oil-Non-Gas Exports (NONG) and Oil-Gas Exports Ratios to 
Total Exports 1982-89. (Percentages)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Growth -0.3 8.8 7.0 2.5 5.9 4.9 5.8 7.5
Manufactures 3.9 7.7 11.0 13.4 19.6 24.8 29.6 32.1
NONG 17.8 23.8 28.3 33.9 45.3 50.1 60.3 60.1
Oil-Gas 82.2 76.2 71.7 66.1 54.7 49.9 39.7 39.9
Sources: World Bank, World Tables, various issues and IMF, International Financial Statistics, various 
issues.
Chronic inflation of the early 1980’s was brought under control by 1985 as a 
result of a temporary slowdown in economic growth and of decelerating money 
expansion, as illustrated in the table below.
Table 1.5.3. Inflation and Money Growth (M l) 1982-89. (Percentages)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Inflation 9.5 11.8 10.5 4.7 5.8 9.2 8.0 6.4
Money 10.0 6.4 13.3 17.9 14.9 9.2 13.5 39.5
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
The 1986 devaluation of almost 30% was due to negative external shocks, i.e. 
world demand falling and the sharp decline of oil prices between 1983 and 1986 (third
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oil shock), and also to unsatisfactory performance in competitiveness. As in the 1983 
devaluation episode, short run balance of payment concerns explain the devaluation 
more than in the 1978’s case. Warr (1989) shows that short-run balance of payments 
concerns played an important role in explaining both the 1983 and the 1986 
devaluations He argues, in the context of a Swan-Salter model, that a devaluation is 
necessary whenever the tradable/non-tradable price ratio reaches an unacceptable level, 
given the key role that this price ratio has in influencing the balance of payments. This 
hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the marked decline that the calculated 
tradable/non-tradable price ratio in the Indonesian case exhibited in the years 
immediately preceding the devaluation episodes.
After 1986, in promoting non-oil export, foreign exchange policy has been 
focused on the current account. Since then, a broader nominal exchange peg, including 
the dollar, the yen and the Deutsche Mark, has been actively applied. The Government 
adopted the target of maintaining a constant real exchange rate35, as it became 
increasingly aware of the destabilising effects on business confidence of too many large 
devaluations16.
"  Ahmed (1993) argues in support of this targeting strategy: the 1986 devaluation helped the 
realignment of the real exchange rate to its equilibrium rate. A study on the behaviour of fundamentals 
affecting this equilibrium rate advocated by Ahmed will be presented in the chapter on the Real 
Exchange Rate (chapter 3).
16 The following table reports the Rupiah/Dollar nominal exchange rates from 1960 to 1993.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
.045 .045 .045 .045 .045 .045 66.9 153.7 300.1 326 362.8 391.9
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
415 415 415 415 415 415 442.1 623.1 627 631.7 661.4 909.3
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1026 t i l l 1287 1644 1686 1770 1843 1950 2030 2087 2161 2249
Source: World Bank, World Tables, various issues.
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1.6. Recent Developments: 1990 to the Present37.
The comprehensive structural adjustment reforms of the 1980’s enabled the 
Indonesian economy to successfully respond to the series of negative external shocks, 
namely oil shocks and world recession. Since the late 1980’s Indonesia has experienced 
steady growth at more than 6% per annum, as shown in the following table.
Table 1.6.1. Real Growth 1990-96. (Percentages)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth 7.2 7.1 6.4 7.3 7.5 8.2 7.8
Source: For figures from 1990 to 1993: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; for figures 
from 1994 to 1996: Bank of Indonesia, Financial Data, available on the Bank’s web site.
The record on growth since 1993 is in line with the target set off in the sixth 
Five Year Development Plan, Repelita VI, which projects an average growth rate of 
7.1% per annum for the period 1993/94 to 1998/9938. Growth has been mainly fuelled 
by the expansion of the manufacturing sector which grew at an average annual growth 
rate of 10.9% between 1985 and 1995 and is expected to grow at 11.5% per annum in 
both 1996 and 1997.
During the 1990’s the government has continued to implement the prudent 
fiscal policy of the earlier decades. The development strategy has been designed to raise 
the competitiveness of Indonesia through trade and investment deregulation while *3
37 Information on developments in the Indonesian economy in the last years, 1995-97, has been mainly 
drawn from documents available on the Internet web sites of Bank of Indonesia, Biro Pusat Statistik 
and Bappenas (National Planning Board).
3S The average projected growth rate for Repelita VI has been revised upwards in August 1995 from
6.2% to 7.1 % per annum.
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maintaining macroeconomic stability. The investment boom of the past few years 
signals the rising confidence in the business community, both domestic and foreign, in 
the economic prospects of Indonesia. In particular, investment has grown at an average 
annual rate of more than 8% between 1990 and 1995 and its gross GDP share has risen 
from 28% in 1990 to 32% in 1996 (see also graph below). Most of this dynamism is 
attributable to private investment, whose share in GDP accounted for more than 22% in
t
the past few years. In addition, foreign investment has been encouraged for the 
development of infrastructures for public utilities through a major deregulation in 1994, 
which allows foreign investors to form joint ventures in Indonesia and fully own the 
capital invested in Indonesia.
Graph 1.6.1. Public, Private and Total Investment Ratios to GDP 1960-93. 
(Percentages)
Sources: Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues and 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
in 1991, for the first time since 1969, mote than half of government total 
revenues (51.1%) came from domestic non-oil tax collection. This ratio rose to 55.3% 
in fiscal year 1992/93, reached 76% in 1996/97 and is projected to peak 87% by the end
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of Repelita VI (1999). The steady decline in the dependence from external budget 
financing (see graph 1.4.1) is the result of the government efforts to boost domestic 
revenues from the non-oil/gas sector. Despite the large direct tax cuts introduced with 
the 1995 tax reforms, which lowered tax rates on corporate and personal income, 
revenues were increased primarily by intensifying tax collection and broadening the tax 
base. On the expenditure side, the control on the budget resulted in an average annual
j»
growth of government expenditure of 3.6% over the period 1990-95, almost half than 
the corresponding 6.5% average growth rate of private consumption. Most importantly, 
the government ran rising fiscal surpluses: their ratio to GDP rose from 0.3% in 1994 to 
1.3% in 1996. Finally, the privatisation program, which includes the partial sale of 
shares in telecommunications and mining companies, has been implemented not only 
to improve efficiency but also in order to obtain resources to prepay high interest 
external debt. This strategy in reducing the debt burden will be further pursued by the 
government in the future.
Significant steps towards trade liberalisation have taken place: import tariffs are 
being gradually reduced and unified and some non-tariff barriers removed. In addition, 
the government officially committed to widening deregulation, purporting free 
international trade and undertaking a major liberalisation of foreign investment 
regulations in 1994, when President Soeharto took over the position of chairman of 
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation).
In the 1990’s, nevertheless, some macroeconomic imbalances have emerged on 
the demand side and on monetary developments. The expansion of the private sector
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r e s u lte d  in  d e m a n d  p re s su re s  le a d in g  t o  in c re a se d  d e m a n d  fo r  im p o r ts .  T h is  c a n  b e  se e n
in graphs 1.6.2 and 1.6.3.
Graph 1.6.2. Real Public, Private and Total Consumption 1960-93. (Billion 
Rupiahs at 1985 Prices)
Sources: Bank of Indonesia. Report for the Financial Year, various issues and 
IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
Graph 1.6.3. Real Exports and Imports 1960-93. (Billion Rupiahs at 1985 
Prices)
Exports---------Imports:
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
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In addition, the early 1990’s world recession, the slowdown of non-oil exports 
and the resurgence of inflation, described in the next paragraph, resulted in slow growth 
in exports in the early 1990’s, as illustrated in the following graph.
Graph 1.6.4. Export and Import Growth 1967-93. (Percentages)
Exports: ------  In p o rts : ------
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
In September 1997, the government announced a series of measures to boost 
exports including deregulation, reduction of import tariffs and direct help to exporters 
and their supporting industries. Moreover, increased sales tax on a number of luxury 
goods will be raised.
As for monetary policy, the monetary authorities have faced the dilemma of 
controlling inflation on the one hand and capital inflows (and outflows) on the other 
hand. Tight monetary policy would help curbing overheating and inflation. However, 
the induced interest rates rise would have a twofold impact: the possibility of capital 
inflows which need to be sterilised and the disincentive effect on investment. The open
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capital account and the fluctuations in international capital market of recent years have 
resulted in the difficulty for the monetary authorities to control money growth. In 
practice, the dilemma for the Indonesian government has been to reduce domestic 
interest rates low enough to stimulate investment, but not too low to induce capital 
outflow. Therefore, in order to reduce domestic interest rates39, monetary policy has 
been relatively easy in terms of liquidity expansion. As a result inflation has been close
f
to almost 10% pier annum in 1991, 1993 and 1994. Table 1.6.2 illustrates trends in 
inflation and money growth from 1990 to 1997.
Table 1.6.2. Inflation and Money Growth (Ml) 1990-97. (Percentages)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Inflation 7.8 9.4 7.5 9.2 9.2 8.6 6.5 4.1s
Money 18.4 10.6 9.3 27.9 23.3 16.1 21.7 8.1b
Source: For figures for 1990 to 1993: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; for figures 
from 1994 to 1997: Bank of Indonesia, Financial Data, available on the Bank’s web site, 
a: January to end August, b: January to end July.
McLeod (1997) argues that the government’s limited ability to control money 
growth may be ascribed to the targeting of broad money growth instead of base money. 
The government announced in December 1995 the extension of direct central bank 
controls to many financial operations in order to control the growth of monetary 
aggregates. McLeod warns about the danger of re-introducing controls and regulations 
in the banking system, which would threaten the liberalisation achieved during the past 
decade.
39 S. Sabirin (1993) suggests the financial liberalisation of the domestic sector, in 1982 and 1988, may 
have played a role in pushing interest rates up. Tighter competition among banks increased fund 
mobilisation at higher interest rates.
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In the last few years, the government targeted inflation between a range of 5% 
to 10%. The past two years show a marked decline in inflation, thanks to a tightening of 
monetary policy, including an increase in the interest rate on the Central Bank’s 
securities, and the above mentioned fiscal cautious management, which entails the 
possibility of rescheduling of government projects should budget imbalances occur in 
the future.
Despite the deceleration of inflation in the last three years, inflation is still 
higher than in most of the country’s trading partners’ and competitors (see table below). 
This places pressure on the exchange rate and on the competitiveness of the country.
Table 1.6.3. Inflation in Selected Countries 1990-96. (Percentages)
USA Japan Hong Kong Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Mexico
1990 5.4 3.1 9.7 2.6 14.1 3.4 5.9 26.7
1991 4.2 3.3 6.9 4.4 18.7 3.4 5.7 22.7
1992 3.0 1.7 9.6 4.8 8.9 2.3 4.1 15.5
1993 3.0 1.3 8.7 3.5 7.6 2.2 3.6 8.7
1994 2.6 .7 8.6 3.7 9.1 3.1 5.3 7.0
1995 2.8 -.1 9.0 3.4 8.1 1.7 5.8 n.a.
1996 2.9 .1 6.0 3.5 8.4 1.4 5.8 n.a.
Sources: For figures from 1990 to 1994: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; for
figures from 1995 to 1996: Bank of Indonesia, Financial Data, available on the Bank’s web site.
In actual facts, the rupiah has steadily depreciated against the dollar since 1990, 
from 1843 in 1990 to 2680 in 1997, and the intervention band has been widened eight 
times since 1992. Moreover, recent development in international capital markets placed 
further pressure on the rupiah. Following the strengthening of the dollar over the past 
months against the major currencies in the world, such as the yen and most European 
currencies, South-East Asian currencies, including the rupiah, the Thai baht and the
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Malaysian ringgit, experienced turmoil and dramatic depreciation. In an attempt to 
reduce speculation against the rupiah and to maintain Indonesian competitiveness in 
international markets, the government has decided to float the rupiah in August 1997.
1.7. Prospects for the Medium Run.
The development strategy of the government for the medium run is focused 
on the following key elements: reducing regional differences through decentralisation 
of development planning at a regional level; increasing the role for the private sector 
through further deregulation; continuing the globalisation policies of the 1990’s to 
boost foreign investment further; improving health and education and investing in 
human capital; and following a sustainable resource management, which protects the 
environment.
As mentioned above, growth is projected at an average 7.1% per annum by 
the end of Repelita VI (1999). Main sources of growth are expected to be high 
domestic demand on the expenditure side, while on the production side the main 
contribution will come from the manufacturing and infrastructure related sectors, 
notably telecommunications and power generation on the production side.
Foreign direct investment is projected to continue the rising trend o f the past 
few years; consequently, capital inflows should remain high and mainly destined to 
finance activities in the private sector.
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As world economic growth recovers, Indonesian non-oil exports are expected to 
increase, in response also to persistent government efforts towards trade liberalisation, 
restored competitiveness and expanded domestic capacity.
The early stages of a floating exchange rate system are generally characterised
T
by substantial fluctuations and speculation. After the floating of the rupiah in August 
1997, a challenge for the Indonesian government is represented by dealing with the 
impact of the new regime on the rupiah through sound macroeconomic policies. As 
already mentioned, the government has recently announced (September 1997) a series 
of measures, ranging from gradual reduction of interest rates and cautious loosening of 
liquidity to prudent fiscal policy management, in order to provide reduce uncertainty, 
boost confidence in the business community and support Indonesian competitiveness in 
international markets.
Finally, Indonesia’s creditworthiness is expected to improve as a result of 
high growth and of declining debt burden, given the government’s commitment to 
prepay high interest external debt with the proceeds from the privatisation program.
In sum, Indonesian prospects for the medium to long run are ones of growth 
and development, provided stable macroeconomic foundations ensure increases in 
efficiency and productivity. We conclude this overview of the Indonesian economy 
with the following statements made by Mr. Kartasasmita, the Bappenas’ chairman, 
on “the ‘vision for the 21s1 century”:
“Indonesia has come a long way over the past 25 years, and is now recognised as 
one of the East Asian “miracle” economies. However, we are still a low income developing
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country with half o f our work force employed in traditional agriculture, so we still have a 
long way to go.
By the end o f the second decade of the 21st century, we intend to become a middle 
income industrial nation, with one-third of our GDP coming from manufacturing and less 
than 10% from farming. Almost all of our young people will enjoy a senior secondary 
school education, and one-quarter of them will be able to move on to higher education. We 
aim to raise the average Indonesian income by 4 times, to approximately US$3,000 (in 
today’s dollars).
With a population approaching 260 million, our economy will be one of the largest 
in the world. Continuation of the rapid economic growth which we have experienced over 
the last decade will also create the resources needed to eliminate absolute poverty within ten 
years. We are committed to attaining these fundamental milestones in our national 
development, and we will institute policies that promote grass roots participation in order to 
ensure that the economic gains are equitably distributed.”40
40 Excerpt from Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Chairman of Bappenas, (1997), Indonesian Planning for 
Development, paper downloaded from the Bappenas web site.
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Appendix 1. Main Indonesian Data.
Table A l.l. Real Growth 1961-96, Inflation 1961-97 and Money Growth (Ml) 
1973-97. (Percentages)
Growth Inflation Money Growth Inflation Money
1961 5.1 95.2 1980 8.5 18.5 48.3
1962 2.5 155.9 1981 7.2 12.2 29.2
1963 -2.4 128.8 1982 -0.3 9.5 10.0
1964 4.9 135.3 1983 8.8 11.8 6.4
1965 0.0 594.5 1984 7.0 10.5 13.3
1966 2.3 635.4 1985 2.5 4.7 17.9
1967 2.3 112.2 1986 5.9 5.8 14.9
1968 11.1 84.8 1987 4.9 9.2 9.2
1969 6.0 17.4 1988 5.8 8.0 13.5
1970 7.3 12.3 1989 7.5 6.4 39.5
1971 6.6 4.4 1990 7.2 7.8 18.4
1972 10.7 6.4 1991 7.1 9.4 10.6
1973 11.4 31.0 42.4 1992 6.4 7.5 9.3
1974 6.8 40.6 40.5 1993 7.3 9.2 27.9
1975 5.6 19.1 33.0 1994 7.5 9.2 23.3
1976 6.5 19.8 28.8 1995 8.2 8.6 16.1
1977 8.8 11.0 25.3 1996 7.8 6.5 21.7
1978 8.4 8.1 24.3 1997 4.1* 8.1b
1979 5.8 20.6 35.8
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues; for figures from 1994 to 1997: Bank of 
Indonesia, Financial Data, available on the Bank’s web site, 
a: January to end August, b: January to end July.
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Table A1.2. Composition of Total Government Revenues: Oil Revenues, Aid 
Inflows and Non-Oil Tax Revenues (NOTR) Ratios to Total Government 
Revenues 1973-198941. (Percentages)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Oil 29.4 49.0 45.7 43.9 45.2 43.6 52.7 59.9 61.7
Aid 17.4 11.7 18.0 21.2 17.9 19.5 17.1 12.7 12.2
NOTR 53.2 39.3 36.3 34.9 36.9 36.9 30.2 27.4 26.1
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Oil 56.9 52.0 53.8 48.8 28.9 37.3 28.9 29.5
Aid 13.5 21.2 17.9 15.6 26.3 22.8 30.3 24.7
NOTR 29.6 26.8 28.3 35.6 44.8 39.9 40.8 45.8
Source: Bank of Indonesia. Report for the Financial Year, various issues.
41 Figures refer to fiscal year beginning 1st April.
57
CHAPTER 2
AID AND ITS MACROECONOMIC IMPACT.
2.1. Introduction.
Over the past decades a number of studies have been focused on the 
macroeconomic impact of aid. Not only the concept of aid itself has evolved, but also 
the identification of the macroeconomic relationships between aid and other economic 
variables has grown in many directions. Aid effectiveness can be assessed in 
relationship to a whole range of targets for the recipients’ economy. Traditionally, the 
most important indicators of the impact of aid are: the level and/or the growth rate of 
national income, its distribution, some measure of poverty alleviation.
It is worth noting that the ways in which aid effectiveness has been studied have 
not only been an evaluation of the macroeconomic impact of aid inflows from abroad, 
but also an evaluation of the microeconomic consequences of development projects.
Up to the early 1970’s the major concern was the impact of aid on growth. 
Thereafter, the savings debate flourished. An important turning point is represented by 
the seminal work of Heller (1975) which introduced the fiscal response approach. From 
the late 1970’s up to the current days various approaches have been developed: aid and 
trade (Michaely, 1981; Van Wijnbergen, 1986b; Morrissey, 1991; Lahiri and 
Raimondos, 1994), aid and allocation (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Gulhati and 
Nallari, 1988; McGillivray, 1989), aid and counterparts funds (Roemer, 1989; Bruton
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and Hill, 1990; Owens, 1991), aid tying (Levy, 1987; Jepma, 1991; Morrissey and 
White, 1993 and 1994), aid and the real exchange rate (Edwards, 1988a and 1989; 
Wood, 1988; White, 1990; White and Wignaraja, 1991 and 1992), aid and fiscal 
response (Mosley et al., 1987; Gang and Khan, 1991), among the most relevant ones. It 
is on the last two approaches that we will concentrate our attention.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2. presents an overview on aid 
related definition and measurement issues. Section 2.3. describes recent trends in aid. 
Section 2.4. offers a critical survey on issues related to the macroeconomic 
effectiveness of aid. Section 2.5 concludes and points out new research approaches.
2.2. Definition of Aid.
2.2.1. Some Preliminary Considerations.
The notion of aid represents one of those powerful concepts that stimulate an 
interdisciplinary approach and raise a spectrum of questions at different levels of 
speculation, ranging from purely practical problems to highly abstract and 
philosophical issues.
At its very heart, aid can be thought of as being the response to the needs of 
somebody1. Moral, socio-political, theoretical and economic issues arise from this 
tentative definition.1 2
1 An attempt to define aid in the broadest sense implies the need for identifying the very nature of aid.
Once there is a consensus on it, there can be a relatively solid point of reference, bearing in mind, 
though, that there is no absolute concept. What we think is the core of aid is the following reasoning: 
somebody is in need, we might give a hand.
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The motives for aid lead us to a “moral case for aid” (see Riddell, 1987, for an 
interesting exposition of these issues). Moral judgements and value rankings provide 
different frameworks for qualifying the motives for giving aid. On one extreme we find 
pure altruism, on the opposite, mere self-interest3. Political and ideological perspectives 
also play a role in assessing the moral case for aid. Critics from the left argue that the 
purpose of aid is a capitalists’ attempt to extend their power and install a neo­
colonialist international order. They also emphasise the negative impact of aid on the 
poor and on the environment. Writers from the right see aid as an instrument for 
extending and centralising the power of the state and even for offering political support 
from the donor countries. Aid is thus an obstacle to the efficacy of the free market.
The political feasibility and sustainability of aid is relevant in both donor and 
recipient countries. A donor country plagued by high unemployment rates and social 
instability may face strong internal opposition to giving aid to other countries. A 
recipient country ruled by incompetent, corrupt and extremely weak governments may 
have credibility problems and be subject to a number of conditions for receiving aid. 
Moreover, a donor country may be politically motivated to give aid for strategic 
purposes. The US huge aid flows to Israel are an example. A socio-political dimension 
of the aid issue arises also when analysing the consequences of aid in the receiving 
country. Who gains and who loses - and how we evaluates those gains and losses -,the 
international role of the receiver, the long run prospects, the poverty and equality issues 
are among the questions to be addressed in this context. *1
2 These broad categories of issues do not stand independently of each other as they overlap and 
interrelate.
1 Self-interest motivated aid is nothing but a version of a "do ut des” (“I give to be given") action.
60
All of these considerations bring us back to a more theoretical ground. In order 
to address the ex ante, interim and ex post aid case we need a framework and some 
guidelines to tell us from where to start, what to look at and what to look for. The 
theoretical debate on aid has been quite lively and has not yet reached conclusive 
answers. One of the most relevant questions concerns the effectiveness of aid. When 
talking about developing countries as receivers, the most comprehensive point of 
reference for the assessment of aid effectiveness is economic development. As pointed 
out by Meier (1989) it “involves more than economic growth. Development is taken to 
mean growth plus change”, covering both quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
receivers’ economies and societies. However, traditionally the focus has been on 
increasing growth.
The economic content of the aid debate can be thus hardly disconnected to the 
previous range of issues. To some extent, there is paradoxically no room for pure 
economics of aid.
2.2.2. An Economic Approach to Aid.
A quite broad and generally acceptable definition of aid is “a transfer of 
resources on concessional terms - on terms, that is, more generous or ‘softer’ than loans 
obtainable in the world’s capital market” (Cassen, 1986 and 1994)4. Aid can be 
classified in terms of its nature, such as more or less conditional (that is of a more or
4 For issues related to aid measurement problems refer to Riddell (1987).
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less grant-like nature), or in terms of its source, bilateral or multilateral, official or 
private.
The main official source for aid statistics, OECD publications, define the total 
flow of resources from donors to recipients as the sum of official development 
agencies, comprehensive also of grants and technical cooperation, (ODA), plus other 
official non concessional flows (OOF1), plus private sector flows. ODA flows must 
pursue a developmental objective (military assistance and private investments are thus 
excluded). The terms and conditions of the financial package have to be concessional, 
i.e. softer than the ones offered on the commercial and financial markets. They must be 
provided by governmental agencies to governments of the developing countries.
Concessionality is measured by the grant equivalent of aid flows, which is the 
amount of the ‘grant-like’ nature incorporated in the flows. The actual determination of 
grant equivalents depends on the financial terms of the loan (disaggregation by nature).
Another important characterisation of aid is the imposition of ‘ties’ and policy 
conditions to the recipient government5. Typically, aid can be tied to: i) a particular 
end-use (project tying); ii) the purchase of goods and services from the donor 
(procurement tying) or another country (partial tying); iii) the implementation of a 
specified package of reforms (conditional aid).
As for the sources of aid, the usual classification is: i) bilateral aid, if the 
transaction actors are just the donor government and the recipient government; ii) 
multilateral aid, if international organisations whose members are governments and 
multilateral development banks act as donors; iii) private flows, if aid comes from non-
, A clear exposition of the issue of aid tying is in Jepma (1991).
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governmental organisations and has the developmental and concessional nature 
mentioned above.
Finally, aid can be classified in relationship with its practical nature, so that we 
may have, for instance, project aid, commodity aid (most notably food aid), technical 
assistance.
The distinction between types of aid is relevant to our topic. As a matter of fact, 
different sorts of aid and of the conditions under which aid is given may well have 
different impacts on growth. For instance, food relief programmes have a temporary 
effect, in that they are meant to ease emergency situations.
The classification of aid is particularly important when it comes to the problems 
of fungibility of aid disbursement and of the possible crowding out/in effect. An 
exogenous inflow of resources will directly finance some development programme, but 
it may also influence indirectly the economy via a reallocation of the government’s 
spending plans and a change in the domestic system of relative prices. In other words, 
some types of aid inflows from abroad may ‘crowd out’ private investment and thus 
erode the beneficial effects of a development project.
2.3. Recent Trends in Aid Flows.
The flow of resources to developing countries has risen over the past thirty 
years from 4.6 US billion dollars in 1960 to 75.2 US$ billions in 19936. Figures for
Current prices.
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net official flows from 1960 to 1993 are presented in table 2.3.1. alongside their 
percentage composition. It can be noticed that bilateral aid has consistently 
represented the greatest proportion of total net resources although its relative weight 
has been decreasing from a high 95% in 1960 to the 61.2% figure of 1993. The 
second important component is multilateral aid which has dramatically increased its 
relative weight from a modest 4% in 1960 to 31.2% in 1993. Peaks in multilateral aid 
giving were experienced during the 1980’s, at the expenses of bilateral aid. As for the 
last component, official private grants, which do not include private foreign 
investments, their share on total flows has been relatively stable, ranging between 
9.2% in 1970 and 6.2% in 1985.
Table 2.3.1. Total Net Official Flows" to All Developing Countries. (Billion US$).
Bilateral
Aid % of Total
Multilateral
Aid %  of Total
Private
Grants
%  of Total Total
1960 4.4 95.6 0.3 4.4 n.a. n.a. 4.6
1965 6.0 88.8 0.9 11.2 n.a. n.a. 6.8
1970 7.1 72.4 1.8 18.4 0.9 9.2 9.8
1975 11.9 60.7 6.4 32.6 1.3 6.7 19.6
1980 21.7 59.1 12.6 34.3 2.4 6.6 36.7
1985 28.1 59.8 16.0 34.0 2.9 6.2 47.0
1990 46.0 61.5 23.7 31.7 5.1 6.8 74.8
1991 46.7 62.3 22.9 30.5 5.4 7.2 75.0
1992 49.4 64.6 21.1 27.6 6.0 7.8 76.5
1993 46.0 61.2 23.5 31.2 5.7 7.6 75.2
Source: OECD, DAC Development Cooperation Annual Review, various issues, 
a: Include ODA and Other Official Development Flows.
Recent trends in the regional and income distribution of ODA flows are
reported in table 2.3.2. for the early 1990’s. Over the period 1990-1994, Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa stand out as the major recipient of ODA. They both constantly
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received around one third of total ODA to all developing countries. North Africa and 
the Middle East, on the contrary, have experienced a steady decline in the absolute 
and relative amount of ODA obtained. The 1990 figure of 13.4 billion US $ fell to 
8.3 billion US $ in 1994, alongside an even more marked decline in their share on 
total ODA (from 23.5% in 1990 to 14.2% in 1994). America, Europe and Oceania’s 
receipts never exceeded 10.4 billion US $ (1993 figure) and their ratio has ranged 
between 14.3% in 1990 and the 1993 peak of 20%, without dramatic or clear trends. 
The figures for income group distribution between 1991 and 1994 are relatively 
stable in both absolute and relative terms. As expected the biggest share of ODA 
goes to Low Income Countries.
Table 2.3.2 Total Net Receipts of ODA by Region and Income Group 1990-94. 
(Billion US $)
Billions US Dollars % of Total ODA
Region Countries 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Asia 18.1 20.3 19.7 17.6 20.9 31.7 34.0 34.4 33.7 35.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 17.4 17.7 19.1 17.4 18.9 30.5 29.6 33.3 33.3 32.5
North Africa
and Middle East 13.4 12.1 9.1 6.8 8.3 23.5 20.3 15.9 13.0 14.2
America 5.3 6.0 5.6 5.6 6.1 9.3 10.0 9.8 10.7 10.5
Europe and Oceania 2.8 3.6 3.8 4.8 4.0 5.0 6.1 6.6 9.3 6.9
Total 57.0 59.7 57.3 52.2 58.2 100 100 100 100 100
LICs* 33.9 33.6 29.2 32.2 56.9 58.6 55.9 55.3
of which LLDCs* 16.0 16.6 15.1 16.2 26.8 29.0 28.9 27.8
LMICs* 13.7 13.6 14.0 15.0 22.9 23.7 26.8 25.7
UMICs* 2.3 1.8 2.4 2.3 3.8 3.1 4.6 3.9
Source: OECD, DAC Development Cooperation Annual Review, various issues.
a: LICs: Low Income Countries; LLDCs: Least Less Developed Countries; LMICs: Lower Middle
Income Countries; UMICs; Upper Middle Income Countries.
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Table 2.3.3. offers additional information on the regional distribution and the 
annual real change of net ODA receipts over the past decade and provides figures for 
the 1994 regional shares of population on total less developed countries population. 
It is worth noting the high proportion of ODA given to Sub-Saharan Africa relative to 
its population share (12%). The same can be said of North Africa and the Middle 
East. Latin America exhibit a stable trend: its share of total ODA stayed at a constant 
11%, which is also comparable to its population share (10.6% in 1994). The overall 
real growth of ODA of .5% between 1984 and 1994 masks opposite regional trends. 
Most notably, real ODA, to Southern Europe grew at a yearly 10.9%, due to rising 
aid flows to the war devastated Balkan area. On the other extreme, ODA receipts for 
North Africa and the Middle East steadily declined at an annual average rate of 4.2% 
between 1984 and 1994, as shown in the final column.
Table 2.3.3. Total Net Receipts of ODA, Share in Total Population and ODA 
Annual Real Change by Region 1983-94 (Selected Years. Percentages).
% of Total ODA Share in Total 
Population (%)
ODA Receipts 
Annual Real % 
Change
1983-84 1988-89 1993-94 1994 1984-94
Sub-Saharan Africa 30.8 39.4 36.6 12.0 2.1
Asia 29.5 32.7 30.2 69.5 1.1
Oceania 3.4 3.3 2.8 0.1 -0.6
North Africa and
Middle East 23.5 12.4 14.0 5.7 -4.2
Latin America 11.0 11.2 11.0 10.6 0.1
Southern Europe 1.8 1.1 5.3 2.1 10.9
Total 100 100 100 100 0.5
Source: OECD, DAC Development Cooperation Annual Review, 1996.
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As for Indonesia, graph 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 illustrate the trends in aid inflows for 
the 1960-93 period. Total aid inflows are here disaggregated by nature into loans and 
grants and are shown in current dollar values and as percentage of GDP. Prior to 
1965, flows were very low, as mentioned in the overview of the Indonesian economy 
(in particular, see section 1.3). A sudden increase followed the stabilisation period of 
the New Order government to help reconstruct the economy. Looking at aid ratios to 
GDP, a peak of over 6% was reached in 1971. During the oil boom the relative 
weight of aid steadily declined only to reverse the trend in the mid-1980’s. Aid 
inflows increased sharply both in absolute and relative terms between 1985 and 1989. 
Since then, flows have been fluctuating but still large. Loans have constantly 
outweighed grants, except in the 1984-86. Although the relative weight of grants on 
total aid inflows has been rising over the whole period, during the past decade, loans 
have increased more rapidly than grants.
Graph 2.3.1. Total Aid, Grants and Loans to Indonesia 1960-93. (Million US$)
Total Aid: -----------  G r a n ts --------Loans
Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution o f Financial Flows to Developing Countries, various issues.
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Graph 2.3.2. Indonesia: Total Aid, Grants and Loans Ratios to GDP 1960-93.
(Percentages)
Total A id :------------  Grants: —  L o an s :---------
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues and OECD, Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries, various issues.
2.4. The Assessment of the Macroeconomic Effectiveness of Aid.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of aid is a rather complex issue. It requires 
adequate theoretical support and conclusive evidence from empirical research. As for 
now, both the theory and the empirical research are unable to give an unambiguous 
answer to the problem of the impact of aid.
Despite the fact that aid is commonly well understood to be a transfer of 
resources from donor to recipient countries whose economies are, generally speaking, 
underdeveloped, there is not yet a clear idea of what is the role of aid for the recipients’ 
economies. The basic question “Does Aid Work?” has been central in almost all of the
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recent empirical literature. Although this question seems simple, it needs to be qualified 
according to what might be the objective of aid policies. Aid effectiveness can be 
assessed in relationship to a whole range of targets for the recipients’ economies.
Traditionally, the most important indicators of the impact of aid are: the level 
and/or the growth rate of national income7, its distribution, some measure of poverty 
alleviation, the terms of trade. The ways in which aid effectiveness has been studied 
have essentially been either an evaluation of the micro-economic consequences of 
development projects or an analysis of the macro-economic impact of aid inflows from 
abroad. An interesting perspective on the so-called ‘micro-macro paradox’ is presented 
in Mosley (1986 and 1987), the paradox being the co-existence of positive evaluations 
from the microeconomic level analyses and of ambiguous answers from the 
macroeconomic level evidence.
This section focuses on the macroeconomic analysis of aid effectiveness. Some 
of the limitations of both the theory and the empirical research will be highlighted that 
may have hampered ability to assess aid effectiveness8.
7 As pointed out in Cassen (1994), another classification of growth is also the distinction between 
‘intensive growth’ (increase in per capita income or output) and ‘extensive growth’ (absolute rise of 
national income or output).
8 An excellent survey on the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid is presented in White (1990 and 
1992a).
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2.4.1. The Theoretical Framework.
The basic theoretical framework for most of the empirical studies on aid and 
growth has been the Harrod-Domar growth model in its simplest form (see Lewis, 
1955; Rostow, 1960; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961) or in its developments, known as ‘two- 
gap’ models (Chenery and Bruno, 1962; Chenery and Strout, 1966, a commonly used 
version). A bottleneck approach characterises the whole class of the models mentioned. 
In particular, in the Harrod-Domar formulation capital shortage is the only constraint on 
growth, while the simplest version of the two-gap model identifies foreign exchange 
shortage as a further constraint on growth in addition to capital shortage.
The Harrod-Domar9 condition for equilibrium growth is derived by the 
Keynesian savings-investment equilibrium condition when put in a dynamic context. 
Savings are assumed to be a constant proportion s of real income Y, so that S = s * Y. 
The investment function is derived by assuming a constant desired capital/output ratio 
k. Entrepreneurs will increase investment to meet anticipated increases in demand if 
they expect output to grow, that is /  = k * AY . Equilibrium in the goods market 
requires that desired savings equal desired investments at each moment in time and that 
capital is fully utilised. The equilibrium condition is thus obtained by imposing I = S 
and in its simplest form is given by:
A Y/Y=s/k ,
9 It is common practice to refer to the Harrod-Domar model, even though, as it is fairly well 
understood, the model proposed by Harrod is slightly different from the one suggested by Domar. 
Both yield the same equilibrium growth condition, although they differ in the interpretation of the 
dynamics between the variables involved.
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where AY/Y is the rate of growth of national income, k is the incremental capital output 
ratio (ICOR) and s is the saving ratio. An important implication is that capital shortage 
is the main constraint on growth: growth can be raised if the saving rate - and thus the 
investment rate - is increased, or, in other words, if the capital constraint is eased.
Two-gap models include an additional constraint on growth, which stems from 
the foreign exchange equilibrium condition. Accordingly, two constraints on growth are 
identified:
1) the saving gap (S-I), where S is the domestic savings and I the domestic investment;
2) the foreign exchange gap (X-M), where X is the export earnings and M the import 
requirements.
Various combinations of the gaps and of their relative size may arise. 
According to whether the growth constraint is caused by a limited absorptive capacity 
or by a prescribed growth target, the requirement of foreign capital to fill the gaps and 
ease the bottlenecks will be determined by whichever of the two gaps is dominant. 
Foreign borrowing is thus not only intended to ease the savings-investment gap, that is 
to provide additional capital where it is scarce in order to promote growth, but also 
serves to ease foreign exchange constraint. This arises when earning from exports are 
not sufficient to finance imports from abroad and may constitute an obstacle to faster 
growth if no substitution between domestic and foreign resources exists.
A further development of the two-gap models has been recently proposed by 
L.Taylor (1990) and Bacha (1990). Here, an additional constraint on growth is 
identified in the government finance gap, namely (T-G), where T is total government 
revenues and G total government expenditure, hence the denomination ‘three-gap’
71
model. These models strictly relate to the structuralist tradition, which is particularly 
concerned with the institutional structure of developing countries economies.
The class of Harrod-Domar growth models offers in essence a Keynesian 
explanation of the growth mechanism. It has been extensively used as a basis for the 
empirical research on the impact of aid on growth. Given the condition for equilibrium 
growth - which is explicit in the Harrod-Domar model and is implicit in the two- and 
three-gaps models - the role of aid is that of an exogenous impulse to capital 
accumulation leading to higher and self-sustained growth. Its impact is therefore 
interpreted and measured in terms of its multiplier effect and in relationship with either 
the ICOR or the saving rate.
Serious limitations, however, undermine the appealing characteristics of clarity 
and structural simplicity of these models. They are simplistic: the underlying 
assumptions of a fixed coefficient production function (i.e. no substitution in 
production) and of a fixed saving rate are too rigid, hence highly unrealistic. Moreover, 
the lack of generality of this class of models becomes apparent when considering that 
they are basically one-sector growth models. No account is taken of the labour force or 
of relative price dynamics, to mention just two of the factors that affect growth besides 
capital accumulation. As a result, the growth mechanism is not really explained10 and 
the ways in which aid may interact with savings, investment and growth not clearly 
identified.
10 Too rigid a priori assumptions ‘explain’ only tautologically what is claimed to be explained as the 
outcome of a model.
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2.4.2. The Savings Debate.
In the early 1970’s, the empirical research on the relationship between aid and 
growth analysed the macroeconomic impact of aid in terms of the Harrod-Domar 
model. In this theoretical framework, savings is a crucial determinant of growth in that 
it acts as the most important channel through which growth can be affected. Hence, if 
aid affects savings this will automatically influence growth. This is the reason why this 
relationship between aid and savings has represented the main concern in the empirical 
aid growth debate of the early 1970’s. While in the 1960’s almost every researcher had 
assumed a direct proportionality between aid and savings11 - and thus growth -, in the 
early 1970’s even the effectiveness of aid on savings has been questioned.
A sizeable empirical research has been devoted to contributions on the ‘savings 
debate’12. Please (1967) argued that governments will tend to consume rather than 
invest additional tax revenues, thus reducing public savings. Griffin and Enos (1970) 
developed the most radical position in the debate by arguing that aid displaces savings. 
In the simple context of an intertemporal budget constraint on consumption, they 
claimed that an anticipated aid inflow will be allocated between consumption and 
savings - except for extreme values of 0 and 1 of the savings rate - in such a way that 
the total resources for capital accumulation will increase at the expense of domestic
11 Their basic and rather naive assumption “was that each dollar of foreign resources would result in an 
increase of one dollar in imports and investments” (Papanek, 1972).
12 Selected references for the aid growth and the savings debate are: Bhagwati and Grinols (1975, 
1976 and 1979), Griffin (1970 and 1971), Griffin and Enos (1970), Eshag (1971), Over (1975), 
Papanek (1972 and 1973), Pezmaglu (1972), Please (1967), Voivodas (1973), Wasow (1979) and 
Weisskopf (1972).
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savings, which, in turn, will be partly used to finance current consumption. As a result, 
by inducing lower savings, an aid inflow will decrease growth.
The lack of a firm theoretical basis casts doubts not only on Griffin and Enos’s 
results, but also on the validity of the subsequent works from authors who offered 
empirical evidence to support this rather pessimistic interpretation of the impact of 
aid13.
The economic-theory-free way in which these researches have been carried out 
is actually more disconcerting than their actual findings. A behavioural relationship is 
not identified by the sole evidence of a cross country association of high foreign 
inflows with low savings devoid of any explanation in terms of a specified savings 
function. It only provides a measure of a negative correlation between aid and savings - 
and thus growth - and does not demonstrate causality. Savings are affected by many 
other factors besides aid, such as the social, political and economic structure of the 
recipient countries, their demographic characteristics and some exogenous climatic and 
environmental variables, in addition to conventional economic theory type factors (e.g. 
level and/or distribution of income, government behaviour, interest rate, etc.).
Moreover, from a statistical and econometric point of view, the methodology 
used has been quite unsatisfactory. Definition and measurement of the variables do 
seem often questionable. Cross country comparisons have been constantly preferred to 
time series analyses, despite the fact that the individual characteristics of the recipient 
countries may differ considerably. Finally, extensive testing procedures have rarely
13 Papanek (1972) names these critics “ ‘revisionist’ in the true sense of the term”, a qualification 
which we find quite appropriate.
74
been applied, especially with regard to dynamics and functional form. However, the 
positive contribution of this literature in challenging the simplistic view of the impact 
of aid on growth through savings should be acknowledged.
It is not surprising, thus, in the light of these considerations, that no definitive 
conclusion has been reached. The results of the empirical econometric estimations of 
the impact of foreign inflows on savings vary considerably in the works of the authors 
from the radical position. In most cases the estimated relationship between foreign 
inflows and savings turns out to be negative, but this result does not seem very reliable 
for the reasons mentioned above.
From a theoretical point of view, the issue of the impact of aid on savings is 
still open and further research should attempt to go beyond this simple single equation 
model. Important economic channels exist through which aid can affect savings and 
growth, such as the interest rate, income distribution, government behaviour and terms 
of trade. These mechanism need to be explicitly modelled in order to capture the static 
and/or dynamic simultaneity that actually exists among the determinants of growth and 
growth itself14. For illustrative purposes, Appendix 1 presents an empirical example of 
the relationship between aid and savings for the case of Indonesia.
14 See also Bowles (1987) and Newlyn (1991).
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2.5. Recent Developments.
As a result of the failure of the savings debate in reaching some conclusive 
outcome, the empirical research of the 1970’s mainly centred the attention on the 
microeconomic effect of aid (for reference of the literature on project evaluation see 
Cassen (1986), in particular USAID and World Bank reports). The poor performance of 
high aid receiving countries such as Sub-Saharan Africa was the major point of 
reference the savings debate literature. The Harrod-Domar and the related dual gap 
model proved their inadequacy to explain what was going on during that time.
The relationship between aid and growth and the Harrod-Domar paradigm 
remained relatively neglected until the beginning of the 1980’s, when the series of 
external shocks that the world’s economy was experiencing (i.e. a sharp fall in the price 
of primary goods exported from less developed countries, such as the second oil-price 
shock, recession and high lending cost in most developed countries and debt crises) 
revived interest on the macroeconomic impact of aid.
The direction towards which the research has gone thereafter are many and 
interesting. As White (1994a) remarks: “A more fruitful approach is to examine the 
channels through which aid is intended to increase growth...”, rather than trying to 
concentrate on deciding whether aid has increased growth or not.
In fact, recent works on aid and growth by Mosley et al. (1987) and Boone 
(1994) have focused on the channels through which aid should impact the receiver’s
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economy, such as investment and consumption15. In addition, a few studies have 
modelled aid effectiveness on growth in relation to political regimes (Boone, 1996; 
Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett, 1996) and government policies (Burnside and Dollar, 
1997) and provide evidence of a positive link between civil liberties, good policy 
environment and the benefits of aid programmes.
As mentioned in the introduction, other fields of investigation have also been 
exploited, such as aid and trade, aid and the real exchange rate, aid and government 
behaviour, aid tying, aid allocation, aid and counterparts funds.
Also, CGE modelling techniques are now being used to perform comparative 
statics exercises in the presence of aid (see for instance Radelet, 1991, for an 
application to the Gambian economy and Weisman ,1990, for a case study on Papua 
New Guinea).
The next chapters will analyse two different channels through which aid may 
impact the receiver’s economy. The first one concerns the role of fiscal behaviour in the 
presence of aid and the interactions between the public sector and the main 
macroeconomic variables. We then focus on the link between aid and the real exchange 
rate in the broader theoretical framework of real exchange rate determination.
15 Mosley et al and Boone find some evidence of aid impact on growth. Moreover, Boone concludes that 
virtually all aid goes into consumption.
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CHAPTER 3
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF FISCAL BEHAVIOUR FOR 
INDONESIA.
3.1. Introduction.
This chapter is concerned with the impact o f aid on the behaviour of the public 
sector and with the feedback effects on the economy as a whole. We present a model of 
fiscal response to foreign aid in Indonesia. A number of studies have developed the 
seminal contribution by Heller (1975) of modelling government behaviour in order to 
capture one of the channels through which aid could displace savings and hence 
negatively influence growth. Heller imposes an optimising framework on the simple 
Harrod-Domar set-up, which had until then been used to analyse the macroeconomic 
impact of aid, in order to model the impact of aid on taxation and government 
expenditure (and thus on public savings). The theoretical result of such models is 
twofold: on the revenue side, aid may reduce the government’s taxation efforts, while 
on the expenditure side, not all the aid inflow will be allocated to government 
investment, that is aid is fungible and is deflected away from investment and into 
consumption1.
Many empirical studies have adopted the core of Heller’s approach (see among 
others Gang and Khan, 1991; Khan and Hoshino, 1992; McGillivray and
1 The underlying value judgement is that increasing consumption is a ‘bad’. This issue is however 
open to debate. For instance, food relief programmes increase consumption of food but also save 
lives.
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Papadopoulos, 1991). Mosley et al. (1987) incorporated the core of Heller’s approach 
in a wider model which includes also a production and an investment function, so that 
they do not actually estimate a Heller type model. However, the empirical evidence 
based on the fiscal response approach is mixed.
This research aims at assessing the impact foreign aid has had on the fiscal 
budget and other real variables in the Indonesian economy. Following White (1993), 
we insert the Government sector into a simple demand determined macroeconomic 
model. The inclusion of dynamic linkages and of static macroeconomic feedback 
effects in a fiscal response model highlights the complexity of aid’s impact.
We find that on impact aid has a weak negative effect. In the long run, once the 
intra- and intertemporal linkages have started multiplier processes, foreign inflows 
appear to influence the economy. In particular, grants, multilateral and bilateral aid 
negatively affect all fiscal variable as well as income and consumption. However, they 
reduce public consumption more than investment, thus exhibiting a pro-investment 
bias. On the contrary, loans encourage tax collection, public and private investment and 
consumption so that the whole economy benefits.
We also find, not surprisingly, that permanent increases in aid greatly amplify 
the effects of a temporary shock, namely beneficial effects from loans and negative 
effects from grants, bilateral and multilateral aid. These results are in contrast with the 
widespread negative assessment of aid’s impact on public budget and on the recipient 
economy.
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The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold, respectively from a 
modelling, an empirical and a methodological perspective. From the modelling point of 
view, three aspects have been introduced: a) interaction between the objective variables 
in the utility function; b) static feedback effects, via a Keynesian like multiplier; c) 
dynamic effects, mainly through the investment function. From the empirical 
perspective, a time series approach has been adopted and the impacts of temporary and 
permanent increases in foreign inflows have been simulated. From the methodological 
point of view, the problems related to the choice of the dataset and to the empirical 
estimation techniques employed have been emphasised.
The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section presents a critical 
review of the literature on fiscal response. The second part describes the model and 
its implications. The third section discusses the empirical implementation of the 
model and the related data and estimation technique issues. It also presents results 
from a simulation exercise. A conclusion highlights the main lessons from this 
particular study and proposes directions for further research.
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3.2. Overview of the Literature.
In this section we present a critical review of the fiscal response literature. We 
first discuss briefly its origin and motivation and explain its core features and 
motivation. Three major contributions, namely Mosley at al.(1987), Gang and Khan 
(1991) and White (1993), are then described. An assessment on the state of the art 
concludes.
3.2.1. Origins and ‘Raison d’etre’ of the Fiscal Response Literature.
In the early 1970’s, the empirical research on the relationship between aid and 
growth analysed the macroeconomic impact of aid within an Harrod-Domar theoretical 
framework, as pointed out in chapter 2. Since savings are a crucial determinant of 
growth, if aid affects savings this will then automatically influence growth2. The 
‘Please effect’ (Please, 1967) indicated that governments would tend to consume rather 
than invest additional tax revenues, thus reducing public savings. Critics of aid, most 
notably Griffin and Enos (1970), argued that aid would displace savings and hence the 
most important channel through which growth can be affected. The savings debate 
which followed, however, did not reach neither theoretical nor empirical consensus in 
support of the claim of aid ineffectiveness.
2 This is the reason why the aid-savings relationship has represented the main concern in the early 
1970’s. While in the I960’s a direct proportionality between aid and savings - and thus growth had 
been generally assumed, in the early I970’s even the effectiveness of aid on savings has been 
questioned.
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A more recent literature has developed the seminal contribution by Heller 
(1975) of modelling the effect of aid on fiscal behaviour and hence on the public 
component of a country’s savings. The central assumption in his model is that the 
recipient government maximises a utility function subject to its finance constraints. The 
arguments of the utility function, which is of a linear quadratic form, consist of a set of 
'intermediate targets’ in terms of government investment, both ‘developmental’ and 
‘non-developmental’ recurrent government expenditure, public borrowing and tax 
revenues. Two separate budget constraints are imposed in order to rule out the 
financing of recurrent expenditure by means of borrowing. The effect of aid on public 
savings and thus on a determinant of growth can be assessed, given the underlying 
Harrod-Domar framework. Heller’s results show that aid stimulates public investment 
but facilitates a reduction in public borrowing and tax revenues. Moreover, although 
both grants and loans stimulate investment, grants show a higher pro-consumption bias, 
while loans exhibit a higher pro-investment bias3.
The debate on the ambiguous aid-savings relationship pointed out the need for 
investigating, more closely, the behavioural links between aid and other 
macroeconomic variables rather then simply exploring national accounts identities.
The fiscal response literature focuses on the impact of aid on government 
behaviour. The main issue is that of aggregate fungibility, i.e. the extent to which an aid 
inflow may displace or crowd in taxes and/or government expenditure. In other words, 
the question is whether aid is used to fully fund expenditure increases or, alternatively, 
partly used to decrease taxes and borrowing. As public savings is a key variable to the
3 Heller’s results confirm the Please effect only for grants.
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whole analysis, this literature can be viewed as a natural development of the savings 
debate.
As it has been mentioned above, fiscal response models have been developed 
on the idea that the government maximises a utility function in various choice variables 
subject to its finance constraint. The following discussion of three major contributions 
will exemplify this approach.
3.2.2. Mosley et al.’s Model.
Mosley (1987) and Mosley et al. (1987) adopted the core of Heller’s model of 
government behaviour and extend it to include a production and an investment 
function. They then apply the model in a cross country empirical investigation in order 
to explore the impact that fiscal response to aid has on the economy (and on its growth 
rate). Their results do not allow for establishing a statistically significant and 
unambiguous relationship between aid and economic growth and between aid and 
savings.
The starting point is the assumption that the recipient government tries to 
minimise a loss function subject to its finance constraints. The arguments of the loss 
function consist of a set of ‘intermediate targets’ in terms of government investment 
(Ig), both ‘developmental’ (or socio-economic) and ‘non-developmental’ (or civil) 
recurrent government expenditure (respectively Gd and G^), public borrowing (B) and 
tax revenues (T). There are two budget constraints: the first one posits that recurrent 
government expenditure derives from taxes and aid inflows (A); the second one states
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that government investment must be financed by taxes, aid inflows plus public 
borrowing. An unspecified aggregate production function (Y), whose arguments are 
private capital, public capital and the labour force (L), is also introduced in the model. 
Finally, private investment (Ip) is assumed to be determined by lagged investment, aid, 
business profits (n) and the domestic bank credit expansion (ACR), according to the 
function:
Ip = y + a,A  + a 2Ipt_, + a 37i + a 4ACR (3.1)
The government will optimise its loss function facing the two budget 
constraints and the linkage between aid and private investment. Aid inflows represents 
the control variable used in order to achieve the targets. From the first order conditions 
Mosley et al. derive the reduced form expressions for Gn, Gnd and Ig. By substituting 
these in the total differential of Y they finally get the reduced form solution of the 
relationship between aid and growth:
AY = p 0 + p, A + P2IPiM + P3ACR + P4T + p5 Y,., + P„AL (3.2)
where the p, ’s are combinations of the parameters of the model. The impact of aid on 
the instantaneous rate of change of income is then obtained by simply taking the 
derivative of equation (3.2) with respect to aid. Actually, as pointed out by White 
(1992a), the model is incorrectly solved and an endogenous variable, namely tax 
revenues, is left in the reduced form expression for growth4.
4 The correct and far more complicated solution is given in White (1992b) as:
’
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where Y is income, A the aid inflow, e = I - a l3, p -  ( l/a 3 + l/a4), t -  [a , 3 + (p/a,,)( a 2 + e a 3)], 
T = [I + a ,/a , - e2a 5p/(Tcxl3)], and the parameters are as defined in Mosley et al.
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The main purpose of their model of fiscal behaviour is to investigate the 
problem of the fungibility of aid disbursements. An exogenous inflow of resources will 
directly finance some development programme, but it may also indirectly influence the 
economy via a reallocation of the government’s spending plans and a change in the 
domestic system of relative prices. In other words, aid inflows from abroad may ‘crowd 
out’ private investment and thus erode the beneficial effects of a development project.
Mosley et al. applied the model in a cross-section analysis of government 
behaviour for a large number of developing countries. Their pessimistic results have 
been subject to some criticism (Newlyn, 1990) based on the unsatisfactory theoretical 
foundations and on the limited correspondence between the theoretical solution and the 
econometric specification.
The equation they actually estimate is an expanded version of the traditional 
specification of the Harrod-Domar growth model, in which changes in output are 
dependent on aid inflows, savings (S), private foreign investments (If) plus the 
additional variables of changes in the literacy rate (ALit) and in export values (AX). 
Their econometric specification for equation (3.2) is:
AY = y0 + y,A + YjS + YjI, + y 4AX + y,ALit (3.3)
where AY is the growth rate of GDP and A, S, If are measured as a proportion of GDP. 
Their claim is that this expanded equation may well be interpreted as a long-run form 
of the solution equation of their model, given the nature of their cross-section data
This answer is far less manageable than the incorrect one given by Mosley et al.; moreover, 
it is more difficult to interpret in terms of the individual coefficients.
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aggregated over ten-year periods. However, there are three weaknesses undermining
(3.3):
1) First, and most important, the ‘misuse’ of Ip. Although the model includes an 
equation for the determination of private investment (eq.(3.2)), the arguments consist of 
a number of exogenous variables that do not appear anywhere else in the model. 
Moreover, private investment is not directly present in the estimated equation (3.3), its 
role being split between savings and private inflows from abroad. In other words, the 
accounting relationship
I„ = S  + If (3.4)
replaces the behavioural relationship defined by equation (3.2). What is more serious, it 
represents a surreptitious introduction of savings. This seems quite arbitrary, as long as 
savings behaviour is not modelled and as long as it constrains the impact of private 
capital flows exclusively on private investment.
2) The introduction of AX and ALit. The use of a literacy variable is not a 
plausible proxy for labour force, since in this single equation model literacy rate is 
exogenously treated and the impact of aid on growth induced by its effect on literacy is 
not explained. Furthermore, if in the regression on growth the rates of growth of 
literacy and of export values are used, as Mosley et al. do, the resulting equation (3.3) is 
not consistent with the solution expression for the model (3.2). In the latter all the 
variables would be divided by the GDP, while in the first the changes of literacy and of 
export values would be divided by the respective current values. Similarly, the 
justification for the introduction of the change in export values as a proxy for the
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constraint of world demand is equally not convincing, since no mention of world 
demand nor of such a constraint is included in the model.
3) The overdeterminacy of the model. The model is overdetermined and some 
of the structural parameters have to be taken exogenously. The detailed theoretical 
explanation of the structural parameters of the model is not matched by an equivalently 
clear actual derivation from the estimated reduced form coefficients. Potential problems 
of ambiguous determination of the responsiveness of private investment to aid 
disbursement and of the return on private and government investment lie in the 
unsatisfactory specification of the investment function - which does not include the 
interest rate - and in the lack of specification of the aggregate production function. In 
fact, their source for the marginal productivities of private (8p) and public capital (8g) is 
a painstaking statistical elaboration. They obtained an average of 8p and Sg by taking 
the ratio of the average 1970-80 increase in constant prices GDP to the average 1970- 
80 increase in constant prices total domestic investment. Given that the model is 
overdetermined and that the differential nature of marginal productivities is not 
matched by the calculated discrete incremental output-capital ratio, it does not seem 
likely that this estimate may coincide with the average of the corresponding parameters 
obtained by working out the coefficients estimated econometrically.
As a result, the correspondence between the theoretical solution of the model 
(eq. (3.2)) and the econometric specification used (eq. (3.3)) is not straightforward.
In addition to the above shortcomings, the theoretical foundation of the model 
is unsatisfactory. Treating national income and exports as exogenous and not modelling
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savings behaviour obscures the partial equilibrium analysis on which the model is 
based. No attempt is made to analyse static feedback effects based on usual Keynesian- 
like multipliers.
Finally, the lack of dynamic analysis is a serious limitation for the interpretation 
of the results. They turn out to be only impact multipliers and not long-run. Dynamic 
factors are likely to be very important and the inclusion of lagged variables is a sensible 
way to overcome potential simultaneity problems due to dynamic feedback effects. 
This issue is not exploited in the model. To be precise, Mosley et al. impose a lag 
structure of the benefits from aid inflow across time on the variables A and If. 
However, this lag structure is rather arbitrary in that it is derived from World Bank 
estimates of the distribution of project benefits across time. On the contrary, lag 
structures should be obtained by the likely data generation process5 and not by treating 
them as being exogenously determined. Although the idea of introducing a dynamic 
structure is innovative, the procedure used by Mosley et al. is questionable: more than 
modelling the dynamics of aid, it forces aid to conform to an a priori fixed dynamic 
process.
Despite the limitations, the pathbreaking contribution by Mosley et al. 
represents an appealing attempt to understand the effectiveness of aid on less developed 
economies. Their model allows for a variety of behaviours in the allocation of aid 
inflows, for interactions between the private and public sector and for trade-offs
5 Time series data should provide the necessary information on dynamics and thus on lag structure.
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between productive and non-productive expenditures. Most importantly, it has revived 
the debate on the issue of aid effectiveness and on the related policy issues6.
3.2.3. Gang and Khan Model.
Gang and Khan (1991) developed a modified version of Heller’s model which 
attempts to overcome some of the econometric and data inadequacies of earlier works. 
Their results appear to back the revenue side results obtained by Heller of a negative 
relationship between taxes and government investment in the presence of aid. 
However, on the expenditure side their findings contrast with those of Heller and 
Please. Grants, loans and multilateral aid are found to have no statistically significant 
impact on government consumption and to be entirely used to finance development 
projects. Only bilateral aid shows a significant and negative relationship with 
government consumption in deflecting resources away from consumption and to 
investment.
The government’s utility function is assumed to be linear quadratic in the 
deviations from the target levels of the choice variables and is in fact the same function 
used by Heller. The five choice variables are defined as above (except for a minor 
change of notation regarding Gd and Gnd which are denoted here Gs and Gc 
respectively) and an asterisk indicates a target variable in the following expression:
It should be noted that our concern is with fiscal response rather than on the aid and growth issue.
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U = a 0 + a , Ug -  I'f y- ^ - ( I g  -  ig )2 + a 3(0 «, - G ^ ) - ^ - ( G nd - G ^ ) 2 +
^ s ( Gd ~ Gd ) ~ ^ ( Gd - GW  ~ ^ ( T - T * ) - ^ - ( T - T *)2- a 9( B - B * ) - ^ B - B *)2
(3.5)
where a ,’s > 0 and starred variables represent target levels.
This utility function is then maximised subject to the following composite 
budget constraint:
Ig = B + (1 -  pi )T + (1 -  p2 )Ag + (1 -  p3 )A/
Gn d +Gd =PlJ' + P2Ag +P3Al  ^ ^
where 1 > p,’s > 0 for z'=l,2,3 and Ag and A| denote foreign grants and foreign loans,
respectively. Two separate budget constraint are imposed so that recurrent expenditure
is not financed out of domestic borrowing7. This structure also allows for aid
fiingibility, as it has been defined above (paragraph 3.2.1).
Gang and Khan claim their approach is superior to previous studies in the 
empirical implementation. Their use of a consistent time-series dataset for India in a 
three-stages least square system estimation and the treatment of target variables 
represents an improvement. An innovative property of the linear quadratic (LQ) 
objective function is its asymmetry: undershooting and overshooting are not equally 
desirable. However, there are many problems with their approach, as pointed out by 
Binh and McGillivray (1993) and White (1994a,d).
Firstly, the utility function is not maximised to a n when the target values of the 
choice variables are met. This is due to the LQ functional form for U, and the same
7 It is worth reminding that a dual budget constraint is imposed in most empirical fiscal response 
studies, such as in Heller, Mosley et al„ Khan and Hoshino, McGillivray and Papadopoulos.
90
criticism can be made of Heller’s original formulation. A quadratic functional form 
would then account for this problem, although, as Gang (1993) replied, the asymmetry 
property of the LQ form would be lost. It should be noted, however, that even losing 
asymmetry a quadratic objective function would still be compatible with the notion that 
deviations from targets are undesirable.
Secondly, although the rational behind the imposition o f two separate budget 
constraint is in general correct, their joint use amounts to predetermining the outcome 
of the model. Since the p,’s are given, and represent the proportions to which the 
revenue variables are allocated within the budget, the allocation itself is predetermined 
and bound to yield fungibility. Utility would be maximised if the p,’s reflected the 
values necessary to allocate spending optimally. However, the p,’s are parameters and 
not variables to be determined by the model solution. Budget allocation is thus not the 
outcome of the government’s optimising behaviour, which is in fact over-restricted. 
White (1993) shows that a single budget constraint of the form
Ig +Gnd+Gd = B + T+Ag +Ai (3.7)
imposed on a quadratic utility function will also produce the result of fungibility. 
Though solving the shortcomings determined by the presence o f two separate budget 
constraints (that is utility is not maximised since government behaviour is over­
restricted and determined by the two budget constraints), this alternative formulation 
treats different types of aid in the same analytical way. The issue of recurrent 
expenditure financing is left over, given some conflicting evidence. It should also be 
noted that the substitutability of foreign capital between recurrent expenditure and 
government investment should not be imposed a priori. The budget constraint is
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essentially an accounting consistency condition and not a behavioural statement. 
Therefore, claiming that a single budget constraint assumes 100% fungibility of aid is 
not more valid than supporting a dual budget constraint.
Thirdly, the analysis is further complicated by the treatment of the target 
variables which results in the presence of too many exogenously assumed parameters. 
The determination of the target variables is rather weak and does not fully exploit the 
interactions between the macroeconomic variables. Heller, Mosley et al. and Khan and 
Hoshino defined target values as linear combinations of a series of instrumental 
variables, given some underlying economic rational. Gang and Khan approximate them 
by fitting the actual values on instrumental variables independently of the equation 
system. They then use these fitted values as targets. McGillivray and Papadopoulos 
also use a similar method for their analysis of the Greece case. The problem is that the 
closer the fit the more meaningless the target values become. If, on the other hand, the 
R2 is not very high there is no reason to consider the resulting target values as sensible 
approximations of the hue unknown targets. The definition of the targets is once more 
driving and strongly influencing the final quantitative outcome of the model. Moreover, 
there is no guarantee that estimated targets will meet the budget constraint.
Finally, in presenting their results Gang and Kahn neither discuss the 
parameters of reduced form equation nor explore the implicit dynamics implied by 
lagged government consumption. In fact, they base their conclusions on the 
significance of the p /s8 and therefore their interpretation of the results is misleading.
" When grants and loans are used, they find only p; is significant and positive, while in the bilateral 
versus multilateral aid case both p( and p, are found to be significant, the latter being negative.
92
The same criticism applies to Khan and Hoshino9 and McGillivray and 
Papadopoulos10 findings. Khan and Hoshino claim that grants stimulate public 
investment and consumption and reduce taxation efforts, while loans stimulate taxes 
and investment and pull resources out of the consumption budget. A closer inspection 
of their results reveals that while the conclusions of the positive impact on public 
investment holds, there is no statistical evidence of a direct impact on government 
consumption and taxation. McGillivray and Papadopoulos argue that both grants and 
loans have no significant impact on taxes and that grants deflect resources away from 
consumption and to investment, while loans do not have any significant impact on the 
budget. Once again, if we look at the estimated structural equation parameters their 
results must be reinterpreted and reveal that aid has no impact on the budget, except for 
a negative effect of grants on government consumption.
The study by Gang and Khan presents some weakness, but on the other hand 
highlights important issues to be addressed if the fiscal response literature is to give 
sensible answers.
W h ite  (1 9 9 4 d )  d e r iv e s  th e  a c tu a l r e d u c e d  fo rm  c o e ff ic ie n ts  a n d  re v e rs e s  G a n g  a n d
K h a n  f in d in g s  o f  th e  im p a c t o f  a id  o n  g o v e rn m e n t  in v e s tm e n t.
9 They estimate a fiscal response model using pooled time series-cross section data from five South 
and Southeast Asian countries.
10 They estimate a fiscal response model on a time series basis for the case of Greece.
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3.2.4. White’s Contribution.
White’s contribution to the literature on aid effectiveness and on the fiscal 
response in particular has been rich. We have summarised some of his critical reviews 
in the previous paragraphs. The need for dynamic linkages and for static multiplier 
effects have been strongly emphasised in his simulation exercise published in 1993.
The starting point is a simplified quadratic utility function in the usual 
arguments:
U = - ^ - ( G - G ’)2 - ^ - ( T - T *)2 (3.8)
which is maximised subject to the simple budget constraint:
G = T + A (3.9)
Target values are determined as linear combination of instrumental variables. In 
particular, G* is defined as a fraction of lagged government expenditure and T* as a
fraction of current income:
G’ = a 3Gt_, (3.10)
T '= a 4Y (3.11)
The model is closed by the introduction of an equation for private investment 
(Ip) and two standard macroeconomic relationships:
C = y, + y 2(Y -T )  (3.12)
I = lp = a 5 + a 6A (3.13)
Y = C + I + G (3.14)
The model solution yields a reduced form equation for income which allows for 
multiplier and dynamic effects. A temporary and a permanent aid shock are then
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simulated. The results show that an aid inflow will only partly fund an increase in 
government expenditure and will also offset tax collection. Fungibility of aid is thus 
obtained as a result of the model and not because two separate budget constraints have 
been imposed.
Once again, there are some problems with this approach. Firstly, as White 
(1994a) himself has pointed out, an aid receiving economy cannot be closed. Therefore, 
equation (3.14) is incorrectly specified. However, the correction he suggests is not 
satisfactory. In order to explain this point we need to open a brief parenthesis on 
accounting identities involving aid and the balance of payments. Given the balance of 
payments accounting identity:
(X -  M) + NTR + NFP = - (  LTLC + LTL" + STL + OKI + AR + EO) (3.15)
where NTR denotes net current transfer, NFP net factor payment, LTLC long term 
concessional loans, LTLn long term non-concessional loans, STL short term loans, OKI 
net other capital inflows, AR net changes in reserves and EO net errors and omissions 
and given:
NTR = OT + PCT (3.16)
where OT are official transfers conventionally on the current accounts (or grants) and 
PCT are private current transfer on the capital account, and defining aid as:
AID = OT + LTLC (3.17)
it is easy to rewrite AID as:
AID = M -  X -  PCT -  NFP -  LTLn -  STL -  OKI -  AR -  EO = OT + LTLC (3.18)
9 5
In practice, however, aggregation and consistency problems may arise as well as 
difficulties in identifying unambiguously the actual figures for the accounting 
identities.
White (1994a) discusses this ‘accounting framework’ at length". Still, the 
income identity he proposes is:
Y = C + 1 + G - A = C  + I + G + (X -M ) (3.19)
In this formulation aid is identified with the balance of trade. The implied 
concept of aid is therefore unsatisfactory in that it encompasses many spurious 
components.
Secondly, the target value for tax revenues are indeed a function of the 
endogenous level of actual taxes (this is easily seen by solving Y for C and then 
substituting Y into the expression for T , see also appendix 2). White substitutes the 
value for the target value of T only after having obtained the first order conditions from 
the Lagrangean. This underestimates the derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to 
the tax variable. In fact, other studies include current period income among the 
determinants of one or more targets (see for example Heller, Mosley et al. and Gang 
and Khan). The simultaneity problem implicit in those studies is made explicit in White 
with the inclusion of the income identity. Appendix 2 presents a stylised dynamic fiscal 
response model with endogenous income. The static and dynamic solutions of the 
model are discussed. It is shown that in this model the impact of aid is smaller than in 
White’s model. Even if the multiplier is larger, the inclusion of current income in target 
formation will result in lower effects of an aid inflow. 1
11 It should be noted that this ‘accounting approach’ is typically ignored in empirical work. An 
interesting and lucid means of addressing these concerns is offered by Bacha’s approach.
96
Finally, the treatment of the dynamics is not really satisfactory. Dynamics is not 
really intrinsic, but rather ad hoc and stems only from the exogenously specified GM. 
An alternative formulation which would allow for endogenously determined dynamics 
could be the introduction of lagged income or even of an the accelerator mechanism in 
the investment function12.
To sum up, the critical discussion of the existing literature presented here has 
highlighted two main issues: i) some models have incorrect derivations of the reduced 
form (Mosley et al), whereas others present inconsistencies and/or misspecifications 
(e.g. Gang and Khan); ii) all models have incomplete macroeconomic frameworks, 
which in itself is not a fault, so long as the model is consistent about what is 
endogenous and what exogenous.
12 Greene and Villanueva (1991) offer support for the idea of an accelerator mechanism for investments 
in developing countries.
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3.3. A Dynamic Fiscal Response Model for Indonesia.
3.3.1. Main Features of the Model.
We present a model of fiscal response to aid inflows. We formally model the 
policy maker’s decision process as to the level of taxation and the alternative uses of 
public resources and exogenous capital inflows.
The main characteristics of the model can be summarised as follows: the 
government maximises a quadratic objective function defined in three intermediate 
targets (government consumption, Gc, government investment, Ig, and tax revenue, T), 
and in their interactions, facing a single budget constraint. A series of economic 
relationships within an accounting framework determines the targets and closes the 
system. From the fundamental macroeconomic identity the static feedback effect (a 
keynesian-like multiplier) can be derived. There exist also dynamic linkages 
originating from the inclusion of lagged income in the private investment function and 
of lagged government consumption in target determination.
Finances obtained both internally, via taxation (T) and borrowing (B), and 
externally, via foreign assistance, may be used for investment purposes (Ig), with a high 
commitment to development targets, or for current expenditure (Gc), mainly devoted to 
the maintenance of the state organisation itself and the provision of social assistance. 
This functional distinction of expenditure categories reflects the way the Indonesian 
public budget is structured. The presence of aid inflows may discourage and even 
displace taxation efforts. In this case, the original purpose of aid of financing Ig would
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be partly or completely offset. Similarly, policy makers may divert aid monies received 
to finance investment projects from their intended use to the funding of more 
consumption oriented expenditure.
The diversion of aid from its intended purpose, or fungibility, may therefore 
occur on both the revenue side and the expenditure side: in the first case, aid is diverted 
to finance a reduction in tax efforts, while in the second one aid is used to fund 
government consumption. The political short term advantages are among the plausible 
determinants of this kind of public behaviour. The potential for economic damages lie 
in the use of aid in less long term productive activities. It should be noted, however, the 
fungibility might be a blessing if the intended purpose of aid is not appropriate to the 
country’s needs (e.g. steel mills with negative externalities).
The structure of the model thus allows for the case of fungibility and implies 
that fungibility itself does not necessarily displace taxation efforts. On the expenditure 
side, the effect of aid on public investment, in particular, is linked to the response of 
private investment to the same aid inflow, given the interactions between private and 
public investment. Finally, the comparison between the short term and the long term 
effect highlights the importance of including intra- and inter-temporal effects. It is our 
contention that the focus on these linkages is relatively more important than the issue of 
fungibility itself once a less partial approach has been chosen.
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3.3.2. The Model.
3.3.2.I. The Government Sector.
The objective function of the government that reflects the above mentioned 
interacting choices for any period t can in general be presented as
U = F{Ig,Gc,T,B,A)  (3.20)
where Ig, Gc, T and B are the expenditure and revenue variables described above and A 
represents foreign aid inflows. These can take the form of loans or grants and are 
received by the government from all sources. Aid inflows are assumed to be exogenous 
to the policy makers, i.e. the amount of aid donors will allocate to the country does not 
depend on and is not influenced by the policy maker and by the country’s economic 
performance. All the other variables are determined endogenously by the public sector. 
Since during the last decades the Government has pursued a balanced budgeting 
approach resulting in no internal borrowing13, B is dropped from the arguments. The 
objective function is thus simplified as
U = F (Ig,Gc,T,A)  (3.21)
The functional form chosen is a quadratic one. Deviations from target values 
for each variable are the arguments of the function. Although undershooting and 
overshooting are equally treated, they still are undesirable. As mentioned in the 
previous section, a linear quadratic function (such as the one used by Gang and Khan 
and also present in Heller) would allow asymmetric treatment of deviations form
13 Balanced budgeting is a constitutional rule in Indonesia. Deficit financing is allowed only in the 
presence of compensating realised aid levels (see also chapter I).
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targets. However, as pointed out by Binh and McGillivray (1993), a linear quadratic 
functional (LQ) form for U would not achieve a maximum of zero when targets are 
met, a desirable property which is instead present in the chosen quadratic functional 
form for U. Further research is needed for providing an asymmetric objective function 
which is optimised when targets are met. The state of the art imposes a choice between 
the asymmetric property of the LQ and the full optimisation property of the quadratic 
form. We have chosen the second one and write it as
U = - ? ± ( I g - f t ? - ^ ( G c - G y - ^ ( T - T y  
- a 4( /  -7*)(G C - G ; ) - a 5( /  - 1 ' X T -  T' ) - a 6(Gc- G ; X T - T ’ )
(3.22)
where Ig, Gc and T are the expenditure and revenue variables described above, the **’ 
denotes target variables and a/s>  0 . The a (’s represent the relative weights given to 
the various terms of the utility function and without loss of generality may be 
normalised so that their sum is unity. When all targets are met, an unconstrained 
maximum of zero is reached14; otherwise, deviating from the planned levels of 
revenues and expenditures is undesirable15.
Similar formulations have been used in the fiscal response literature. The 
formulation adopted here differs slightly from earlier specifications in that it represent a 
more general case16. As for the first three terms, the disutility consequences of
14 A positive maximum cannot be achieved when one or more target deviations are negative because 
of the quadratic terms and of concavity conditions.
15 Asymmetry in this kind of quadratic function could be introduced by imposing different values on 
the a,s, depending on whether the attached deviation is positive or negative. It is, however, apparent 
how this is a surreptitious solution to the asymmetry problem.
16 A constant term is usually included, say a„, which is here dropped without loss of generality. It mainly 
represents a shift factor.
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deviations (either positive or negative) are assumed to become increasingly serious, as 
implied by the squared terms. In an attempt to take into account the interdependency 
between the variables, the last three terms have been added. These reflect the disutility 
consequences of the interactions between the three deviation. Disutility from deviations 
is amplified when these have the same sign. On the other hand, interaction between 
opposite deviations, positive and negative, may partly compensate the disutility coming 
from the first three terms. The compensation would be only partial because of 
concavity conditions, necessary for defining a well behaved objective functions, as will 
be shown in the following paragraphs. Given unconstrained finances, the government’s 
utility will be ameliorated by partly offsetting the undershooting of one or two targets 
with the overshooting of the remaining target/targets. For example, disutility arising 
from a too low level of government investment may be partly compensated by a 
sufficiently high level of tax revenues. The imposition of a budget constraint (and 
concavity conditions) will ensure that economically plausible fiscal behaviour is 
pursued. Quadratic forms which exclude the interactive terms, i.e. the government is 
only concerned with the deviations and is not affected by partial compensatory effects 
from other targets, are simply special case of (3.22), where a 456 = 0.
First order partial derivatives of U are given by
| f  = ^ l( / , - / ; ) - a 4(Gc- G ; ) - a 5(7’- 7 ’*)
d I K
| f -  = - « J(Gc- G ; ) - a 4(/f - / ; ) - a i ( r - r )
dGc
| f  = ^ 3( r - n - a 4( / , - / ; ) - a 6(Gc - G ;)
(3.23)
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It can be easily shown that utility unambiguously decreases if the government 
undershoots or overshoots either all its targets simultaneously or only one target at a 
time, the other two being just met. Apart from these extreme cases, the interaction 
terms may partly compensate utility losses stemming from undershooting 
(overshooting). If, for instance, the government undershoots (overshoots) one target, it 
may be possible to partly offset the utility loss by overshooting (undershooting) the 
other one, given the third is met.
The Hessian, H, is:
H  =
«1 a 4 a  5
«4 «2 «6
«J «6 «3
(3.24)
The utility function will be concave, ensuring that the second order conditions
for a maximum will be satisfied , if
<X/<X2 > a j
- a / a i a i - 2 a ja ja « +  a / a i + a 2a i + a j a i  < 0
(3.25)
These conditions imply that the combined weights attached to deviations have 
to be larger than those attached to the interaction terms (i.e. a l 2 3 are of higher order 
than CLj jg). The government will give more weight to meeting a target rather than to 
the corresponding interaction effects. In fact, if it was to give no weight to the target 
deviations (i.e. a ,  = 0), or the same weight to all a /s , second order conditions would 
not be met. On the contrary, a 4S6 = 0 is consistent with a well behaved utility function. 
In other words, concavity conditions will ensure that preferences will be concave, 7
l7For strict concavity to hold, the Hessian must be negative definite. In our case, this requires that the 
three principal minors (i.e. the determinants of the sub-matrixes obtained by taking only the first n; 
rows and ni columns, where i= 1,2,3) must alternate in sign starting from the negative sign. Note that 
the first minor is given by -a ¡<0, while the second and the third are shown in order in (3.25).
1 0 3
consistent and transitive. Moreover, a ,a 2> a24 can still be met if <x/>a4 and a 2< a4 
(and viceversa). In this case, a 5 must be greater than a 6 (or if a ,< a 4 and a 2> a 4 
a 5< a6), that is, if the government attaches a higher weight to meeting Ig* relative to 
meeting Gc*, then, given a 3, then interaction between Ig’ and Gc* has to be preferred to 
interaction between Gc and T*. As a rule of thumb, the sum of a /23 must be greater 
than one half to ensure concavity18.
The allocation of public financing is subject to the country’s economic and 
institutional ties. The policy makers’ maximisation process is therefore subject to the 
following budget constraint:
I„+Gc = T + A g + A, (3.26)
The assumption underlying the budget constraint is that government spending 
in investment and current expenditure must be financed by tax revenues and grants (Ag) 
and loans (A|) inflows. We have chosen a single budget constraint rather than a dual 
one (in the Heller’s tradition) in order not to predetermine the allocation of government 
resources and thus overdetermine the system (see also paragraph 3.2.3, on the 
discussion of Gang and Khan model’s shortcomings)19. In any case, the budget 
constraint imposes an a posteriori consistency condition and is not a behavioural 
relationship. The test of whether aid leaks to recurrent expenditure rather than is on
11 If for instance a i - a 2=a}- a 4=as=at =\/6 , their sum being equal to unity, it is easy to show 
condition (3.25) is not met. If a /= a ;=aJ=2/9, so that their sum is greater than 1/2, and 
a 4=ai =a6=l/9, so that the sum of the a / j= l ,  then condition (3.25) is met:
ot|Ot2 =>ii
-c^otjOj - 2  a 4a ,a 6 + a |a ^ + a 2a j + a ,a 5 = -%29 < 0
19 As noted in paragraph 3.2.3 a single budget constraint implies that different kinds of aid are 
analytically equivalent. This can be the case if aid was fully fungible. One rather different argument 
for including a dual budget constraint is that this can pick up conditionality: if donors impose some 
restrictions on the use of revenues, the ‘conditions' affect fungibility.
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public investment should be based upon the model’s solution and not on the budget 
constraint. As shown in White (1993), a single budget constraint is also consistent with 
the possibility of fungibility. An aid inflow may not fully fund capital expenditure, but 
may instead be used to partly fund increases in Gc at the expense of reducing T.
Moreover, the rationale for the imposition of a dual budget constraint, that is 
the controversial issue of recurrent expenditure financing out of domestic borrowing, is 
not relevant in the case of Indonesia. Although in theory government deficit financing 
is possible, the pursuit of roughly balanced budgets and of no internal borrowing has 
been an established practice in fiscal policy since 1965. Aid inflows have thus resulted 
in financing the gap between tax revenues and government expenditures20.
The imposition of the budget constraint results in further interactions between 
fiscal variables in addition to those implied by the last three terms in the utility 
function. As a result, interaction between T, Ig and Gc is picked up in the model via the 
utility function and the accounting relationship, i.e. the budget constraint. These two 
channels are different in nature and complement each other, so that the final effect of 
the budget constraint will depend on the utility function interaction terms, as will be 
shown in the following.
20 An alternative way of imposing a budget constraint which includes internal borrowing and allows for 
the issue of recurrent expenditure financing could be the imposition of a single budget constraint coupled 
with some complementary slackness condition on I, and B, e.g. lg>=B or lg>=B+A. If lg=B or lg=B+A, 
there would be full fungibility. If Ig>B or lg>B+A, then public investment would be financed out by B 
and/or A and some fungibility could arise.
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Finally, maximising the quadratic utility function subject to this budget 
constraint is consistent with the occurrence of aggregate fungibility21, i.e. of 
government diverting aid revenues from the purposes they were primarily destined - 
typically from developmental investments to recurrent expenditures.
The desired levels of government investment and consumption and of tax 
revenues, respectively Ig\  Gc* and T*, are defined as:
where Ip denotes private investment, Y is income, OIL is Oil Revenues, Ag and A, are 
as defined above, and the subscript (t-1) lags the variables. In an ideal world we would 
be able to have full information on these target levels. Unfortunately, this is not the
Here, we assume that the policy makers set their targets according to the above
defined as linear combinations of instrumental variables Ip, previous period government 
consumption, lagged OIL revenues and aid inflows. This is a simplified version of both 
Heller and Mosley et al. targets specification and reflects a similar economic rationale, 
described as follows.
Categorical fungibility occurs when aid funds which are destined to a certain economic sector are 
diverted to an other one, so that, for instance, flows destined to agriculture end up financing education. 
See, for example, Pack and Pack (1990 and 1993).
22 See paragraph 3.2.3 for a critical discussion of the alternative method of estimating targets 
independently of the equation system.
(3.27)
(3.28)
T a 9OIL,_t "fot j~t~cc11 4^^ (3.29)
case and we have to approximate the desired levels of government policy variables.
relationships between observable macroeconomic variables22. Ig\  Gc* and T* are thus
21 However, it does not shed light on categorical fungibility, an issue which is not on our agenda.
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The planned level for public investment is related to private investment 
decisions. Higher private investment would trigger higher demand for infrastructures 
and hence lead to higher public investment. In the context of a Harrod-Domar growth 
mechanism public investment serves to complement private investment in order to 
reach a desired growth rate. The target for government current expenditure is simply set 
to reflect the routine needs of the public sector assuming adaptive expectations and 
stable growth, that is next year Gc will be a proportion of last year’s level of 
government consumption. The desired level of tax revenues is set as a proportion of 
previous period oil revenues as a determinant of T 23. It also depends on current aid 
inflows24. Indonesia is an oil exporting country and oil related tax revenues represent a 
large proportion of tax revenues, although in recent years a major tax reform has been 
introduced that attempts to raise proportionately higher non-oil taxes. Pack and Pack 
(1990) argue that there is a strong sentiment against aid among Indonesian officials. 
This could be reflected in a positive relationship between aid and taxation efforts, in 
order to reduce aid reliance, i.e. a )0and/or a M> 0 .
23 T* depends on lagged oil revenues given the high oil price volatility. This is justified by an 
underlying adaptive expectation assumption for oil revenues. Incidentally, preliminary estimations 
confirm the significance of OIL,., against the insignificance of current oil revenues.
24 A better specification would define the aid variable as aid commitment. Data limitations prevent us 
to use aid commitments so that aid disbursements are employed instead. In an adaptive expectation 
framework, this implies the assumption that last year’s commitments are equal to current year 
disbursements. The issue of aid commitments versus aid disbursements is not addressed here, 
although it deserves further investigation, despite data constraints.
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3.3.2.2. Other Relevant Economic Relationships.
The structure of the model thus far is clearly identified in the tradition of the 
fiscal response literature modelling. Here, however, we add three economic 
relationships in order to close the system (see White, 1993, who is one of the early 
proponents of such practice, as already mentioned) and to provide dynamic linkages. 
The static economy-wide effects and the dynamic impact of aid inflows can be assessed 
once the relevant multipliers are derived.
The first relationship is the following private investment function:
Ip —  Po +  P t^ l-l P 2,1,1 +  P î. l . î^ s .f - l  + p 2 .2 ,lA  + p2,2,2A,r-l
+P 31OF+ P^jOF,., + P iDomCred
(3.30)
where Ag and Ai represent grants and loans respectively, OF are other official financial 
flows from abroad25 and DomCred is the level of domestic credit available in the 
economy. In essence, this specification assumes that private investment decisions 
depend both on real lagged GDP and financial foreign (Ag, Ai, OF) and domestic 
(DomCred) variables. In particular, Po is an exogenous investment component26, p/ 
links Ip with previous period level of economic activity, which again reflects an 
underlying Harrod-Domar growth framework27. The P^j/s coefficients are of particular
25 Other official financial flows, as defined in OECD statistics, are non concessional capital flows both 
from official and private sources other than grants and loans.
26 We may think of Po as capturing all the other investment determinants which are exogenous to our 
model. For instance, it may embody the relationship between investment and interest rate as well as a 
purely autonomous component of investment decisions. Here we are not modelling monetary issues and 
assume constant price levels. A possible extension of the model could take into account the monetary 
sector and the dynamics of prices.
27 An accelerator mechanism could replace lagged income. However, preliminary estimates for the 
case of Indonesia show how the accelerator mechanism does not fit the Indonesian case well.
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importance. Negative (positive) values imply that aid inflows stimulate (displace) 
private investment. Since Ip is among the determinants of the target level of public 
investment Ig, aid will also affect Ig and the level of income. The p2.i,i’s are therefore a 
key measure in the assessment of aid’s impact. The rationale for including aid among 
the determinants of private investment is that entrepreneurs perceive them as additional 
financial resources. It should be noted that this is a simplification as aid is normally 
given to governments and not directly to the private sector. Therefore, the relationship 
between private investment and aid depends on the government’s response to aid, on 
the consequences on the credit market and on how the government will pass aid inflows 
to the private sector. In equation (3.30), the Pzù’s thus incorporate the anticipated 
indirect effect of aid on Ip through the public sector. Further research should develop a 
more sophisticated specification requiring a simultaneous modelling of private and 
public responses to aid inflows28 29.
We then assume a standard keynesian consumption function C:
C = Yo+Y,(l, - î ’) (3.31)
where Yo is the subsistence level of consumption and Yi is the marginal propensity to 
consume out of disposable income (Y-T) .
28 The problem of the relationship between private and public investment in the presence of aid 
inflows is further complicated by issues related to credit markets and credit rationing. The simple 
inclusion of current public investment in (3.30), for instance, which would endogenise private investment, 
or the insertion of lagged public investment in (3.30), which would imply that I ,  is a function of I^n, 
would not account for these issues.
29The estimation of this specification for consumption suffered from autocorrelations problems. We 
therefore added lagged consumption among the regressors. This does not pose any particular problem of 
theoretical justification. The above specification may be viewed as the long run specification for private 
consumption.
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We assume that income is demand determined30, so that the following applies: 
Y= Min(Y \Yd) (3.32)
Finally, the following accounting identity ensures system consistency:
Y = C + I p + I g+Gc + X - M  (3.33)
where X and M are respectively exports and imports of goods and services and all the
other variables are as defined earlier. Once we take into account the accounting 
relationship between aid and the balance of payment, discussed in greater detail in 
White (1994a,c), we can rewrite the national accounts identity as:
Y = C + I p + Ig +Gc- A g - A , - O F - O B P  (3.34)
where all the variables are as defined above and OBP is an aggregate of other 
components of the capital account not included elsewhere31 plus private current 
transfers and net factor payments, the last two coming from the current account. An 
alternative disaggregation for aid would distinguish between bilateral and multilateral 
flows.
A superficial inspection of this accounting identity would suggest a negative 
impact of aid on income. Solving for the level of income we get:
Y = — (Y„ -  Y tT + l p + I , + G ' - A g - A , - OF-OBP)  (3.35)
* Yi
In fact, the national account identity is only a consistency condition and once 
the behavioural implications of the model are included 3Y/3A appears to be given not 
simply by -l/(l-yi). We will see later how the impact of aid is more complex32.
30 This implies that we are not modelling the supply side.
31 These are essentially short term capital, changes in reserves and errors and omissions.
32 This impact is even more complex when current income is included in target specification (see 
appendix 2 ).
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3.3.2.3. The Solution of the Model.
The reduced form equations which must hold under maximisation are obtained 
by maximising the following Lagrange an:
maxL = - ^ ( 7 ,  -  /,* )2 - ^ - ( G c -  G'cf  - ^ - ( T -  T‘ )2
- a 4( / t - / ;X G c - G ; ) - a 5( / i - / ; ) ( r - r * ) - a 6(Gc-G ;X T - r* )
+ X ( I , + G c - T - A g - A , )
(3.36)
The first order conditions are:
—  = - a 1(/i-/;)-a4(Gc- G c,)-a5( r - r ) + X  = 0
^  = - a 2(Gc-G;)-a4(/f-/;)-a6(T-r*)+X = 0
dGc
H  = - a 3(r-r*)-a4(7,-/;)-a6(Gc-G;)-X = 0
Ï L  = Ig+Gc- T - A g- A , = 0
(3.37)
It can be shown that the structural equations for Ig, Gc and T are given by the 
following equations:
/„ = 8 l/ ; + 8 204f +A, + r , - G ; )
Gc = 8 , G ; + 8 4(A( + A , + r - / ; )  (3.38)
T  =  8 , T '  - 8 6(Af + A, - / '  -G*)
where
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From the budget constraint, the following adding up restrictions apply33:
8 , + 8 2 = 8 , + 8„ = 8 , + 86 = 1
82+8„+ 86 =l  (3.40)
8 | +S 3 + 0 j = 2
Substituting out the target variables in the structural equations we obtain the following 
semi-structural set of equations:
I g = 8 1a 7/„-82a gG Ci,_1+ 8 2(l+a10)A,+82(l+allM , + 8 2a 9O/LM  (3.41)
Gc = - 8 4a 7/p+8,a8G c.,.l+ 8 4(l+a10)Ai(+ 8 4(l+a11M (+ 8 4a 9O/L,.l (3.42)
T = 8 6a ,/, + 8 6a  gGc l., + (8 5a l0 - 8 6 )A, + (8 3a ,, - 8 6 )A, + 8 sa 9OIL,_, (3.43)
The sign of the 8/s  is not known a priori, as they depend on the relative 
preferences within the utility function34. If a / and 0.2 are both larger than 0(4 the 8, 's 
will be positive, except for the cases when otj is sufficiently greater than a« (so that
33 The derivation of conditions (3.40) from the budget constraint is not straightforward. However, it is 
easy to show that 82+84+8»=/ by substituting out I,, Gc and T in the budget constraint with the 
corresponding equations in (3.38). This gives (82+84+8#-/) as the coefficient attached to aid; therefore, a 
change in aid, other things given, will result in AA (82+84+8#-/)=0 .
34 D has to be positive for the Lagrangean to be concave and thus possess an optimum.
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84<0) or 06 is sufficiently greater than a j (so that ?>2<0)3S. A larger preference of the 
policy maker to interaction between Ig* and T* relative to interaction between Gc* and 
T*, i.e. as>0 6 , may thus result in a negative coefficient for T* and A in the structural 
equation for Gc*. Similarly, Os<a^ results in a negative parameter for the revenue side 
targets in the structural equation for Ig*. Moreover, as mentioned above in the 
discussion of the a , ’s, for concavity to hold 0C/XX4 and a 2<ct4 requires OC5XX6 (and 
similarly ot/<(X4 and (X2XX4 requires a 5<a6>. In these cases the 8,’s will generally be 
positive except for possible values of 0 for 82 and 84. In sum, the sign and magnitude of 
8,’s will be determined by the variety of feasible combination of relative preferences 
within the utility function. This shows that the interaction terms in the objective 
function do affect fiscal behaviour in a complex way, different in nature from the effect 
of the budget constraint36.
3.3.2.4. Static and Dynamic Impact of Aid.
Aid will affect the economy and government behaviour aid via a static and a 
dynamic channel. These will be discussed in turn in the next sub-sections.
35 Note that S2 and 54 cannot simultaneously be negative.
36 While in theory the interactive terms allow for a more general utility function and for a wider variety 
of preferences -and relative preferences-, in practice they are less relevant as the actual derivation of 
the a i's is not possible. However, they may help explain differences in the signs of the estimated 
parameters. An example will clarify this point. Suppose 0 4 ,5,4=0 , then S2=otjCtyTot, a 2+a , a  2+a 2ct and 
84=0,a 3 /fa;Ot2+a;CX.i+a2a.,) which are both positive. Therefore, A l/A A  and A G/AA  will be both 
positive or negative, depending on the sign and magnitude of a  to- If Okj,«* 0, then 52 and 64 can 
exhibit opposite signs, as discussed above. In such a case, A/^/AA and AG/AA will also be of opposite 
sign.
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Static Effects.
The impact of aid on government behaviour depends on the sign and 
magnitude of aw  and a//, on the response of private investment to aid (jk.u’s), on 
the relationship between public and private investment (0C7), and on the relative 
preferences within the utility function (8, ’s). It can be decomposed into a direct and 
an indirect effect.
The direct impact of aid is given by the coefficients on Ag and Ai in the semi- 
structural equations (3.41), (3.42) and (3.43) and crucially depends on the way the 
target for taxation is set. A tendency to reduce aid reliance, as mentioned above and 
as suggested by Pack and Pack, may result in increasing rather than reducing taxation 
efforts, i.e. a w and ci//>0. Supposing 82 and 8<>0, the direct impact of aid on the 
expenditure side will be positive, thus reflecting increased fund availability.
The indirect effect is channelled through private investment responses. If this 
increases in response to higher aid and does not crowd out public investment, then 
the indirect impact on tax and on Ig will be unambiguously positive. The effect on Gc 
will depend on the sign of 84.
The response of current income to an increase in aid will also include a static 
feedback effect brought on by the multiplier. If we consider, for simplicity, an 
increase in grants only, then
1 “  •= + <M r P * ,,  +  (8,0,0 -  86) (3-44)oA  1 — y,
The first term captures the effect of a consumption increase (decrease) caused by the 
response of private investment to higher aid. If Ip increases, income will rise and 
consequently also consumption will rise. The higher the marginal propensity to
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consume (yt), the higher the effect of aid channelled by consumption. In addition to 
the indirect consumption effect, all the other terms reflect the direct and indirect 
effects which result from fiscal behaviour37.
Dynamic Effects.
The static effects represent only the impact effect . In the year following an 
increase in aid, dynamic linkages will start to operate, not only because of the 
influence of lagged aid on private investment, but also, and more importantly, via the 
changes in previous period income and government consumption. An increase in Y 
and/or in Gc will start a multiplier process which will last beyond the year of the 
initial aid shock. If the increase in aid is temporary, the long run effect, i.e. the 
cumulated sum of all periods changes, will thus include two multiplier effects, 
namely income and government consumption multipliers, plus the initial impact 
effects.
For simplicity, let us assume a temporary increase in grants only. The long 
run effect38 on fiscal behaviour, on income and on consumption will be given by:
37 To obtain the static effects we substite out Ip, i.e. equation (3.30), in equations (3.33) for the impact 
on current income (i.e. (3.44)) and in the semi-structural equations (3.41), (3.42) and (3.43) for the 
impact on fiscal variables. We then take the derivatives of the dependent variables with respect to aid. 
The static impact of aid on consumption is finally derived using equation (3.31) and the calculated 
dY/dA and dT/dA.
38 The derivation of these impacts is rather complex and tedious and will not be replicated here. It 
involves an iterative series of substitutions. A shock in year 1 will affect Ip, I,, Gc, T, Y and C. If the 
shock is temporary, in the next period we will still observe a direct effect on Ip, i.e. 3 l/dA,./, but also 
the indirect effects brought on by lagged Y and Gc on private investment and on fiscal variables, that is 
3 t,/d Y,.i, 3 Ig/d Gc,,.i, 3 Gc/d GCJ.i, 3 T/3 GCJ.i, plus the indirect effect on I,, Gc and T brought on by 
current Ip, i.e. 3 l /d  /,* 3 G,/d lp and 3 T/d lp. As a result, current income will also be affected and will 
influence the economy in the subsequent period. In the third period, all the direct effects will have 
been absorbed, but lagged Y and Gc will still propagate the effects of aid also through Ip. At the end of 
each period we calculated the impact on income and on Gc and used them for obtaining the next period 
change in Ip and subsequently the effects on fiscal variables. The iteration has produced a simultaneous 
system of geometric progressions which has finally been solved to yield (3.45) to (3.49).
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(3.45)
d GeJ„___ 1_ ^4^ 7 Pi ®6®Vll )
h  3 A tJa ~  4>g p  " + 8386a 7agp,
| «7 Pi (8, + 52S4a 8)QM>t, +86a gt|,) 
+ 8386a 7a gp,
^  3 7)+i S6a 8 0C7 p, (86 -  8486a g )(M> g + S .a ^ ,)
! ~ ®7 + — ---------
y  3 Y,+, _ +86a8T),
h  3 A g 0 <&,<!>„ +8386a 7agp,
v ’  3  C w  _  Y i (P2,i,i P2.1.2)
tS d A g.0 1-Y |
where
T|. =84( l+ a l0) - 8 4a 7(P2lil + p 212) 
TI2 = 82 (1 + a 10) + 8,a7 (P2,, + P 2ii,2)
= (85O10 ~ 86) + 86a 7 (P2, | + P212) 
1
fl = (85a 10- 86) +
O g = i - 83a«
**»> = 1-P .
1-Yi
■ + 86a 7 (P2.U +  P2.I.2 )
1-Y.
+ S6a 7
(3.46)
(3.47)
(3.48)
(3.49)
(3.50)
T)/, t |2, r)j and 0  represent the impact effect of aid on Gc, Ig, T and Y, respectively, 
after the first two periods following an aid shock. They embody the direct dynamic 
effect of aid on private investment in addition to the direct and indirect impact 
effects, but exclude all other dynamic linkages. lAt>K and lrt>y are the dynamic 
multipliers of lagged government consumption and income respectively39.
39 Similar results are obtained if we consider an increase in loans only. If we consider increases in both 
grants and loans the dynamic effect will be given by the sum of the two sets of effects.
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There are three components of the long run effect: first, the static direct and 
indirect impact of aid (intratemporal effect); second, the dynamic leakages related to 
lagged Gc and Y (intertemporal effects); and third, the combination of intra- and 
intertemporal effects caused by the consumption multiplier process working in 
combination with the dynamic linkages40.
Incidentally, equations (3.45) to (3.49) are equivalent to the difference 
between the new equilibrium level that the economy would attain if the increase in 
grants was set to be permanent and the initial equilibrium.
The next section presents the results from the empirical implementation of the 
model for the case of Indonesia using time series econometric estimation. The static 
impact of aid and its initial dynamic effect will be presented and discussed. The full 
dynamics of the model will be described analysing graphic output of the simulated 
model.
3.4. Econometric Estimation.
3.4.1. Data and Estimation Problems.
We use a time-series data set which covers Indonesia over the period 1968- 
199341. All data are given in billions of real rupiahs using the 1985 GDP deflator.
40 In the long run, the economy resettles to its initial equilibrium provided that:
+8386a7agP| <1.
41 The period 1960 to 1967 has been deliberately excluded so that results would not be influenced by 
those years of economic and political turmoil (as it has been described in the first chapter).
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Government data are drawn both from national official sources (mainly Bank of 
Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, various issues) and from IMF, Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook (various issues). In both cases, they have been adjusted for 
solar year, given that fiscal year begins on the lsl April42. Data on macroeconomic 
aggregates are taken from IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
Finally, aid dollar data are obtained from OECD, Geographical Distribution o f 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries (various issues). They have been converted 
to rupiahs using the IMF published dollar exchange rate. Appendix 8 lists all the 
variables and the relevant sources.
We deem the use of data expressed in real terms consistent with the model and 
superior to the use of ratios to GDP, per capita figures and logarithmic transformations. 
Ratios to GDP surreptitiously introduce endogenous income. As a result, the 
econometric specification is inconsistent with the theoretical model. Per capita figures 
mask the addition of a new variable to the system, namely population. Assuming 
population is exogenous is unrealistic, although it could fit easily in the model. On the 
other hand, modelling population as being endogenously determined, for instance 
assuming population growth is affected by government spending in health care, and 
would need a rewriting of the model which would complicate it further. The use of 
logarithms implies that the whole model is not linear. The model would then need a 
careful reinterpretation.
42 The adjustment for solar year has been carried out on a constant flow assumption. While this is 
clearly a strong assumption, we do not have sufficient information for an alternative method of 
apportionment.
118
Most empirical studies on fiscal response (for instance Gang and Khan, 1991; 
Khan and Hoshino, 1992; McGillivray and Papadopoulos, 1991; and Pack and Pack, 
1990) use budgetary statistics of the country governments. Aid data are generally taken 
either from the OECD statistics or from government sources.
Indonesian data presents some problems, even though government statistics 
provide detailed time-series across the whole period. Fiscal aggregates comprise 
budgetary accounts only and are divided into four main series: domestic and 
development - i.e. aid - revenues, and routine and development expenditures. They 
differ from the corresponding IMF government statistics, which instead include also 
extrabudgetary accounts. This is a relevant issue, given the size of Pertamina, the oil 
state company, and of its operations. Moreover, development revenues are not included 
in IMF government revenues. Routine and development expenditure correspond to IMF 
figures for budgetary current and capital expenditures respectively, apart from minor 
discrepancies. A second problem is that aid revenues from government sources are 
neither disaggregated into grants and loans nor into bilateral and multilateral flows. 
Most seriously, they are not comparable with aid data as provided from OECD sources. 
Given that the fiscal years begin 1st April, some differences in aid flows may be 
explained by the different time coverage: fiscal year for aid revenues and solar years for 
OECD aid data. Looking at the data discrepancies, however, this cannot fully account 
for such differences. From the government sources to which access to was available 
sufficient information was not obtainable on the composition of their aid revenues, so 
that a full explanation of such discrepancy was not possible.
According to budgetary data from national official sources (henceforth GOV 
dataset), the size of the government sector is underestimated, aid data of uncertain
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composition and unknown donor source are used, and the impact of different types of 
aid cannot be analysed. The only advantage is that the budget constraint is statistically 
met, given the balanced budget rule43. On the other hand, if IMF data on government 
behaviour and OECD aid data are employed (henceforth IMF-OECD dataset), the 
above mentioned problems are solved.
Using the second set of data, namely IMF-OECD dataset, the estimations have 
been replicated with the other set of data for comparison purposes (reported in 
appendixes 4, 5 and 6). Given the simultaneity that stems from private investment we 
estimated the system using instrumental variables. Moreover, given the budget 
constraint we only estimated two of the three equations, namely equations (3.41) and 
(3.43); the coefficients for the third one, equation (3.42) can be derived algebraically. 
The equations were estimated three times, allowing for distinction between grants and 
loans, bilateral versus multilateral aid, and total aid.
Simultaneous estimation methods could also be used. The empirical literature 
on fiscal response has in fact mostly employed system estimation methods, such as 
2SLS or 3SLS. While on the one hand this last method would result in lower variance, 
it suffers most of the lack of degrees of freedom and propagates single equations 
problems to the whole system. Our dataset has not enough degrees of freedom to be 
confident with 3SLS results. We have replicated the estimations for both the IMF- 
OECD and the GOV datasets and results are reported in appendix 7. Further research 
may focus on the VAR approach, which would allow full incorporation of dynamic
43 It now becomes apparent how this rule should be interpreted with care, if not with suspicion.
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aspects as well as a detailed analysis of reduced form equations. Once again data 
constraints could result in a serious lack of degrees of freedom.
3.4.2. Results and Interpretation.
The econometric estimates on a time series basis show that aid does have an 
effect on fiscal behaviour, but mainly through private investment and the dynamic 
linkages stemming from lagged government consumption and income44. Tables 3.4.2.1, 
3.4.2.2 and 3.4.2.3 present the results for the three alternative models: Model I uses 
grants and loans, Model II bilateral and multilateral aid, and Model in total aid. 
Diagnostic test are reported in appendix 5. Tables 3.4.2.4, 3.4.2.5 and 3.4.2.6 report the 
calculated reduced form coefficients for each model expressed as percentage changes 
following a 1% shock in aid45. These tables show aid’s effect on the budget, on GDP 
and on private consumption on impact and after the second period, when dynamic 
linkages have started to operate (i.e. short run and medium run effects). The full long 
run dynamics of the estimated model is presented in the next paragraph.
Grants and loans do not exhibit a significant direct impact on fiscal behaviour. 
However, the interaction between fiscal behaviour and private investment decisions 
channels an indirect effect. Reduced form coefficients show that grants tend to 
discourage taxation efforts and to deflect resources away from public investment and to
44 Instrumental Variables estimations were carried out with PcGive 8.0 while 3SLS estimations were 
implemented with PcFiml 8.0.
45 The corresponding reduced form coefficients in levels are reported in Appendix 3.
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government consumption. On the contrary, loans positively affect government revenues 
and investment, although in the short run the impact on taxation is negative. However, 
the correct interpretation of the results should be based on statistically significant 
parameters, as pointed out in paragraph 3.2.3. The tables show both sets of results to 
highlight how misleading it would be to rely on all parameters, significant and 
insignificant.
In fact, if we consider significant parameters only, there is no evidence of a 
short term impact either on fiscal behaviour or on income and consumption. Once 
dynamic linkages initiate a multiplier process, statistically significant effects emerge. 
At the end of the second period following the aid shock, a 1% increase in grants 
discourages taxation efforts and leads to a 4% drop in revenues. Similarly, on the 
expenditure side, investment and consumption will be curtailed, although investment 
will be reduced by less than consumption. Thus, grants seem to partly finance a 
tightening in fiscal policy aimed at reducing the size of government and exhibit a pro- 
investment bias. As for loans, the effect is reversed. A 1% rupiah increase in loans 
results in 1.7% increase in tax revenues leading to higher public investment and 
consumption. Even if public consumption grows more than investment, investment still 
increases more than proportionately with respect to the increase in loans. This implies 
that loans pro-consumption bias is not high enough to cause fungibility.
An explanation for the opposite effects of grants and loans may lie in the 
disincentive effect of receiving non-repayable grant money, which are used by policy 
makers to reduce the tax burden. Given the budget constraint, reduced finances result in 
reduced outlays and a general depressing effect on the whole economy. On the other 
hand, loans add interest payments and the final capital payback burden to the budget, so
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that they induce an intensification of tax collection efforts. Although increased 
revenues will finance public investment less than public consumption, the whole 
economy will benefit as a result of the multiplier process. As shown in table 3A.2.4 to 
3.4.2.6, the effect on income and private consumption are both negative in the grant 
case and positive in the loans case. The size of the coefficients in general is due to the 
small figures for aid as a proportion of GDP, which ranged from 1% to 6.2%. In 
particular, grants never exceeded 1% of GDP and loans ranged between 1% and 5.2%.
Interestingly, the use of the GOV dataset, yields different results. The impact of 
aid is direct and not channelled via private investment. Grants have a significant 
negative impact, while loans exhibit insignificant effects.
Model II and Model IE perform less well than Model I. The impact effect of aid 
is only direct as coefficients for bilateral, multilateral and total aid in the private 
investment equation are insignificant. Moreover, there is no evidence of long run 
effects on the budget, on income and on private consumption from multilateral aid. In 
both models, bilateral and total aid negatively affect, on impact, only taxation, public 
consumption and income, while there is no statistical evidence for their effects on 
public investment and private consumption. However, at the end of the second period, 
not only T and Gc but also Ig will be curtailed as a consequence of an increase in 
bilateral or total aid. In both cases, there is a pro-investment bias, given that 
government investment will be reduced by .8% and .9%, respectively, against a fall in 
public consumption of 1.3% and 1.2%, respectively.
Once again results from the corresponding regressions using the GOV dataset 
differ. Government taxation efforts are significantly influenced by bilateral and
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multilateral aid. Bilateral aid has a direct and negative impact only. On the contrary, 
multilateral aid positively affects taxes, both directly and indirectly. Surprisingly, public 
investment does not interact with private investment decisions and the only aid effect 
comes from bilateral aid and is negative. When we turn to total aid results the only 
significant effect is the direct negative impact on taxation efforts.
As for general diagnostics, the three model perform well when estimated with 
the IMF-OECD dataset. The estimated equations (restricted reduced forms of the 
structural model) appear to parsimoniously encompass their respective unrestricted 
reduced forms. There is also no evidence of problems of autocorrelation and 
misspecification. On the contrary, for all the three models estimated with GOV dataset, 
diagnostic tests do not allow us to accept the null of the equations parsimoniously 
encompassing the unrestricted reduced forms. There are also problems of 
autocorrelation in both the private and the public investment equations when bilateral 
and multilateral aid are used.
The comparison with 3SLS results in all cases tend to confirm the 
corresponding results from IV estimations. However, these model perform badly in 
terms of some diagnostic tests. The most serious problem is the rejection in all cases of 
the null that the reduced model parsimoniously encompasses the system. There are 
problems of autocorrelation in most equations and of normality for public investment.
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Finally, it is worth noting the robustness of the private consumption equation. 
The long run estimated marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income is 
0.62 for the IMF-OECD dataset and 0.60 for the GOV dataset46.
Table 3.4.2.I. Model I. Grants and Loans (IMF-OECD Dataset)
Constant I imf *D out,., r  imf«e,H A, A,
rpimf 2661.0**
(1239.7)
.37“
(.07)
.46”
(.19)
.65“
(.28)
-3.04
(3.24)
-.75
(1.07)
1  imf 
** -932.6(876.5)
.09’
(.05)
.31“
(.13)
.60"
(.20)
-2.78
(2.29)
1 .0 2
(76)
Instruments used: Ag,,.i, A|,t.i, OFt_i, Y u , Dcred.
Constant Oil tv, r  imf 'Jc.l-l A, A, A«.i-i A|,m OF,., Y vi Dcred
■ imf -10098**
(1793.6)
-.03
( 22)
-.50
(.41)
6.14
(3.72)
.30
(1.30)
-14.3“
(5.68)
3.67“
(1.48)
-.80"
(27)
.37“
(.06)
.15“
(04)
Private Consumption Equation: Long Run 
C = 10990“  Constant +.62“  Yd‘mf
(2460) (.05)
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
46 Woo, Glassburner and Nasution (1994) obtain a 0.63 elasticity of the private consumption deflator 
with respect to the GDP deflator. This is loosely comparable with our estimated marginal propensities 
to consume, 0.62.
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Table 3.4.2.2. Model II. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset)
Constant I « out,., P imf«C.U Ab Am
rjiimf 2893.4" .41" .47" .47' -1.63" 3.47
(1200.1) (.07) (.18) (.26) (.74) (315)
I ,“"' -634.2 .08 .34" .49" .26 .005(903.2) (.05) (.14) (.20) (.56) (2.37)
Instruments used: Ab,,_i, OF,.,, Y,.i, Dcred.
Constant Oilt,., g~* imf t-1 Ab Am Ab.t-i Ani,|.i OF,., Y ,., Dcred
■ imf 
*P -6858.3**(1915.4)
- .0 2
(.25)
.23
(61)
-1.16
(1.44)
3.99
(6.93)
2.49
(1.65)
-9.78
(7.87)
-.52
(32)
.23"
(.08)
.17"
(05)
Private Consumption Equation: Long Run
C = 11040* Constant +.62** Yd1"*
(2581) (.05)
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3.4.2.3. Model III. Total Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset)
Constant i.“ out,., G«,,.,“ A
rjiiltlf 2989.3" .38" .47" .56" -1.28'
(1214.7) (.07) (18) (.26) (72)
i f * -719.5 .08 .34" .50" .28(881.5) (.05) (13) (.19) (53)
Instruments used: A,.,, OF,., Y u , Dcred.
Constant out,., r  imf A A,., OF,., Y i-i Dcred
« imf 
*P -8178.7**(1693.3)
-.04
(25)
-.33
(.44)
.0 2
(1.19)
1 .2 1
(1.25)
-.69"
(.30)
.31"
(.06)
.14"
(.05)
Private Consumption Equation: Long Run
c  = 10980** Constant +.62** Yd“"'
(2449) (.05)
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Percentage Changes Following a 1% Increase in Aid.
Table 3.4.2.4. Model I. Grants and Loans (IMF-OECD Dataset (.Estimated
Impacts on the Budget, on GDP and on Consumption.
All Parameters 
1“ period 2nd Period
Significant Parameters 
1" Period 2nd Period
a T /d  A , A I TK R -.7 -3.1 - -4.7
-5.0 -4.0 - -2.9
dGc / d A g Ag / g c 3.3 -.9 - -5.4
a T Id A, A, I T - .8 .3 - 1.7
d l g I d  A, A, l l g 3.3 3.0 - 1 . 1
a Gc I d  A, A, /  Gc - 1 .2 .5 - 1.8
d Y / d A g Ag / Y 1 .0 -4.5 - -5.7
d Y  I d  A, A, / Y -.04 1.5 - 1.7
d C / d A g Ag 1C .4 -3.8 - -4.7
d C I d  A, A, 1C .0 2 1 .2 - 1 .2
Table 3.4.2.5. Model II. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). 
Estimated Impacts on the Budget, on GDP and on Consumption.
Percentage Changes Following a 1% Increase in Aid.
All Parameters 
1“ period 2nd Period
Significant Parameters 
1” Period 2nd Period
3 T l d A h A J T -2.5 -2.4 -1.9 -2.4
d l g / d A h A j l g .5 - 1 .0 - -.9
dGc 1 d Ah Ah /Gc -2 .1 - 1 . 1 - 1.0 -1.3
a T / d A m Am / T 3.6 3.3 - -
d l , / d A m An I I g .7 5.4 - -
3Cc l d A m Am / G c 8 .1 4.5 - -
a Y I d  Ah A J Y -.5 .4 - . 2 -.4
d Y l d A m Am / Y 1.5 -2.7 - -
d C / d A h Ah I C - . 1 .6 - - . 1
d C / d A m Am/ C .2 -3.2 - -
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Percentage Changes Following a 1% Increase in Aid.
Table 3.4.2.6. Model III. Total Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). Estimated Impacts on
the Budget, on GDP and on Consumption. Elasticities.
All Parameters 
1“ period 2nd Period
Significant Parameters 
1" Period 2nd Period
3 T / d A  A I T -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 - 1 .8
a  l t  I d A  A l l g .8 .2 - - .8
a  Gc I d A ■ A I Gc -.9 -.5 -.4 -.7
a  Y I d  A A l  Y - .2 .1 - . 2 -.6
3 C / d A  A I C .0 2 .3 - -.3
3.4.3. A Simulation Exercise.
The estimated parameters are also used to simulate the impact of grants and 
loans on fiscal and macroeconomic variables in order to explore the full long run 
dynamics of the estimated model. Graphs 3.2.3.1 to 3.4.3.6 show the simulated effects 
that temporary and permanent shocks in grants, loans and joint grants and loans have 
on all the endogenous variables of the system. We carried out simulations47 using 
shocks of the size of the estimated standard errors from autoregressive regressions of 
grants and loans, namely 69.32 billion rupiahs for grants and 279.27 billion rupiahs for 
loans. Percentage changes are plotted against time.
47 Simulations have been carried out with TSP 4.3.
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Graph 3.4.3.I. Effect of a Temporary Shock in Grants.
Y;-----  Ip :----  c:
Graph 3.4.3.2. Effect of a Temporary Shock in Loans.
Y:------- Ip:-----  C:
% Change on the vertical axis; time on the horizontal axis.
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Graph 3.4.3.3. Effect of a Temporary Joint Shock in Grants and Loans.
Y:-------  Ip :------ C:
% Change on the vertical axis; time on the horizontal axis.
Graph 3.4.3.4. Effect of a Permanent Shock in Grants.
Y:----  Ip:----  C:
% Change on the vertical axis; time on the horizontal axis.
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Graph 3.4.3.S. Effect of a Permanent Shock in Loans.
Y:------ I p —  C:
% Change on the vertical axis; time on the horizontal axis.
Graph 3.4.3.6. Effect of a Permanent Joint Shock in Grants and Loans.
Y;------ Ip :—  C:
% Change on the vertical axis; time on the horizontal axis.
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Simulations confirm the preceding discussion of the results. We note briefly the 
overall negative impact of grant aid in contrast to the generally positive impact of loans. 
Their joint impact is also positive, except for a 2 periods adjustment in taxation efforts. 
What is striking is the size of the short period impact in all cases. This may be ascribed 
once again to the relative little weight of grants and loans to GDP. In fact, the 
temporary effects tend to stabilise to values not in excess of 2.5%. Not surprisingly, 
private and public investment are the most sensitive to such shocks, given the structure 
of the model. On the budget side, the policy maker in this simulated economy would 
reduce taxation efforts for about one year as a response to increased loans and joint 
loans and grants. Afterwards, tax revenues would rise again. The increase in public 
investment would therefore be at the expenses of taxation efforts only in the very short 
run. Grants alone would only harm the budget and the overall economy. Similar 
behaviour can be inferred when considering the reactions to permanent shocks. Not 
surprisingly, these cause a much higher impact on the economy, especially on 
investment decisions, both private and public.
3.4.5. A Comparative Perspective.
Our results on loans effectiveness are in line with Pack and Pack (1990) 
conclusions on aid effectiveness in Indonesia. They find that in Indonesia aid does not 
displace development expenditure nor lead to tax reduction. Moreover, they show there 
is no evidence of categorical fungibility since aid is not diverted from the use intended 
by the donors to other categories of spending. However, our findings of a negative
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effect, if any at all, of total aid, grants, bilateral and multilateral aid are in contrast with 
Pack and Pack conclusions.
The difference between their results and ours can be explained by the markedly 
different modelling approach used, and by the different dataset and sample period 
employed. Pack and Pack address the issue of categorical fungibility within a three 
equation model (plus a budget constraint) centred on the government sector only and 
closely related to the literature on public decision making. They use government 
aggregated aid revenues and disaggregate development expenditure into various 
categories over the period 1966-86. On the contrary, our approach focuses on the issue 
of aggregate fungibility and on the interactions of the public sector with the rest of the 
economy within an expanded fiscal response model. We use OECD disaggregated aid 
data and aggregated public investment over the period 1968-93.
Compared to results from other fiscal response empirical studies, our findings 
confirm them only in part. In particular, they are at variance with Heller and Pillai’s 
(1982) results on the positive impact of loans on public investment and the negative 
effect of grants on taxation. Notably, our negative assessment on the effectiveness of 
total aid combined, bilateral and multilateral aid matches Mosley’s et al. pessimism. 
Furthermore, the insignificant effect of grants and loans we have found is in line with 
the statistically insignificant reduced form coefficients obtained by Gang and Khan. 
However, our results strongly differ from theirs once dynamics are taken into account. 
Khan and Hoshino’s reduced form coefficients are only significant and positive for the 
impact of aid on public investment. This compares with our loans result. Finally, 
McGillivray and Papadopoulos’ reduced form coefficients show the only significant
133
impact aid has is on government consumption and is negative. Once again, this 
confirms only partly with our results.
In sum, the empirical evidence from fiscal response literature is mixed. The fact 
that our results confirm, and contrast, partly and in different ways all the studies 
mentioned here demonstrates the complexity of the effectiveness debate, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective.
3.5. Final Comments and Directions for Further Research.
The general lesson we draw from our analysis is threefold. On the aid issue, we 
conclude with a positive assessment of aid giving, provided it is given in loans. The 
burden of repayments stimulates a commitment to a fiscal behaviour such that perverse 
effects are prevented. Loans are found to encourage tax collection, public and private 
investment and consumption so that the whole economy benefits. On the contrary, total 
combined aid, grants, multilateral and bilateral aid negatively affect all fiscal variable 
as well as income and consumption. However, they reduce public consumption more 
than investment, thus exhibiting a pro-investment bias.
The second consideration is one of rethinking the modelling approach. The lack 
of consensus on aid effectiveness which emerges from the empirical studies is an 
indicator that the fiscal response modelling approach presents some weaknesses. 
Further research should include the monetary sector in the theoretical framework in 
order to take into account interest rates, inflation and monetary policy issues. Another 
important theoretical contribution would be the introduction of an asymmetric objective
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function for the government consistent with utility maximisation when targets are met. 
Further investigation is also needed to explain the nature of the budget constraint, that 
is whether it is linear or kinked, single or dual.
We have stressed the importance of static feedback effects and of dynamic 
linkages. It is our contention that their role is a crucial one in understanding aid 
effectiveness and must not be underestimated. A structuralist approach could focus on 
the three gap model (see for example White, 1994b), while more traditional views 
could analyse aid effectiveness in the endogenous growth theoretical framework. A 
dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model would shed light on the 
intrasectoral interactions across time in the presence of aid. This approach, however, 
has prohibitive data and analytical costs48.
Finally, the disaggregation of aid into grant and loan and into bilateral and 
multilateral aid has shown different impact of each aggregate, when compared to total 
combined official aid. It is thus important to take into account the forms and the nature 
in which aid is given. There is a variety of alternative aid disaggregations. One of the 
most significant ones refers to the distinction between tied versus untied aid and is 
related to the issue of the conditions attached to aid inflows the receiver has to fulfil. 
This has interesting policy and political implications49.
The final consideration focuses on methodological aspects. The fact that our 
results change across the models and depending on the dataset used is likely to be an
48 For an example of static CGE modelling in the presence of aid see Benjamin et al. (1989), Radelet 
(1991) and Weisman ( 1990).
49 There is a growing literature on aid tying. See for instance Jepma (1991) and Morrissey and White 
(1993 and 1994).
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indicator that they are not too robust. The issue of the choice of data is shown to be a 
source of potential misinterpretation of results. At the same time, the estimation method 
is also important. The poor performance of our model when estimated simultaneously, 
with 3SLS estimation techniques, is probably due to the lack of degrees of freedom. 
What is cause for concern is the poor discussion of both issues in the existing literature. 
It is worth stressing how results heavily depend on the datasets used and on the 
estimation techniques employed. Moreover, results are comparable only if similar data 
conventions are adopted.
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In paragraph 3.2.4., we discussed White’s contribution and pointed out some 
shortcomings in his modelling approach. This appendix presents a slightly modified 
version of White’s model (1993) and solves it statically and dynamically. The notation 
for the variables used is the same employed in paragraph 3.2.4.
White’s model is incorrectly solved as endogenous income is not differentiated 
with respect to T and G in the derivation of first order conditions. Moreover, if the 
country receives aid, it is an open economy. If we assume, for simplicity, that all aid is 
capital in nature and that there are no other capital movements to and from the rest of 
the world, then we can rewrite the balance of payments as:
X — M = -A  (A2.1)
The starting point is a simplified quadratic utility function in the usual 
arguments:
U = - ^ - ( G - G ’)2 - ^ - ( T - T *)2 (A2.2)
which is maximised subject to the simple budget constraint:
G = T +A  (A2.3)
Target values are determined as linear combination of instrumental variables. In 
particular, G’ is defined as a fraction of lagged government expenditure and T* as a 
fraction of current income:
G* = otjG,., (A2.4)
T'=ot<Y (A2.5)
Appendix 2. A Dynamic Fiscal Response Model With Endogenous Income.
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The model is closed by the introduction of an equation for private investment
(Ip) and two standard macroeconomic relationships:
C = Yo+Y,(Y-T) (A2.6)
I = Ip = “ 5 + a 6A (A2.7)
Y = C + I + G + (X -M ) = C + I + G —A (A2.8)
Substituting the expression for consumption in the income identity we obtain:
Y = —i— (Yo+I + G - y,T -A ) (A2.9)
l-Y i
Since T is a function of current income, the correct first order conditions 
include also derivatives of T* with respect to Y, as shown in the following equations:
f i - - a l(O- O - ) - a , ( 7 - - r ) . £ . f I - X . 0
a r  b y  .  n —— — + x = o
dY dT
(A2.10)
where L is the Lagrangean and A. is the constraint parameter.
It can be shown that the reduced form solutions for G, T and Y are given by the 
following equations:
c  = a 2a 4( l - a 4) ( Y o + a 5) + a | a i ( l - Y i ) G , - 1 + a 2(1- « 4 ) [ ( l - « 4 ) 0 - Y i )  +  tx4a 6]A
( 1 - Y i ) [ a ,  + q 2( l - q 4)2]
(A2.ll)
T q 2a 4( l - q 4)(Yo +  a , ) + a i a 2( l - Y l)G,-l + [ « 2 « 4 « 6 ( l - « 4 ) - « i ( l - Y l )]A
( l -Y ,) [ a ,+ a 2( l - a 4 ) 2]
(A2.12)
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y _ [ a , + a 2( l - a 4)](Y0 + a 5) +  a | a 3( l -Y , )G,_ l + ( a 6[a|  + a 2( l - a 4) ] - a , ( l - 7 , )}A
( l - Y , ) [ a l + a 2( l - a 4)2]
(A2.13)
Therefore, the static short run impact of an aid inflow embodies the
consumption multiplier effect and is given by:
a  g °t2 (1 — CX4 )[(1 — 0t4 )(1 — Y|)'*'tX4CX6]
d A  ~ (1—Y, )[a,  + a 2( l - a 4)2]
a T  _ a 2a 4a 6( l - a 4) - a , ( l - Y , )
a A Cl—Y, )[ot, + a 2( l - a 4)2]
3Y a j a ,  + a 2( l - a 4) ] - a , ( l - Y , )
d A ( l - Y , ) [ a , + a 2( l - a 4)2]
(A2.14)
(A2.15)
(A2.16)
Given that the denominator is positive, the sign of aid’s impact crucially 
depends on the sign and magnitude of the investment response to an aid inflow, that is 
on 06- In particular, given that cl,, the ratio of T* to Y, is unlikely to be negative.
q
j| 
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>| 
qj
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l
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o i f a 6 > 0 or a 6 < 0  and  ( l - a 4) ( l - Y , ) > - a 4a 6
(A2.17)
i f a 6 < 0 and ( l - a 4) ( l - Y , ) < - a 4a 6
d A
| I < 0
d A
i f a 6 > 0 and ot2tx4ot6(l -  a 4) > a ,  (1 -  Yi)
(A2.18)
i f a 6 < 0 or a 2a 4a 6( l - a 4) < a , ( l - Y , )
| —> 0  
dA
| I < 0
dA
i f a 6 > ° and a j a ,  + a 2( l - a 4) ] > a , ( l - Y , )
(A2.19)
i f
oV<oa o r  a 6 > 0  and  a j a ,  + a 2( l - a 4) ] < a l( l ~ Y l)
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Aid will affect the economy dynamically via lagged G. If the shock is 
temporary, in the long run income will return to its initial equilibrium, but the
cumulated sum of all the single periods effects will be given by:
<I>
where <J> = (1 — y, )[a, + a 2(l -  a 4)2]
a 6[a, + a 2( l - a 4) ] -c t , ( l -Y ,)  | a.oc,<x2ot3(l — tx4)[(l — cx4)(l — -y, )-h a 4ot6] 
[a,  + a 2( l - a 4)2] - a , a 3
(A2.20)
which, incidentally, corresponds to the new equilibrium level at which income would 
settle if the aid shock was permanent. Note that the system will be stable provided that
Although the multiplier, given by l/<t>, is larger than the multiplier obtained 
by White, the final impact and dynamic effect of aid will in general be smaller. If aid 
encourages private investment, GDP will also rise and more taxes will be collected. 
As a result, the response of the government will be relatively smaller than the 
response in White’s model: the inclusion of current income in taxes target formation 
implies a higher emphasis on the multiplier channel than on government intervention.
For illustrative purposes, White runs simulations for his model using the 
following set of parameters: a/=(X2=0.50, 013= 1.03, ol,=0.40, a?=0 ex« =0.25, Yo= 2 0  
and Y/=0-70. Using the same values for these parameters, we obtain: 3GC/3A=0.41, 
3T/3A= -0.59, 3Y/3A=0.24 and a long run effect of 0.51 on income. These responses 
are much smaller than the ones derived using White’s model, namely: 3GC/3A= 1.42, 
3T/9A=0.42, 3Y/3A=4.58 and a long run effect of 7.14 on income.
(1 -Y,) [a ,  +  a 2( l - c x 4)2] > 0 (A2.21)
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Table A.3.1. Model I. Grants and Loans (IMF-OECD Dataset). Estimated 
Impacts on the Budget, on GDP and on Consumption.
Appendix 3. Impact of Aid. Reduced Forms Coefficients in Levels.
All Parameters 
l '1 period 2nd Period
Significant Parameters 
l"  Period 2 nd Period
B T / B A g -.77 -3.46 - -5.29
-2.23 -1.79 - -1.29
BGC /  3Ag 2.46 -.67 - -4.00
BT/ BA, -.64 .23 - 1.36
dlg /  dA, 1.05 .96 - .33
dGc /  dAl -.69 .27 - 1.03
d r / d A g 7.31 -33.97 - -42.90
BY/ BA, -.24 9.65 - 11.02
B C / B A g 1.94 -18.92 - -23.32
dC  /  dA[ .10 5.84 - 5.99
Table A.3.2. Model II. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). 
Estimated Impacts on the Budget, on GDP and on Consumption.
All Parameters 
1“ period 2“1 Period
Significant Parameters 
1“ Period 2nd Period
d T / B A h -2.11 -2.03 -1.63 -2.08
dlg /  BAb .17 -.33 - -.31
dGc /  dAb -1.28 -.70 -.63 -.77
B T / dAm 5.11 4.79 - -
31, 1X "1 .32 2.57 - -
dGr /c m 5.79 3.22 - -
d Y / d A h -3.62 2.34 -1.63 -3.07
B Y l d A m 10.29 -19.51 - -
B C I B A h -.35 2.71 - -.61
d C / d A m 1.19 -15.1 - -
Table A.3.3. Model III. Total Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). Estimated Impacts on 
the Budget, on GDP and on Consumption.
All Parameters 
l” period 2"d Period
Significant Parameters 
1“ Period 2nd Period
B T  /BA -1.27 -1.26 -1.28 -1.59
B l g /BA .28 .07 - -.14
BGC1 BA -.55 -.33 -.28 -.45
B Y / B A -1.24 .68 -1.28 -3.91
B C/ B A .01 1.21 - -1.44
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Appendix 4. GOV Dataset Instrumental Variables Estimates.
Table A.4.1. Model IV. Grants and Loans (GOV Dataset).
Constant T gov*P out,., p gov «c.t-1 A, A,
rpgOV 3996.3“ .31 .46“ .59 -6.46* -.39
(1562.5) (.20) (.21) (.54) (3.74) (121)
I gov 2453.4* .11 .42" .35 -5.68* -.03
(1197) (.16) (.16) (.41) (2.86) (93)
Instruments used: Ag.t-1 • Ai,t-i OF,.,, Y, i, Dcred.
Constant out,., Gc.,.,-" A, A, At.t-i Aut-i OF,., Y,., Dcred
I gov -12420“ -.52“ .83* 3.91 1.92 15.8” 3.44“ -.85“ .32** .03(1889.4) (.21) (.44) (3.64) (1-21) (5.29) (130) (.26) (.06) (.04)
Private Consumption Equation: Long Run
C = 11100“  Constant +.60** Yd8“'
(2196) (.04)
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A.4.2. Model V. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (GOV Dataset).
Constant |  gov*p o u t,., f l  .*°V W , t-i Ab A .
rpgOV 4212.2“ .45“ .46" .16 -2.19“ 6.50’
(1455.2) (.19) (.20) (.48) (.90) (3.55)
I,«ov 2297.6* .13 .40“ .21 -1.45“ 4.08(1144.5) (15) (15) (.38) (.71) (2.79)
Instruments used: Ab,,.|, Am,,.,, OF,.|, Y u , Dcred.
Constant out,., G,. Ab A„ Abj., Am.t-1 OF,., Y,., Dcred
f gov -5449.2**
(1770.5)
-.52“
(.18)
1.70"
(.37)
-1.18
(95)
11.4“
(4.88)
1.58*
(.86)
-21.0“
(5.30)
-.19
(.24)
.13“
(05)
.02
(.04)
Private Consumption Equation: Long Run
C = 11080“  Constant +.60" Yd*0''
(2163) (.04)
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.4.3. Model VI. Total Aid (GOV Dataset).
Constant |  gov out,., G , A*"
rpgöV 1907.3" .2 0 .70" .72 -.68"
(1047.5) (.26) (.16) (.71) (34)
¥ gov 846.46 .0 0 1
*00•n .45 -.32
(860.8) (.21) (.13) (58) (.28)
Instruments used: A, i1" , OF,. , Y t l . Dcred.
Constant out,., Gc,,.,r " A*" A ,,1" OF,., Y,., Dcred
I gov -7431.2**
(1290.2)
-.80"
(.20)
1.52"
(.61)
-.23
(44)
-.14
(.58)
-.52*
(27)
.2 2 "
(.07)
- .0 0 1
(.06)
Private Consumption Equation: Long Run
C = 11050" Constant +.60*’ Yd*"
(2083) (.04)
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
Appendix 5. Diagnostic Tests.
Table A.5.1. Model I. Grants and Loans (IMF-OECD Dataset). Diagnostic Tests.
T*mf RFR2=.99; 0=1042.66; DW=1.73; IV x2(4)=4.11 [.39]; IV P=0 x2(5)=1463 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=1.10 [.58]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=.15 [.70]; N x2(2)=3.67 [.16]; X,2 F(I0,9)=.76[.66]
I1ln'r RF R2=.99; o  =737.19; DW =2.29; IV x2(4)=3.75 [.44]; IV (3=0 x2(5)=755.4 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=.77 [.6 8 ]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=.80 [.38]; N x2(2)=3.72 [.15]; X,2 F(10,9)=3.3 [.05]
IB,mr R2=.99; F(9,16)=361.79 [.00]; 0=1088.28; DW=2.31; VIT:.110; JIT: 2.068
AR2F(2,14)=.44 [.65]; ARCH 1 F(l,14)=.30 [.59]; N x2(2)=2.35 [.31]
RESET F( 1,15)= 1.36 [.26]
Probabilities in squared brackets.
Table A.5.2. Model II. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). 
Diagnostic Tests.
T‘mf RFR2=.99; 0=1018.81; DW=1.62; IV x2(4)=4.53 [.34]; IV P=0 x2(5)=1536 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=4.38 [.11]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=.ll [.74]; N x2(2)=.44 [.80]; X 2F(10,9)=.94[.54]
It lmr RFR2=.98; 0  =766.75; DW=1.92; IV x2(4)=4.21 [.38]; IV p=0 x2(5)=696.6 [.00]
AR 2 X2(2)= 1.16 [.56]; ARCH 1 F( 1.18)= 1.27 [.27]; N x2(2)=5.38 [.07]; X,2 F(10,9)=1.39[.32]
Iplmf R2=.99; F(9,16)=265.16[.00]; o  =1270.07; DW =2.26; VIT: .260; JIT; 2.004
AR2F(2,14)=.22 [.80]; ARCH 1 F(l,14)=.03 [.85]; N x2(2)=3.26 [.19]
RESETF(l,15)=2.44 [.14]
Probabilities in squared brackets.
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Tlmf RFR2=.99; a  =1029.63; DW=1.64; IVx2(3)=3.48 [.33]; IV 0=0 x2(4)= 1500 [.001
AR 2 x2(2)=1.79 [.41]; ARCH 1 F(l,19)=.35 [.56]; N x2(2)=3.66 [.16]; X 2 F(8,12)=1.04[.46J
I,lraf RFR2=.98; 0  =747.20; DW=1.92; IV x2(3)=3.10 [.38]; IV (3=0 x2(4)=733.2 [.(X)]
AR 2 X2(2)= 1.23 [.54]; ARCH 1 F(l,19)=1.51 [.23]; N Z2(2)=5.3 [.07]; X,2 F(8,12)=2.40[.08]
Ipln,f R2=.99; F(7,18)=337.68 [.00]; 0=1275.58; DW =2.26; VIT: .319; JIT: 1.653
AR 2 F(2,16)=.26 [.78]; ARCH 1 F(l,16)=.13 [.72]; N x2(2)=1.09 [.58]
RESETF(l,17)=1.27 [.28]
Probabilities in squared brackets.
Table A.5.3. Model III. Total Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). Diagnostic Tests.
Table A.5.4. Model IV. Grants and Loans (GOV Dataset). Diagnostic Tests.
T80* RFR2=.99; o = l  185.73; DW=1.58; IV x2(4)=10.3 [.04]; IV 0=0 x2(5)=977.6 [.(X)]
AR 2 x2(2)=.61 [.74]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=.33 [.57]; N x2(2)=.39 [.82]; X,2 F( 10,9)= 1.06 [.47]
I ,80’ RF R2=.98; o  =908.39; DW =1.36; IV x2(4)=10.9 [.03]; IV 0=0 x2(5)=452.2 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=1.80 [.41]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=.19 [.6 6 ]; N x2(2)=3.21 [.20]; X 2 F(10,9)=.71 [.70]
Ip80* R2=.99; F(9,16)=445.17 [.00]; 0=1011.88; DW =2.64; V IT :.113; JIT: 1.799
AR2F(2,14)=2.51 [.12]; ARCH 1 F(l,14)=.16 [.69]; N x2(2)=.45 [.80]
RESETF(l,15)=.97 [.34]
Probabilities in squared brackets.
Table A.5.5. Model V. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (GOV Dataset). Diagnostic 
Tests.
T8°v RFR2=.99; o = l  134.69; DW=1.53; IV x2(4)=8.76 [.07]; IV 0=0 x2(5)= 1071.1 [00]
AR 2 X2(2)= 1.77 [.41]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=.05 [.83]; N x 2(2)=.79 [.67]; X 2 F(I0,9)=.48 [.87]
I ,80’ RF R2=.98; o  =892; DW=1.10; IV x2(4)=l 1.09 [.03]; IV 0=0 x2(5)=469.1 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=7.64 [.02]; ARCH 1 F(l,18)=1.32 [.26]; N x2(2)=3.62 [.16]; X,2 F(10,9)=.43[.90]
Ip80* R2=.99; F(9,16)=609.32 [.00]; 0=865.37; DW =3.20; VIT; .178; JIT: 1.483
AR 2 F(2,14)=7.80 [.01]; ARCH 1 F(l,14)=1.45 [.25]; N x2(2)=3.97 [.14]
RESETF(l,15)=.89 [.36]
Probabilities in squared brackets.
Table A.S.6. Model VI. Total Aid (GOV Dataset). Diagnostic Tests.
T80’ RFR2=.99; o = l  148.13; DW=I.57; IV x2(3)=l 1.58 [.01]; IV 0=0 xz(4)=1042.3 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=.84 [.6 6 ]; ARCH I F(l,19)=.01 [.94]; N x2(2)=.50 [.78]; X,2 F(8,12)=.48[.84]
I,80’ RF R2=.98; o  =943.59; DW =1.24; IV x2(3)=13.2 [.00]; IV 0=0 x2(4)=415.5 [.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=3.20 [.20]; ARCH 1 F(l,19)=.35 [.56]; N X2(2)=-93 [.63]; X,2 F(8,12)=.70 [.69]
Ip80'  R2=.99; F(7,18)=372.21 [.00]; 0=1253.05; DW =2.46; VIT: .133; JIT: 1.674
AR 2 F(2,16)=.55 [.59]; ARCH 1 F(l,16)=1.08 [.31]; N x2(2)=1.24 [.54]
RESETF(l,17)=.23 [.64]
Probabilities in squared brackets.
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Table A.6.1. Model I. Grants and Loans (IMF-OECD Dataset).
C  = 4372.3”  Constant +.24”  Ydln,f +.60” C,.,
(2148.3) (.10) (.18)
Diagnostic Tests : RF R2=.99; o  =2001.14; DW =1.95; IV x2(8)=8.21 [.41]; IV (3=0 
X2(2)=1839.2[.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=.25 [ 88]; ARCH 1 F(l,21)=.03 [.87]; N x2(2)=1.98 [.37]; X,2 F(4,18)=l ,20[.34] 
Instruments used: Ag, A,, Ag.,i, A|,n, OF,.|, Oilt, i, Gc,,.|"nf,Y,.i, Dcred.
Table A.6.2. Model II. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset).
C = 4186.3'Constant +.23”  Ydlmf +.62”  C,.,
(2145.6) (.10) (.18)
Diagnostic Tests: RF R2=.99; o  =2000.42; DW =1.98; IV x2(8)=10.4 [.24]; IV [3=0 x2(2)=I840.1[,00] 
AR 2 x2(2)= 08 [.96]; ARCH 1 F(l,21)=.04 [.84]; N x2(2)=1.71 [.42]; X ,2 F(4,18)=1.24[.33] 
Instruments used: Ab, Am, Abt.,, Am.,.|, OF,.|, Oilt,.|, Gc, Dcred.
Table A.6.3. Model III. Total Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset).
C = 4391.5”  Constant +.25”  Yd“  +.60” C,.,
(2152) (.10) (.18)
Diagnostic Tests: RFR 2=.99; 0  =2001.27; DW=1.95; IV x2(6 )=8 .12 [.23]; IV (3=0 x2(2)=1839[.00] 
AR 2 x2(2)=.23 [.89]; ARCH 1 F(l,21)=.02 [.8 8 ]; N x2(2)=2.00 [.37]; X 2 F(4,18)=1.20[.34] 
Instruments used: A, A n, OF,.|, Oilt, Gc,,.|“"t,Y,.|, Dcred.
Appendix 6. Short Run Private Consumption Equations. Instrumental Variables.
Table A.6.4. Model IV. Grants and Loans (GOV Dataset).
C = 4775.5”  Constant +.26”  Yd*”'  +.57”  C,.,
(2276.7) (.10) (.19)
Diagnostic Tests: RF R2=.99; o  =1932.57; DW =1.94; IV x2(8)=9.83 [.28]; IV (3=0 
X2(2)=1971.5[.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=. 16 [.92]; ARCH 1 F(l,21)=.44 [.52]; N x 2(2)=1.09 [.58]; X,2 F(4,18)=1.39[.28[ 
Instruments used: Ag, Ai, Ag.,.,, A|,,.|, OF,.|, Oilt,.|, Gc , i80, , Y D c r e d .
Table A.6.5. Model V. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (GOV Dataset).
C = 4839.9”  Constant +.26”  Yd*“'  +.56”  C,.,
(2280.9) (.10) (.19)
Diagnostic Tests: RF R2=.99; o  =1931.81; DW =1.93; IV x2(8)=9.58 [.29]; IV (3=0 
X2(2)=1973.2[.00]
AR 2 x2(2)=. 18 | .91]; ARCH I F(I,2I)=.42 [.52]; N x2(2)=1.12 [.57]; X,2 F(4,18)=1.38[.28] 
Instruments used: Ab, Am, At,,,.,, Aml.|, OF,.,, Oilt,.|, Gc,i.i*ov, Y Dcred.
Table A.6.6. Model VI. Total Aid (GOV Dataset).
C = 5005.1”  Constant +.27”  Yd*“'’ +.54”  C M
(2283.6) (.10) (.19)
Diagnostic Tests: RF R2=.99; 0  = 1930.3; DW =1.90; IV x2(6)=12.0 [ 06]; IV |3=0 x2(2)=1976.2[.00] 
AR 2 x2(2)=.21 [ 90]; ARCH 1 F(l,21)=.39 [.54]; N x2(2)=l.20 [.55]; X 2 F(4,18)=l.35[,29] 
Instruments used: A*0*, A-i*” . OF,.|, Oilt,.|, GC,,.|P’\Y D c r e d .
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.7.1. Model la. Grants and Loans (IMF-OECD Dataset). 3SLS.
Appendix 7. Three Stage Least Squares Results.
Constant 1 imf *P Oilt,., /-« imf A, A|
rpimf 3260" .41“ .46" .53' -2.77 -1.08
(1198) (.07) (17) (.26) (3.22) (1.05)
,  imf -754.9 . 1 0 ' .32 .56" -2.56 .89
(861.3) (.05) (13) (.19) (2.28) (75)
Constant A, A, A,..., A|.m OF,., Y,., Dcred
1  imf -10840" 3.94 .59 - 1 2 .2 “ 4.15“ -.78" .32“ .14“
(1563) (3.05) (1.11) (4.83) (1.21) (.23) (03) (.03)
Diagnostic tests
Tlmr ct =1069.5; AR 2 F(2,13)=2.52 [.12]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=.17 [.69]; N x2(2)=1.32 [.52]
It taf 0=741.6; AR 2 F(2,13)=7.34 [.01]; ARCH 1 F( 1,13)=.57 [ 46]; N x2(2)=5.68 [.06]
IDiraf 0=1038.8; AR 2 F(2,13)=4.33 [.04]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=.16 [.69]; N x 2(2)=1.21 [.55]
LR test of over-identifying restr. x2(13)=43.99[.00]; VAR 2 F(18,34)=1.17 [.34]; VN x2(6)=7.04 [.32]
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities in 
squared brackets.
Table A.7.2. Model Ila. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). 
3SLS.
Constant ■ imf out,., P imf«C.M Am
rpimf 3099" .42“ .41“ .51” -1.82" 3.34
(1134) (.07) (.14) (.23) (.67) (3.14)
I ,hnf -625.6 .08 .32" .52" .23 -.08
(889) (.05) (13) (19) (55) (2.36)
Constant Ab Am Asa-, Aih,M OF,., Y,., Dcred
1 imf -7371” -.80 7.36 2.14“ , . _ *•-13.2 -.40' .26“ .15”
(1410) (.92) (5.24) (93) (4.89) (22) (.02) (.03)
Diagnostic tests
rpimf o=1025; AR 2 F(2,I3)=4.88 [.03]; ARCH 1 F(1 ,13)=.36 [.56]; N X2(2)=.16[.92]
1 imf o  =765.9; AR 2 F(2,13)=6.45 [.01]; ARCH 1 F(1 OJ ¥ Ln 00 [.46]; N X2(2)=6.43 [.04]
* imf lP 0=1175.8 AR 2 F(2,13)= .73 [.50]; ARCH 1 F(1 13)=.03 [.87]; N X2(2)=1.05 [.59]
LR test of over-identifying restr. x2(13)=38.02[.00]; VAR 2 F(18,34)=2.19 [.02]; VN x2(6)=3.94 [.6 8 ]
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities in 
squared brackets.
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Table A.7.3. Model Ilia. Total Aid (IMF-OECD Dataset). 3SLS.
Constant i.“ out,.,
imf A
rgsintf 3465“ .41“ .46” A T -1.47”
I,lmf
(1161) (.07) (.16) (24) (.68)
-681.7 .08 .34” .50” .26
(874.5) (.05) (.13) (.19) (52)
Constant A An OF,., Y,., Dcred
v imf -8988” .07 1.75- -.59" .27“ .13”
(1467) (.88) (.98) (25) (.02) (.04)
Diagnostic tests
Tirar 0=1054.6; AR 2 F(2,15)=2.80 [.09]; ARCH 1 F(l,15)=.17 [.69]; N x2(2)=.61 [.74]
Isln,f o  =747.8; AR 2 F(2,15)=5.26 [.02]; ARCH 1 F(l,15)=.72 [.41]; N x2(2)=7.84 [.02]
I„lmf 0=1220.1; AR2F(2,15)=1.78 [.20]; ARCH 1 F(l,15)=.04 [.85]; N x2(2)=1.18 [.55]
LR test of over-identifying restr. x2(l 1)=34.88[.00]; VAR 2 F(18,37)=l.95 [.04]; VN x2(6)=4.29 [.64]
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities in 
squared brackets.
Table A.7.4. Model IVa. Grants and Loans (GOV Dataset). 3SLS.
Constant ¥ gov *p out,., A, A,
rpgOV 4688” .30 .34* .69 -7.26" -.84
(1467) (.19) (19) (.51) (3.71) (1.17)
I,*" 2902” .09 .31” .49 -6.33” -.36
(1109) (.14) (.15) (.38) (2.82) (.89)
Constant A, A, At.,., A,.,., OF,., Y,., Dcred
I ROY -14070" 8.07" 2.41’ -15.7“ _ „ .*» 3.86 -.85“ .34“ .11“
(1699) (3.25) (1.18) (5.20) (1.29) (.25) (.03) (.03)
Diagnostic tests
T*0* 0=1198.5; AR 2 F(2,13)=4.45 [.03]; ARCH 1 F( 1.13)=. 14 [.72]; N x2(2)=.79 [.67]
I,*"’' 0=913.2; AR 2 F(2,13)=6.15 [.01]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=.35 [.56]; N x2(2)=4.22 [.12]
Ip*0’ 0=1121.0; AR 2 F(2,13)=5.86 [.01]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=.39 [.54]; N x2(2)=2.16 [.34]
LR test of over-identifying restr. x2(13)=31.88[.00]; VAR 2 F( 18.34)= 1.84 [.06]; VNx2(6)=4.29 [.64]
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities in 
squared brackets.
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Table A.7.5. Model Va. Total Aid (GOV Dataset). 3SLS.
Constant f gov *P Oilt,., r i ,t°y A b A „
rpgOV 4 5 9 8 ” .36* .29 A l
_ ** 
-2.73 6 .01“
(1339) (19) (.18) (.47) (.81) (3.55)
f  gov 2 5 2 8 ” .08 .29’ .41 -1 .7 8 ” 3 .77“
(1087) (.15) (.14) (37) (.66) (2.79)
Constant A b A m Ab.t-i A m,t-i O F ,. , Y , . , D cred
¥ gov -9 9 0 1 “ 1.07 6.2 1.59 -12 .9” -.49’ N) 00 .12“
(1537) (.95) (6.18) (1.0) (6.19) (.25) (.02) (.04)
Diagnostic tests
T '0’ 0=1131.9; AR 1 F(2,13)=4.44 [.03]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=.31 [.59]; N x2(2)=.48 [.79]
I,*"' 0  =896.9; AR 1 F(2,13)=7.06[.01]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=1.09 [.31]; N x2(2)=3.91 [.14]
Ipgov 0=1233.4; AR 1 F(2,13)=39.2 [.00]; ARCH 1 F(l,13)=.23 [.64]; N x2(2)=.77 [.68)
LR test of over-identifying restr. x2(13)=44.23[.00]; VAR 2 F(18,34)=l .92 [.05]; VN x2(6)=2.57 [.86]
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities in 
squared brackets.
Table A.7.6. Model Via. Total Aid (GOV Dataset). 3SLS.
Constant f gov *p out,., f l  .gov W.t-1 A*0'
rpgOV 2 3 8 0 ” .31 .71“ .47 - .6 4 '
(984.2) (.24) (15) (66) (33)
V " 1187 .08 .5 8 " .27 -.30
(820.8) (20) (.13) (.55) (27)
Constant A «°* A,.,*" OF,., Y,., D cred
I  gov -5 6 6 8 ” .01 1 .10 ' - .6 1 ' .19“ .2 0 "
(1086) (52) (62) (30) (03) (.03)
Diagnostic tests
T*OY o = l 196.1; AR 2 F(2,16)=4.23 [.03]; ARCH 1 F(l,16)=1.23 [.28]; N x2(2)=.0l [.99]
I,«“’ 0=966.4; AR 2 F(2,16)=6.91 [.01]; ARCH 1 F(l,16)=,51 [.49]; N x2(2)=.49 [.78]
Ip*"' o =1679.6; AR 2 F(2,16)=9.73 [.00]; ARCH 1 F(1,16)=.I2 [.74]; N x2(2)=5.44 [.07]
LR test of over-identifying restr. x2(8)=33.57[.00]; VAR 2 F(18,37)=1.83 [.06]; VN x2(6)=5.83 [.44]
*, ** denote significance at 10% and 5% respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Probabilities in 
squared brackets.
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Appendix 8. List of Variables: Glossary and Sources.
IMF, International Financial Statistics, Various Issues
Y Gross Domestic Product
C Private Consumption
I Gross Capital Formation
Dcred Domestic Credit
IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Various Issues
|  imf Government Capital Expenditure
I imf 
*P Private Investment defined as I- Iglrrf
G c‘mf Government Current Expenditure
rj-iimf Government Revenues
Ydlmf Total Disposable Income defined as Y- T”*
Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year, Various Issues
f  gov *8 Government Development Expenditure
f  gov 
Mp Private Investment defined as I- IeEOV
c r Government Routine Expenditure
rp*OV Government Domestic Revenues
A *" Government Development Revenues
Yd*"* Total Disposable Income defined as Y- T8°v
o u t Oil Revenues
OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 
Various Issues
A Net Official Development Assistance (ODA)
A , Net ODA Grants
A, Net ODA Loans
Ab Net Bilateral ODA
Am Net Multilateral ODA
OF Other Net Official Financial Flows Plus Net Export Credits Plus Net Direct and 
Portfolio Investment
GOV Dataset 
IMF-OECD Dataset
Dataset containing budgetary data from Bank of Indonesia, Report for 
the Financial Year
Dataset containing IMF data on government behaviour and OECD aid 
data (includes Oilt)
All data are given in billions of real rupiahs in terms of the 1985 GDP IMF deflator. 
Government figures have been adjusted for solar year. Aid dollar data have been converted to rupiahs by 
using the IMF published dollar exchange rate.
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Appendix 9. Abbreviations for Diagnostic Tests.
R2
RFR2
Coefficient of determination of the regression 
Reduced Form R2 (Instrumental variables estimation)
T Number of observations
k Number of dependent variables
F(k-l/T-k) F-test on the joint significance of all explanatory variables except the constant
o Standard error of the regression
DW Durbin Watson test for first order autocorrelation
rv x2 X2 test for the validity of the choice of the instrumental variables used
IV ß=0 X2 test on the joint significance of reduced form explanatory variables except the 
constant
AR 2 F, 
A R 2 XJ
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation up to the 
second lag (F- and x 2 forms).
ARCH 1 F LM F-test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity up to the first lag
Nx1
x ,2f
Doomik and Hansen x 2 test for univariate normality o f the residuals 
White’s F-test for heteroscedasticity using squares
RESETF Ramsey’s general F-test of misspecification
VIT Variance instability test
JIT Joint instability test for all the parameters in the model
3SLS System Diagnostics
LR test of overidentifying restr. Likelyhood Ratio test of whether the reduced model
<\#2 n a rc im n n in iis lv  p n rn m n a s s e s  th e  sv stemX
V A R F 2
p rsi o iou ly e co p  m  y t
LM F-test for system residuals autocorrelation up to
the second lag
V N x 2 X2 test for multivariate normality of the residuals
These tests are the standard output of the econometric package used, PcGive 8.0 and 
PcFiml 8.0. Full references and explanations for each test are available in most standard 
econometric textbooks, as well as in PcGive and PcFiml manuals.
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CHAPTER 4
REAL EXCHANGE RATE BEHAVIOUR IN INDONESIA. 
THEORETICAL AND STATISTICAL ISSUES.
4.1. Introduction.
This chapter analyses the behaviour of the real exchange rate (RER) for the 
Indonesian rupiah. In the first chapter, we have described foreign exchange policy in 
Indonesia since the 1960’s. The analysis presented here offers a theoretical and 
statistical background for the understanding of the RER. It also represents the first 
necessary step towards the empirical implementation of a model for RER behaviour, 
which will be presented and discussed in the next chapter. This model includes aid 
among the fundamental determinants of the RER. The role of aid can therefore be 
studied under a different perspective than the dynamic fiscal response model presented 
in chapter 3. The following analysis is a technical digression aimed at ascertaining the 
time series properties of the Indonesian RER1. The main findings are reported below, 
so that the reader could easily skip the rest of the chapter and turn to the 5th, if she/he is 
not interested in technical issues.
1 Cointegration issues are raised in the empirical implementation of the models presented in Chapter 5.
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As mentioned in the first chapter, during the period under analysis, 1960-1993, 
Indonesia experienced five episodes of major nominal devaluation (1965, 1971, 1978, 
1983 and 1986). The hyperinflation crisis of 1965 caused a massive devaluation and the 
Government gradually moved towards the dismantling of the then prevailing multiple 
exchange rate system. By 1969 the rupiah became freely convertible and its value 
remained pegged to the dollar until 1978. By 1971 the rupiah’s exchange value versus 
the dollar was 30% less than it was in 1969 and after a further 50% devaluation in 
November 1978 the Government opted for a tightly managed float regime. The rupiah 
was again devalued in March 1983 by 37% and more recently, in September 1986, by 
50%, when more flexibility was introduced in exchange rate management. The 
exchange rate regime remained a managed float regime pegged to the dollar, the yen 
and the Deutsche Mark until August 1997, when economic turmoil in international 
markets led the government to float the rupiah.
The nominal exchange rate has systematically diverged from the RER, due to 
inflation above that of the rest of the world. Real exchange rates are commonly used as 
indicators for movements in international competitiveness: this practice needs to be 
qualified with respect to the informational content of RER indices. In this chapter we 
discuss theoretical and statistical issues related to the definition and measurement of the 
RER. The Indonesian real effective exchange rate (REER) is calculated and tested for 
stationarity. A series of unit root tests is then carried out using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test. Rolling, recursive, sequential and Perron type ADF tests are also 
implemented to allow for breaks in the RER behaviour. Most of the tests do not allow 
us to reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root, i.e. of non stationarity.
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Opposite results are obtained in two cases: ADF tests over the full sample (1960-1993) 
and ADF tests which allow for two breaks in the RER. Whether these conflicting 
results are essentially due to the hyperinflation of the early 1960’s and/or to the 
inclusion of the two ‘Indonesian tailored’ breaks cannot be assessed with certainty. It is 
probably true that thirty-three years are too a short time span to ascertain the long run 
behaviour of the RER. As a result, our unit root test outcome must be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, we feel more confident in relying on results from unit root tests 
carried out over a sub-sample which excludes the years 1960-1965.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2. presents an overview of the 
theoretical issues underlying RER definition. Section 4.3. focuses on the measurement 
of the Indonesian RER and offers some theoretical insights on measurement problems. 
Section 4.4. analyses the statistical behaviour on the Indonesian RER with an emphasis 
on unit root testing. Final remarks conclude the chapter.
4.2. Alternative Definitions of the Real Exchange Rate.
By definition, RER indexes measure relative prices expressed in a common 
currency. If the notion of an ‘effective’ rate is introduced this can be restated as relative 
prices adjusted for nominal effective exchange rates movements. Nominal effective 
exchange rates (NEER) represent the relationship between a numeraire currency and a 
basket of ‘relevant’ foreign currencies, expressed in terms of the numeraire currency. 
International trade considerations mainly guide the choice and the aggregation 
procedure used in the construction of the foreign currency composite.
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Real effective exchange rates (REER) are the counterpart of NEER once RERs 
have been adjusted for relative prices2. Defined as such, REERs depend heavily on the 
selection of, and the weights attached to, foreign currencies and on the choice of the 
price indices for the reporting country and abroad. As a result, different policy 
questions may be addressed with differently computed REERs. The assessment of a 
country’s international competitiveness cannot be based only on the analysis of the 
RER (or REER), which provides only a rough indicator for such a purpose, and needs 
to be complemented with a more comprehensive evaluation of that country’s economic 
conditions3.
The most common theoretical definitions of real exchange rate are the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) definition and the trade theory definition. The law of 
one price underlies the former formulation and is stated as EP*/P, where E is the 
nominal exchange rate, P* and P are the foreign and the domestic price levels, 
respectively. The trade theory definition has recently become more popular and is 
theoretically motivated by the Swan-Salter model4. It is based on the ratio of traded 
goods price, Pt, to non-traded goods price, Pn: Pt/Pn, or, more commonly, EPt*/Pn, where 
the **’ denotes a foreign variable.
2 Unit labour costs, wage differentials, productivity indexes may be used, although data limitations 
prevent their use for developing countries.
3 Maciejewski (1983) presents an interesting analysis on the issue of RER definition and informational 
content. See also Harberger (1986) for a wide-ranging discussion of the concept of RER and on 
theoretical issues related to the measurement of price deflators.
4 Salter (1959) presents a pioneering version of the model, which features both traded and non-traded 
goods. Incidentally, the Swan-Salter model is also known as the tradable versus non-tradable, the 
Australian, the dependent economy and the small open economy model.
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In practice, the PPP definition usually takes the ratio of the foreign to the 
domestic consumer price index (most commonly the CPI), while the trade theory 
definition uses two different indexes. An accepted convention, suggested by Harberger 
(1986), is to use the wholesale price index (WPI) as a proxy for the price of traded 
goods5 and the consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy for non-traded goods. The reason 
for such a choice is that the WPI contains mainly traded goods, while non-tradable 
goods and services heavily influence the CPI6.
The use of GDP deflators for both the home and the foreign country may 
provide an approximation of the changes in competitiveness in production. However, 
GDP deflators measure the aggregate domestic production of both tradable and non­
tradable goods. Their use is therefore conceptually closer to the PPP definition of RER 
than the trade theory interpretation7.
Given the close correlations which exists between CPI and WPI, the two 
definition may not vary much. From a theoretical perspective, however, the trade theory 
definition is seen to have a higher informational content on the domestic economic 
structure. The measure of competitiveness it gives is thus preferred when analysing 
developing countries, whose economic structure and performance can be readily fitted 
into a tradable- non-tradable modelling framework.
5 Goldstein and Officer (1978) point out some weaknesses in the use of the WPI, while supporting the 
view that the WPI is the logical proxy for the traded good price. The most important ones are the 
possibility of double counting, as the WPI measures the price of commodities at various stages of 
production, and the inclusion of imports among non domestically traded goods.
6 It should be noted that the CPI is a good proxy for the price of non-traded goods, but is not the ideal 
one, as some tradable enter this index.
7 For a clear and synthetic review on the problems related to the choice of the relevant price indexes see 
Edwards (1988a). A more detailed and in depth analysis of this issue is presented in Maciejewski (1983).
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Moreover, the trade theory definition is deemed more appropriate in cases of 
resource booms leading to Dutch Disease. As noted in the first chapter, a country 
experiencing a commodity boom is traditionally analysed in terms of ‘spending’ and 
‘resource movement’ effects. The first one refers to the decline of the tradable sector 
and the concurrent rise in non-traded output, following the excess demand for non­
tradables generated by the rise in real income. An increase in the relative price of non­
tradables to tradables is then required to restore equilibrium, hence a real appreciation. 
The ‘resource movement’ effect concerns the competition of the different sectors of the 
economy for available resources following a commodity boom. The latter is deemed 
not to be relevant in the case of an oil boom, and thus in the case of Indonesia, as the oil 
sector does not compete with the non-oil economy for resources. The composite non­
tradable biased structural adjustment of the economy is termed Dutch Disease8. Dutch 
Disease need not be necessarily brought on by a commodity boom. Capital inflows, and 
in particular aid, may also induce a real appreciation in the exchange rate. As they add 
to the recipient country’s spending capacity, spending and resource movement effects 
may happen. Therefore, pressure on the non-tradable sector to expand at the expenses 
of the tradable sector may emerge.
Another theoretical reason for preferring the trade theory definition is that 
simplified versions of the PPP theory suggest the constancy of equilibrium RER. More 
specifically, absolute PPP holds when the nominal exchange rate between two
8 There is an extensive literature on Dutch Disease. Among the most important studies we should mention 
are Corden (1984), Corden and Neary (1982), Van Wijnbergen (1984, 1986a) and Neary and Van 
Wijnbergen (1986). See also paragraph 1.4.1, chapter 1.
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currencies, E, equals the ratio of the price levels of the two countries, P and P*. 
Formally,
E —P IP ’ (4.1)
and the RER = 1. A less strict version of the PPP hypothesis allows for a constant 
proportionate relationship between the price ratio and the nominal exchange rate so that
E = k P /P '  (4.2)
and the RER = k. A more general version restates PPP in terms of inflation 
differentials, as
Ae = A p - A p ’ (4.3)
where e, p  and p" are the logarithm of E, P and P’ respectively and A is the first 
difference operator. Equation (4.3) embodies both the absolute and the relative PPP 
hypotheses and states that exchange rate movements reflect equiproportionate changes 
in the price ratio and are thus explained by inflation differentials9.
Both the absolute and the relative PPP hypothesis imply that in the long run the 
RER is stationary. If long run PPP holds, then any large deviations of the RER from its 
PPP level should reflect misalignment (Edwards, 1989). In his study on real exchange 
rates in developing countries, Edwards finds strong evidence against the absolute 
PPP10. He also argues that the variability of the RER is better explained by taking into 
account the fundamental determinants of RER. As fundamentals vary so does the
9 Isard's survey on exchange rate economics (1995) offers a clear exposition of the PPP hypothesis and 
of its macroeconomic theoretical implications. See also Froot and Rogoff (1995) for an updated analysis 
of the theory of PPP.
10 Bahmani-Oskooee (1993) presents an empirical study of absolute PPP formulation using cointegration 
techniques applied to 25 developing countries. He finds mixed evidence in support of the PPP rule. When 
effective real exchange rates are used PPP fails, while the use of bilateral RER leads to mixed 
conclusions.
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equilibrium exchange rate. This approach will be discussed more in detail in the next 
chapter.
Apart from the choice of the relevant price index, there are other issues to take 
into account when constructing a real exchange rate index. First, whether to use a 
bilateral or a multilateral rate, and, in the latter case, which countries should be selected 
and what weighting procedure is preferable. Second, how to handle the existence of 
black market rates. Finally, whether to take into account the labour market structure and 
the trade restriction system, that is the degree of domestic economic protection.
4.3. The Indonesian RER.
In calculating the real exchange rate for Indonesia the following has been done. 
The use of a bilateral rate (usually measured against the dollar) has been considered 
inadequate for three reasons. The first is the increasing world exchange rate instability, 
especially during the 1970’s. Relying only upon the dollar exchange rate may not 
reflect fully exchange rate variability with the other trading partners which themselves 
exhibit greater variability towards the dollar than they did before the collapse of Bretton 
Woods. The second is that the Indonesian exchange regime since 1978 has been a 
managed float dependent upon a basket of foreign currencies. The third is that the USA 
are not the only important trading partners for Indonesia. In fact, trade with Japan and 
Singapore is also relevant, as can be observed in graphs 4.3.1 to 4.3.3, which illustrate 
the relative importance of Indonesia’s trading partners.
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We have therefore calculated a set of multilateral nominal effective exchange 
rate indexes, defined as weighted averages of trading partners nominal exchange rates. 
An inspection of the Direction of Trade Statistical Yearbook (IMF) suggested the 
choice of the following trading partners: USA, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Germany, Netherlands, France, UK, Italy and Belgium. Three 
sets of weights have been derived from the IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook: export 
shares, import shares and (export+import) or trade shares11. As the sum of each set of 
weights has to be unity, we have scaled all the shares, in that any residual share in trade 
has been proportionally distributed to all the thirteen partners’ weight. Appendix 10 
reports the average weights of the individual countries. Graph 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 
show import, export and trade weights plots. Note that data for Singapore was not 
available for the years 1963 to 1967.
The use of import shares is of particular relevance in the Indonesian case (see 
Pinto, 1987). As oil exports represent a significant share in Indonesian exports, using 
import weights ‘cleans’ REER of the importance of oil. The non-oil sector is thus 
implicitly focused on. In addition, the use of import shares gives an indication of 
purchasing power over foreign goods. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics (reported 
in appendix 2) show very high positive correlations (around .99) between REER 
calculated with the three different weights.
11 The use of current weights leads to a RER index which is essentially the inverse of a Paasche index. 
More specifically it correspond to the Palgrave formulation of a weighted index number. On the contrary, 
if we were to use fixed weights, this would result in a standard Laspeyres Index number.
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Graph 4.3.1. Import Weights.
R a n g e : .0 8  to  1 o n  a v e ra g e : G e rm a n y  (D ) , J a p a n  (J ) , U S A , S in g a p o r e  (S IN G ).
» : ______  J : ______ U S A :......  S IN G :...
Range: .03 to .08 on average: France (F), the Netherlands (NL), 
United Kingdom (UK), Australia (AU), Hong Kong (HK).
Range: .00 to .03 on average: Belgium (B), Italy (I), Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MAL).
>:___ It___ KM:...  UAL: ....
Source: IMF, D irec tion  o f  Trade Yearbook , various issues.
Graph 4.3.2. Export Weights.
R a n g e : .0 8  to  1 o n  a v e ra g e : Ja p a n  (J ) ,  U S A , S in g a p o re  (S IN G ).
J : _______ U S A :_____ S IN G :......
Range: .03 to .08 on average: Germany (D), the Netherlands (NL), Australia (AU).
D:_____  NL:_____ AU:....
Range: .00 to .03 on average: Malaysia (MAL), France (F), Belgium (B), Italy (I), 
United Kingdom (UK), Korea (KOR), Hong Kong (HK)
Source: IMF, D irection  o f  Trade Yearbook, various issues.
Graph 4.3.3. Trade Weights.
R a n g e : .0 8  to  1 o n  a v e ra g e :  U S A , J a p a n  ( J ) ,  S in g a p o re  (S IN G ).
USA:_____ J : _______  SIN G :».....
Range: .03 to .08 on average: Germany (D), the Netherlands (NL), 
United Kingdom (UK), Australia (AU).
»:______ HI:_____ UK:....  Ml: .....
Range: .00 to .03 on average: Korea (KOR), Italy (I), Belgium (B), France (F), 
Hong Kong (HK), Malaysia (MAL).
Source: IMF, D irection  o f  Trade Yearbook, various issues.
Maciejewski (1983) argues that the choice of the weighting procedure does not 
play a significant role. However, we opted for the geometric weighted average 
procedure, which is deemed superior in terms of statistical properties, most importantly 
symmetry12. Moreover, differenced logarithms of geometrically weighted averaged 
indexes are equal to the sum of the growth rates of its components. The geometrically 
trade weighted averaged REER is thus defined as:
GREER, = (4.4)
where t is the time subscript, subscript i refers to the i-th trading partner, E denotes the 
exchange rate index between the home country and the trading partner, P* and P are the 
foreign and home country price indices respectively, a  refers to the relevant trade
n
weight and ypc, =1 . An increase (decrease) in the index implies real depreciation
¡=1
(appreciation) or an indication of rising (falling) competitiveness.
The corresponding multilateral effective nominal exchange rate is defined as:
GNEER, = f jE , ,“u  (4.5)
i=l
where notation is as above. Arithmetic weighted indexes have also been calculated for 
comparison purposes. The very high correlation between the arithmetic averaged 
indexes and their corresponding geometric counterparts demonstrate the validity of 
Macijewski’ s statement13. We have also chosen to use all the annual data from 1960 to
12 Depreciations and appreciations are treated symmetrically. Among the other properties, we mention 
that the logarithm of the geometric mean is equivalent to the arithmetic average of the logarithms of the 
terms and that the geometric mean is invariant with respect to measurement units.
13 None are less than .99.
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1992 to have annual weights, instead of considering an average over the period (which 
is a common practice in this literature)14.
Three sets of multilateral REERs have been constructed: the PPP REER, the 
trade theory REER and REER defined in terms of GDP deflators. Within each set a 
further breakdown was calculated: non competitors, non-oil competitors, oil 
competitors and competitors indexes.
Non competitor partners are USA, Japan, Australia, Germany, Netherlands, 
France, UK, Italy and Belgium; they have been attached the same weights as above 
once these have been reproportioned to sum to unity. Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines have been selected as the main non-oil competitors 
and an equal weight of 1/6 has been attributed to each of them. The chosen oil 
competitor countries are OPEC members Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, once again equally weighted (by 1/10). It should be 
noted that a more appropriate weighting procedure for competitors would be to attach 
to them weights reflecting each competitor’s main export goods relative importance in 
world trade. However, this method is very data intensive and not too relevant for our 
comparative analysis purposes. Finally, a composite competitors REER has been 
calculated as the weighted average of non-oil and oil competitors REERs, the weights 
being the non-oil and oil proportion in total Indonesian exports.
In addition, we have computed a set of corresponding bilateral (rupiah/dollar) 
REERs, for comparison purposes.
14 Correlations between indexes built with variable weights and the corresponding ones computed using 
average weights, employing both arithmetic and geometric averaging procedure, were all greater than .99.
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All the data on consumer and wholesale price indexes, GDP deflators and 
nominal exchange rates are taken from the IMF sources. It should be noted that the 
complete series for WPI for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong are not 
available, so the CPI has been used instead in the calculation of the trade theory REER.
We have not taken into account black market premia as they were not relevant, 
especially after 196915. Finally, the lack of data prevented the use of an effective rate 
which takes into account the degree of trade restrictions and the labour market 
structure. The base year for all the indexes is 1985.
The following table lists the exchange rates computed. The second column 
indicates the set of foreign countries to which each index is referred. The third column 
shows which price ratio has been used. The final column gives the available weighting 
option: X for Export, M for Import and (X+M) for trade weights. Suffixes X, M and 
XM, corresponding to weights used, are attached to REER labels, where appropriate, in 
the remainder of the text.
15 Correlation between the official rupiah/dollar nominal exchange rate and the black market rate is .99 
over the period 1960-1983, for which we have data. Figures for black market rates have been taken from 
Wood (1987).
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Table 4.3.1. Real Effective Exchange Rate Index Names.
Index name Foreign Countries Price Index Ratio Weights Used
GRWCPI all trading partners WPI/CPI X, M, (X+M)
GRCPI all trading partners CPI/CPI X, M, (X+M)
GRERD all trading partners GDP Deflator X, M, (X+M)
GRNCWC non competitors WPI/CPI X, M, (X+M)
GRNCCC non competitors CPI/CPI X, M, (X+M)
GRNCD non competitors GDP Deflator X, M, (X+M)
GRNOCWC non-oil competitors WPI/CPI equal weight
GRNOCCC non-oil competitors CPI/CPI equal weight
GRNOCD non-oil competitors GDP Deflator equal weight
GROILWC oil competitors WPI/CPI equal weight
GROILCC oil competitors CPI/CPI equal weight
GROILD oil competitors GDP Deflator equal weight
GRCOMPWC competitors WPI/CPI oil proportion/ 
non-oil proportion
GRCOMPCC competitors CPI/CPI oil proportion/ 
non-oil proportion
GRCOMPD competitors GDP Deflator oil proportion/ 
non-oil proportion
BRERWCPI USA WPI/CPI —
BRERCPI USA CPI/CPI —
BRERD USA GDP Deflator —
The following graphs, 4.3.4 to 4.3.8, show the historical pattern of selected 
NEERs and REERs. The notation for the latter is as in table; where suffix ‘xm’ appears 
it refers to trade weighting procedure, that is exports+imports.
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Graph 4.3.4. Rupiah/Dollar Exchange Rate and Selected Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rates 1960-1993.
dollar:____  gno»rio«=......  gnoMO 11 =......  gnnorxH:......gnnoord: __
dollar: rupiah/dollar NER; enomrxm: all trading partners NEER (trade weighted); gnomoil: oil 
competitors NEER; gnncrxm: non competitors NEER (trade weighted); gnnocrd: non oil competitors 
NEER.
Source: Author’s calculations.
In 1986 the broader nominal exchange peg introduced in 1978, which includes 
the dollar, the yen and the Deutsche Mark16, was actively applied. This explains the 
sharper devaluation of the NEER for all trading and non competitor partners (gnomrxm 
and gnncrxm, respectively) relative to the dollar exchange rate since 198617, which can 
be observed in graph 4.3.4.
16 As shown in graphs 4.3.2 to 4.3.4, Japan and Germany are important non competitor trading partners 
for Indonesia.
17 In addition, in 1986 the dollar devalued by 29% against the yen.
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Graph 4.3.5. Selected Real Effective Exchange Rates 1960-1993.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Graph 4.3.6. Selected Real Effective Exchange Rates 1966-1993.
g rw o p x n c _____  grnoHOKM c  g m o o w o p -   g r o i  1h o =  
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Graph 4.3.7. Selected Nominal Versus Real Effective Exchange Rates: All
Trading Partners and the USA 1960-1993.
Source: Author's calculations.
Graph 4.3.8. Selected Nominal Versus Real Effective Exchange Rates: All 
Trading Partners and the USA 1966-1993.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Table 4.3.2. Selected Real Effective Exchange Rates 1960-1993. Index Numbers:
1985=100.
grwcpxm grcpxm grerdxm brerwcpi grncwcxm grnocwcp groilwc grcompwc
1960 420.5 361.7 370.9 425.8 427.5 501.7 212.0 400.3
1961 242.5 205.0 362.3 243.7 245.6 268.9 123.5 207.6
1962 196.6 164.7 285.9 197.2 199.6 201.3 103.1 162.9
1963 183.4 151.8 244.4 178.3 183.4 190.2 95.6 145.8
1964 146.0 119.9 215.9 138.9 146.3 143.7 74.4 112.7
1965 58.3 47.4 180.3 55.7 58.4 55.7 29.5 43.6
1966 84.0 71.2 151.5 80.1 84.4 82.0 41.3 66.8
1967 91.2 78.2 136.2 86.8 91.1 93.2 46.2 72.4
1968 95.2 84.2 123.8 94.2 96.2 98.5 47.8 73.4
1969 88.2 78.1 112.6 90.5 89.0 95.7 45.3 72.7
1970 90.9 81.2 116.5 92.9 92.4 90.1 46.7 70.6
1971 96.8 88.2 130.0 99.4 98.0 95.0 50.9 74.3
1972 107.8 99.4 139.4 103.2 109.1 102.3 55.5 74.9
1973 102.7 92.2 126.9 89.1 102.4 97.6 49.6 69.5
1974 86.0 72.2 93.5 75.3 85.3 89.8 44.7 55.2
1975 76.5 67.7 90.7 69.2 76.0 78.1 41.2 48.8
1976 66.2 60.0 84.0 60.4 66.4 67.5 37.6 44.6
1977 65.3 60.9 83.1 57.7 65.8 65.7 38.1 45.5
1978 74.9 72.2 96.4 61.3 76.1 70.6 41.2 49.3
1979 94.7 89.8 108.4 80.6 96.2 92.2 62.7 72.2
1980 91.0 82.3 89.3 78.2 92.9 88.6 66.7 72.3
1981 85.5 78.8 80.1 76.6 86.5 84.0 65.3 68.5
1982 77.8 73.2 77.1 74.7 77.8 80.9 65.6 68.4
1983 96.2 92.8 92.1 93.0 96.2 96.6 89.2 91.1
1984 98.4 95.9 96.7 97.3 98.1 99.8 94.0 95.6
1985 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1986 125.7 134.1 143.0 106.1 129.1 107.1 109.2 108.2
1987 161.0 175.5 176.5 127.7 167.7 133.3 125.8 129.5
1988 166.4 183.1 185.4 126.2 174.0 136.6 128.2 133.2
1989 163.9 180.2 177.5 130.7 168.7 142.7 121.1 133.9
1990 159.0 177.7 180.0 125.2 162.8 137.4 115.9 127.4
1991 159.8 182.8 186.1 121.4 163.7 139.7 106.9 126.0
1992 159.1 185.4 188.9 118.3 162.9 144.2 99.1 128.4
1993 152.1 182.0 170.3 112.5 155.9 136.6 88.6 121.9
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The hyperinflation of the early 1960’s is clearly reflected in graphs 4.3.5. and
4.3.7. The very low value of the Indonesian price deflator index accounts for the very 
large figures for the REERs between 1960 and 1965. In graphs 4.3.6 we observe a real 
appreciation following the first oil shock (1973). This trend is temporarily reversed 
when the rupiah was devalued in 1978. Between the 1979 oil shock and the 1983 
devaluation, real appreciation occurs again. A turning point is the year 1986, when the 
application of the broader nominal peg increases variability between the REER for all 
trading and non competitor partners (grwcpxm and gnncwcxm, respectively) and the 
oil/ non-oil competitors REER (groilwc and gnocwcp, respectively). With the 
exception of groilwc, these REERs had all moved closely together since 1960. The 
jump following the 1986 devaluation is followed by a less variable behaviour of the 
REER (except for oil competitors REER) relative to the earlier periods. This seems to 
partly confirm government success in targeting real exchange stability. It is evident 
from graphs 4.3.7 and 4.3.8 that nominal and real exchange rates did not move 
together. Although nominal devaluations episodes are closely matched by real 
devaluations, the behaviour of the REER with respect to the nominal rate is quite 
different.
Finally, it worth mentioning that the PPP and the trade theory definition REERs 
are unsurprisingly closely correlated. The use of the three different weighting sets 
seems not to alter the REERs. Appendix 11 reports basic statistical properties of the 
calculated indexes, such as mean, standard deviations and correlations between relevant 
sets of REER18.
18 Correlations involving GDP deflated RER are lower. The GDP deflator based REER diverges strongly 
from the other two in the 1960s because of a very low value of the domestic deflator.
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4.4. A Test of the PPP Proposition.
As stated above, the PPP hypothesis implies that the RER is stationary, so that 
any large deviation of the RER from its equilibrium value should be temporary and 
reflect possible misalignment. We have tested this proposition by adopting the strategy 
used by Edwards (1989). We detrended the logarithms of the REERs and subsequently 
tested it for residual autocorrelation in the residuals. In all cases our results allow us to 
reject the null of no autocorrelation in the residuals from the detrended REERs: both F- 
tests on the coefficients of up to six lags and the Portmanteau tests for six lags strongly 
reject the absence of residuals autocorrelation. As a result, we cannot accept the 
hypothesis that the REER behaviour can be described by a trend stationary process with 
white noise errors over the full sample, hence the absolute version of PPP cannot be 
accepted. As for the long run, testing for autocorrelation in the residuals from the 
detrended series implies the assumption of trend stationary process. Questions as to 
whether a trend is actually present and whether it is a stochastic rather than a 
deterministic one is not addressed. A more rigorous time series analysis is therefore 
needed to assess the time series properties of REER.
The analysis of the RER behaviour can be used to test the long run PPP 
proposition. Whether a variable is stationary depends on whether it has a unit root. If 
there is a unit root, the variable is said to be integrated of order one, 1(1), and non- 
stationary. If there is no unit root, the variable is said to be integrated of order zero, 1(0), 
and stationary. In the PPP context, if the RER shows no tendency to return to its mean 
or trend, long run PPP cannot be confirmed. On the contrary, a tendency of the RER to 
return to its mean value is regarded as a necessary condition for PPP to hold.
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Testing for unit root is not the only possible way of testing PPP. Boucher 
Breuer (1994) assesses the evidence on PPP focusing on the most recent developments. 
Among the various methods used since the mid-1980’s she points out Dickey Fuller 
(DF) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests, Perron type tests which 
allow for structural breaks, variance ratio tests, Engle and Granger cointegration 
technique, Johansen and Juselius maximum likelihood approach for cointegration, and 
fractional integration methods. The conclusions from her in-depth survey on recent 
evidence on PPP point towards a reinterpretation of the PPP concept. She argues that 
while recent studies claim to have found support for long run PPP, they have instead 
supported a weaker version of it. However, they have been interpreted as rejecting the 
original Casselian concept. Her proposed new interpretation is based on three main 
weakenings of the absolute, or relative, PPP statement. The first one is the distinction 
between the short and the long run. The second one is the requirement of stationarity 
rather than constancy of the RER. The final weakness is due to disregarding the 
coefficient restriction required in the original PPP concept, namely symmetry (domestic 
and foreign price levels with the same magnitudes but opposite signs) and 
proportionality (price coefficient of opposite signs and equal to one in absolute value). 
As a conclusion, the PPP rule can be reinterpreted as an ultra-long run constraint which 
nevertheless allows for temporary short run and even long run real shocks.
The next two sub-sections show results from a series of unit root tests for the 
Indonesian REER. We use traditional DF/ADF tests and rolling, recursive, sequential 
and Perron type DF/ADF tests which allow for breaks.
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4.4.1. Time Series Properties of the RER: Testing for Unit Roots.
The following tables presents the results of ADF unit root tests for a selection 
of REERs. We have implemented a sequential testing procedure, proposed by Perron 
(1988), which starts with a general specification and then eliminates unnecessary 
nuisance parameters. In particular, we first use the following regression model to test 
for the null hypothesis of a stochastic trend (non-stationarity) against the alternative of a 
deterministic trend (stationarity):
Ay, = py,_, + a  + P / + ^(p,Ay,_, + «, where u, = IID(0,a2) (4.6)
where p  is the lag length, and the relevant tests are Xt, xpt, Xox, d>3, <J>2, reported in tables 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2, columns 2 to 6. Xt, XpT and Xot are the tests on the significance of p, p 
and a, respectively; 4>3 tests the hypothesis that p and p are jointly zero and <J>2 tests the 
joint significance of p, P and a 19. We then test a regression model which allows for the 
constant but eliminates the trend, the null being of a unit root series with non-zero 
mean20, as follows:
and the relevant tests are xM, x^, Oi, reported in columns 7 to 9 of tables 4.4.1 and
4.4.2. xM and Xop are the tests on the significance of p and a, respectively and 4>i tests 
the hypothesis that p and p  are jointly zero. The last step is to use a more restricted
19 The null hypotheses for <t>3 and <t>2 are that y, is an 1(1) series with drift a  or with zero drift, 
respectively, (see Dickey and Fuller, 1981).
20 The alternative hypothesis is that y, is stationary around a constant mean but has no trend. Note that in 
the preceding model, under the alternative hypothesis y, is trend stationary.
where u, = lID (0,a2) (4.7)
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model, which tests for a unit root when the overall mean of the series is zero, 
formalised as:
p-l
Ay, = py,_, + £<p,Ay,_, + u, where u, » IID(0,a2) (4.8)
¡=0
and the relevant test is X, which tests for the significance of p, reported in the final 
column of tables 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. For all models, lag length p  has been determined 
looking at the significance of additional lags. In fact, no significant Ay,./ was found. As 
a result, all the tests are ADF(O), that is DF tests.
The relevant critical values for the tests are reported in the last rows of the 
tables, given that x- and d>-statistics do not follow the standard distributions of the 
corresponding t- and F-statistics, respectively. In particular, critical values for xpt, 
Xot.Xo/i, i>3, ® 2  and 4>i are taken from Dickey and Fuller (1981); while the critical 
values for x* , xM and x are obtained using MacKinnon’s (1991) response surface 
parameters.
Over the full sample the results are ambiguous. The calculated statistics do not 
allow us to unambiguously reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The ambiguity 
arises when we compare the full sample tests (1960-93) with the post-hyperinflation 
sample tests (1967-93). In the first case, it appears that we could reject the null of non- 
stationarity, even if the values of the statistics are very close to the critical values (see in 
particular Xj’s). However, this could be due to the u-shaped nature of the exchange rate, 
as seen in graphs 4.3.5 and 4.3.7. For sub-sample 1967-93, the conclusion is an 
unambiguous acceptance of the unit root hypothesis.
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The sub-sample tests suggests REER behaviour in Indonesia is indeed 
characterised by non-stationarity. However, if we consider the full sample, we should 
rather move towards the stationarity hypothesis. A possible explanation for this 
ambiguity is that thirty-three years are too a short time span to assess long run time 
series properties of RER. Most importantly, the hyperinflation of the early 1960’s 
explains the steady and dramatic real appreciation between 1960 and 1965. This 
exceptional event has probably strongly influenced the full sample unit root test 
statistics. As a consequence, results from full sample tests may not be reliable and 
should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 4.4.1. Unit Roots Tests. Full Sample: 1960-93.
A ll V a r ia b le s  in  L o g a r ith m s .
l x % 4 > 3 4>2 '1 (7)1 < X > , X
G RW CPIX -3.57 2.42 2.98 10.09 7.04 -3.52 3.43 6.58 -1.04
G RCPIX -3.55 3.37 2.85 10.77 7.33 -2.76 2.68 3.97 -0.78
G RW C PIM -3.70 2.38 3.13 10.42 7.27 -3.63 3.54 7.01 -1.05
G RC PIM -3.43 3.06 2.88 9.08 6.14 -2.63 2.58 3.57 -0.64
GRW CPXM -3.62 2.41 3.03 10.21 7.12 -3.56 3.47 6.74 -1.04
GRCPXM -3.52 3.25 2.88 10.12 6.88 -2.72 2.66 3.85 -0.73
GRNCW CX -3.56 2.48 2.96 10.10 7.04 -3.47 3.38 6.41 -1.03
GRNCCCX -3.46 3.45 2.75 10.33 7.01 -2.54 2.48 3.37 -0.71
GRNCW CM -3.66 2.44 3.09 10.24 7.12 -3.54 3.45 6.65 -1.02
GRNCCCM -3.39 3.17 2.83 8.93 6.02 -2.46 2.41 3.12 -0.59
GRNCW CXM -3.60 2.46 3.01 10.14 7.06 -3.50 3.40 6.49 -1.03
GRNCCCXM -3.42 3.32 2.78 9.65 6.53 -2.50 2.45 3.24 -0.66
GRNOCW C -4.12 2.01 3.48 12.92 9.14 -4.46 4.33 10.6 -1.28
GRNOCCC -4.00 2.10 3.33 12.79 9.01 -4.36 4.24 10.2 -1.24
G RO ILW C -3.68 3.18 3.04 9.15 6.31 -2.52 2.43 3.41 -0.91
G RO ILC C -4.08 3.63 3.42 11.41 7.80 -2.63 2.55 3.68 -0.85
G RCO M PW C -3.85 2.75 3.08 11.60 8.11 -3.59 3.47 6.93 -1.16
G RCO M PCC -4.00 2.90 3.23 12.87 8.95 -3.74 3.63 7.45 -1.13
Critical values: N=50 N=50 N=50 N=50 N=50 N=50
10% -3.208 2.38 2.75 5.61 4.31 -2.62 2.18 3.94 -1.62
5 % -3.55 2.81 3.14 6.73 5.13 -2.95 2.56 4.86 -1.95
2 3 % 3.18 3.47 7.81 5.94 2.89 5.80
1% -4.26 3.60 3.87 9.31 7.02 -3.64 3.28 7.06 -2.63
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Table 4.4.2. Unit Roots Tests. Sub-Sample: 1967-93.
A ll V a r ia b le s  in  L o g a rith m s .
"tt % Tat «>3 ®2 tan <J>, T
G RW C PIX -1.45 1.44 1.40 0.09 1.16 -0.64 0.70 0.68 0.94
G RCPIX -1.36 1.54 1.27 1.77 1.51 -0.28 0.40 1.02 1.39
G R W C PIM -1.47 1.33 1.45 1.42 1.14 -0.75 0.81 0.80 0.97
G R C PIM -1.38 1.46 1.35 1.08 1.50 -0.39 0.50 1.13 1.44
G RW CPX M -1.45 1.39 1.41 1.21 1.14 -0.68 0.73 0.72 0.96
G RCPX M -1.36 1.50 1.31 1.12 1.49 -0.32 0.43 1.06 1.41
GRNCW CX -1.45 1.42 1.40 1.10 1.14 -0.66 0.72 0.69 0.93
GRNCCCX -1.39 1.59 1.31 1.33 1.57 -0.25 0.37 1.02 1.40
G RN CW CM -1.49 1.36 1.46 1.24 1.16 -0.74 0.80 0.78 0.97
G RN CCCM -1.41 1.47 1.38 1.93 1.54 -0.40 0.52 1.17 1.46
GRNCW CXM -1.45 1.39 1.41 1.14 1.14 -0.68 0.74 0.72 0.95
GRNCCCXM -1.38 1.54 1.33 1.65 1.54 -0.30 0.42 1.07 1.42
G RN OCW C -1.41 1.25 1.39 1.92 1.07 -0.79 0.84 0.81 0.96
G RN OCCC -1.20 1.27 1.16 0.79 1.06 -0.56 0.61 0.76 1.08
G R O ILW C -1.13 0.73 1.27 0.15 0.98 -1.01 1.12 1.22 1.08
G R O ILC C -1.28 0.95 1.41 0.41 1.61 -1.00 1.15 1.97 1.61
G RCO M PW C -1.44 1.48 1.37 1.60 1.15 -0.54 0.62 0.61 0.93
G RCO M PCC -1.37 1.59 1.29 1.87 1.39 -0.31 0.40 0.78 1.20
C ritical values: N=25 N=25 N=25 N=25 N=25 N=25
10%
-3.228 2.39 2.77 5.90 4.67 -2.63 2.20 4.12 -1.62
5% -3.59 2.85 3.20 7.24 5.68 -2.97 2.61 5.18 -1.95
2.5% 3.25 3.59 8.65 6.75 2.97 6.30
1% -4.34 3.74 4.05 10.61 8.21 -3.70 3.41 7.88 -2.65
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Sub-sample results (table 4.4.2) suggest non-stationarity in the REER’s. 
Therefore, we have tested whether the series are 1(2) against the alternative of being
Ay, is non-stationary against the alternative of stationarity. Failure to reject the null 
implies Ay, is 1(1), and thus y, is 1(2). Once again we use an ADF type regression model 
of the form:
and 4 of the following table for both the full sample and the sub-sample22. In addition, 
we have replicated the tests using (4.9) without the constant term a. The relevant t-tests
Critical values for x,, and x are obtained as above, using MacKinnon’s (1991) response 
surface parameters.
Results unambiguously suggest none of the series for the REER are 1(2).
21 It has been argued (Dickey and Pantula, 1987) that the correct testing procedure is to start with taking 
the largest number of unit root likely to be present in the series, and then to reduce the order each time the 
null of non-stationarity is rejected. In practice, this usually would involve starting with the hypothesis of y, 
being 1(2): if the null is rejected, the next step is to test for a single unit root.
22 Full sample tests have been carried out for completeness.
22 As in the preceding tests the chosen value for p is zero, given the insignificance of lagged second 
differences.
I(l)21. This is done testing, for each series, the null hypothesis that the first difference
P - 2
where A2 denotes second difference operator. The xM-tests on p are reported in column 2
on p for the two sample periods are reported in columns 3 and 5 of table 4.4.323.
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Table 4.4.3. Unit Roots Tests. Differenced Logarithms.
1962-1993 1968-1993
Constant Included No Constant Constant Included No Constant
Ip X X„ X
GRWCPIX -5.4149“ -5.5044” -3.3567* -3.3826”
GRCPIX -5.1823” -5.2860” -3.4972* -3.4327“
GRWCPIM -5.4276“ -5.5161” -3.3835* -3.4050”
GRCPIM -5.7440“ -5.6800“ -3.4517* -3.3776”
GRWCPXM -5.4240“ -5.5130” -3.3614* -3.4224**
GRCPXM -5.3875“ -5.5933” -3.4913* -3.3851”
GRNCWCX -5.3474” -5.4368“ -3.3204* -3.3445”
GRNCCCX -5.1721” -5.2761” -3.4416* -3.3737”
GRNCWCM -5.4293" -5.5200” -3.3424* -3.3563”
GRNCCCM -5.4786” -5.5830” -3.4321* -3.3378”
GRNCWCXM -5.3928” -5.4832” -3.3192* -3.3393“
GRNCCCXM -5.3499“ -5.4553” -3.4413* -3.3629”
GRNOCWC -5.4441” -5.5202” -3.8072* -3.8580**
GRNOCCC -5.3901” -5.4763” -3.7003* -3.7346”
GROILWC -5.2336” -5.3251“ -3.3856* -3.4058”
GROILCC -5.3942“ -5.4961” -3.6856* -3.5419”
GRCOMPWC -5.5555” -5.6480” -3.5466* -3.5671”
GRCOMPCC -5.6303” -5.7322” -3.6736* -3.6339”
Critical values: 
5% -2.95 -1.95 -2.98 -1.95
1% -3.65 -2.63 -3.70 -2.65
* and ** denote 5% and 1 % significance level, respectively.
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4.4.2. Testing for Breaks.
A visual inspection of the REER graphs suggests that the standard unit root 
testing procedure might be inappropriate as there appears to be two breaks in the series: 
around 1965 and around 1986 for most of the calculated REERs. This is the reason why 
we have carried out a series of unit roots tests which allow for the presence of a break: 
recursive, rolling, sequential and Perron type ADF tests24.
Recursive minimum ADF Xt are computed in two ways: forward and 
backwards. Forward ADF tests use sub-samples t=1962,....,k for k=1967,..., 1993.
Backwards ADF tests use sub-samples t=k,....  1993 for k=1962....  1988. The
minimum value of Xt is corrected for k,/T, where k,=(k-1962+1) in the forward tests and 
lq=(1993-k+l) in the backward tests, and where T is the size of the sample. Table 4.4.4, 
columns 3 and 4, reports minimum Xt’s for each REER and table 4.4.5, columns 3 and 
4, shows results from the same tests over the sub-sample 1967-1993. The relevant 
critical values are obtained from Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock’s (1992) tables, 
reproduced in Harris (1995). Results show that there is no evidence for rejecting the 
unit root null hypothesis.
Rolling minimum ADF Xt are computed using sub-samples, which are a 
constant fraction of the full sample (namely 11/32), rolled through the sample. We start 
with testing sub-sample 1962-72, then 1962-73, and so on. The last sub-sample used is
All are ADF(I) tests.
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even after allowing for the presence of breaks in the mean or in the trend. Only in a few
cases, namely full sample trend shift F-tests for GRNOCWC, GRNOCCC, GROILWC,
GROILCC and GRCOMPCC, the null of joint zero values for and p cannot be
accepted, thus suggesting the possibility of a break in trend in 1966.
Table 4.4.4. Recursive, Rolling and Sequential Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests on 
Unit Roots. Full Sample 1962-1993.
All Variables in Logarithms. All x-tests ADF(l).
V ariable Tt
Recursive
Forward
Recursive
Backward
Rolling 
(11 obs)
Mean
Shift
Trend
Shift
min XT min Tt min Tt min Tt max F min Tt max F
GRW CXM -2.81 -2.81 -3.48 -3.24 -2.58 7.58 -2.47 11.73
GRW CX -2.76 -2.76 -3.43 -3.27 -2.61 7.38 -2.51 11.24
G RW CM -2.88 -2.88 -3.62 -3.29 -2.71 8.05 -2.61 12.42
GRCCXM -2.73 -2.73 -3.11 -2.63 -2.74 6.78. -2.64 11.26
GRCCX -2.75 -2.75 -3.02 -2.65 -2.75 6.80, -2.64 10.81
G RCCM -2.73 -2.73 -3.30 -2.74 -2.75 6.82, -2.67 12.04
GRNCW CXM -2.80 -2.80 -3.42 -3.03 -2.70 7.23 -2.59 11.47
GRNCW CX -2.77 -2.77 -3.36 -3.03 -2.68 7.05 -2.57 11.04
GRNCW CM -2.85 -2.85 -3.56 -3.13 -2.75 7.72 -2.65 12.15
GRNCCCXM -2.64 -2.64 -3.04 -2.50 -2.77 6.09, -2.66 10.28
GRNCCCX -2.66 -2.66 -2.97 -2.59 -2.77 6.05, -2.65 9.76
GRNCCCM -2.69 -2.69 -3.23 -2.52 -2.81 6.43, -2.72 11.32
GRNOCW C -3.16 -3.16 -4.02 -3.74 -2.58 9.95 -2.54 15.46
GRNOCCC -3.00 -3.00 -3.58 -3.81„ -2.52 8.82, -2.50 14.29
G RO ILW C -2.84 -2.84 -3.55 -3.81c -2.17a 8.00, -2.06, 14.09
G RO ILCC -3.23 -3.23 -4.42 -3.25 -2.38a 11.8, -2.16, 19.92
G RCO M PW C -2.89 -2.89 -3.20 -5.52c -2.33a 8.01, -2.25, 12.90
G RCO M PCC -3.02 -3.02 -3.36 - 3 . 4 2 c -2.41a 9.33, -2.39, 14.75
min T, and max F 
values refer to 
the years or 
periods indicated 
here
1962-93 1965-93 1965-75
or
b: 1976-86 
c: 1979-89
1986
or
d:1983
1965
or
a: 1966
1986
or
e:1979
f:1983
1966
Critical Values
T=100 Tt
Recursive 
min T,
Rolling 
min Tt
Mean shift 
min T, max F
Trend shift 
min T, max F
2.5% -3.73 -4.62 -5.29 -5.07 20.83 -4.76 19.15
5% -3.45 -4.33 -5.01 -4.80 18.62 -4.48 16.30
10% -3.15 -4.00 -4.71 -4.54 16.20 -4.20 13.64
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Table 4.4.5. Recursive, Rolling and Sequential Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests on 
Unit Roots. Sub-Sample 1967-1993.
All Variables in Logarithms. All x-tests ADF(l).
V ariable Tt
Recursive
Forward
Recursive
Backward
Mean
Shift
Trend
Shift
GRW CXM -2.35
min Tt
-2.35
minx,
-2.62
min X,
-3.01
max F
9.36
min x,
-2.91
max F
8.64
GRW CX -2.38 -2.38 -2.65, -3.01 9.34 -2.92 8.68
GRW CM -2.36 -2.36 -2.53, -3.07 9.78 -2.97 9.01
GRCCXM -2.13 -2.13 -2.62 -2.65 9.12 -2.91 8.59
GRCCX -2.13 -2.13 -2.64 -2.95 9.02 -2.89 8.55
G RCCM -2.15 -2.15 -2.59 -3.05 9.73 -2.98 9.13
GRNCW CXM -2.37 -2.37 -2.68 -3.14 10.22 -3.03 9.35
GRNCW CX -2.39 -2.39 -2.71 -3.12 10.01 -3.01 9.25
GRNCW CM -2.38 -2.38 -2.65 -3.23 10.83 -3.11 9.89
GRNCCCXM -2.17 -2.17 -2.68 -3.15 10.29 -3.07 9.66
GRNCCCX -2.20 -2.20 -2.70 -3.17 10.39 -3.11 9.90
GRNCCCM -2.15 -2.15 -2.65 -3.19 10.72 -3.11 9.94
GRNOCW C -2.20 -2.20 -2.74b -2.29 7.60, -2.26 6.88d
GRNOCCC -2.02 -2.02 -2.75b -2.12 4.63 -2.13 4.65
G RO ILW C -1.97 -1.97 -1.97 -1.87, 7.79, -1.55, 7.29„
G RO ILCC -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 -1.97, 6.07, -1.62, 4.71„
G RCO M PW C -2.14 -2.14 -2.49, -1.97, 6.05, -1.98, 6.28h
G RCO M PCC -1.98 -1.98 -3.11. -1.90, 9.06, -2.03, 6.60d
min Xt and max F 1967-93 1973-93 1986 1986 1986 1986
values refer to 
the years or 
periods indicated 
here
or
a: 1974-93 
b: 1975-93
or
e:1983
or
c:1975 
f: 1979 
i: 1983 
1:1974
or
g:1983
or
d:1973
h:1979
Critical Values
T=100 Tr
Recursive 
min X,
Rolling 
min Xt
Mean shift 
min Xt max F
Trend shift 
min Xt max F
2.5% -3.73 -4.62 -5.29 -5.07 20.83 -4.76 19.15
5% -3.45 -4.33 -5.01 -4.80 18.62 -4.48 16.30
10% -3.15 -4.00 -4.71 -4.54 16.20 -4.20 13.64
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An alternative approach is the use of a Perron type ADF/DF test. Following 
Perron (1989), we assume that the date of the breaks is known and use his testing 
methodology. He develops three models summarised as follows. Under the null 
hypothesis of a unit root, model A, or the ‘crash’ model, includes a dummy which takes 
the value of one at the time of the break. Under the alternative hypothesis of trend 
stationarity, a change in the intercept of the trend function is allowed. Model B, or the 
‘changing growth’ model, describes a unit root process whith a change in the drift 
parameter p  (see equation 4.11 below) at the time of the break under the null 
hypothesis. The alternative hypothesis entails a one-time change in the slope of the 
trend function at the time of the break. Finally, model C embodies model A and model 
B: under the alternative hypothesis the break will be followed by both a change in the 
intercept and a change in the growth path. Formally, model A and model B can be 
written out as:
Model A: ‘crash ’ hypothesis:
H0:y, = p  + 5 D(TB), + y,_t + e,
H A. y , = m + p f + ( m - m ) D i / ,+ « ,
where
D{TB), = 1 i f  t = TB + 1, 0 otherwise', (4.11)
DU, = 1 if  t> T t , 0 otherwise',
and
A(L)e, =  B(L)v, v, -  i . i . d . (0,0)
where A(L) and B(L) are polynomials of order p and q, respectively, in the lag operator 
L23. The corresponding regression equation is constructed nesting the null and the 
alternative hypothesis in an ADF type regression equation:
23 The error term e, is thus specified as an ARMA(p,q) process and allows the variable y, to represent a 
general process.
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(4.12)y, = p + a  y,_, + 8 D{TB\ + 7  DU, + P t-+ £  cp, A y,_,+ e,M
Model B: ‘change in growth ’ hypothesis:
Ho>y,= fX, — \i\) DU t + yt~ 1 + et
HA.y, = \i + ^ t  + ^ - ^ ) D r , + ei (4.13)
DT' = t — Te if t>T„, and 0 otherwise.
and the regression equation is constructed nesting the null and the alternative
hypothesis in an ADF type regression equation:
y, = p + a y M + T) £>r; + p/ + 1  <p, A y,.( + e, (4.14)
1=1
However, Perron does not allow for a change in growth and a change in the 
intercept happening at different years. In his ‘Model C’ he considers the case when at a 
particular year there is a change in both the intercept and the growth rate. As we deem 
more appropriate for our case to consider different break years, we have developed a 
‘Model D’ which allows for a change in growth and a crash at different years and is 
formalised as:
Model D: crash and 'change in growth’ hypothesis at different years:
Ho'.y, =  P, +  5 D{TB), + (p 2 -  p ,) DU 1 + y,_, + e,
//„: y, = p, + (p , -  p,) D V, + p, i + (P2 — p,) Dr? + e,
where
D(TB\ = 1, if  t = Tt l  +1, and 0 otherwise-, (4.15)
DU, — 1, if t> Tt 2 and 0 otherwise-,
DV, = 1, if  t>  T b.i and 0 otherwise-,
DT", = t ~TBI if  t>T„„ and 0 otherwise.
and the regression equation is constructed nesting the null and the alternative
hypothesis in an ADF type regression equation:
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y ,  =  P  +  a  y , - 1 + SD(TB), + QDU,+ yDV, + r\DT' +  p t  +  £  cp, A y _  +  e , (4.16)
1=1
The following tables report the results from the Perron tests of model A, B, and 
of our model D. For completeness, all the estimated parameters are reported alongside 
the respective significance tests. However, the focus is on xa, which directly tests the 
unit root null. The critical values for Ta for model A and B (tables 4.4.6 and 4.4.7) are 
drawn from Perron. For model D the critical values for To (tables 4.4.8 and 4.4.9) are: - 
3.76 at 10%, -4.06 at 5% and -4.34 at 2.5%26.
The results from model A and model B indicate that in most cases the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected at the 2.5% significance level. 
However, the tests statistics from model D give an opposite indication. These results 
suggest that the REERs series are stationary, if two breaks are simultaneously allowed. 
This point of the double break changing the outcome of the unit root tests must be 
taken with caution. As it has been stressed above, the sample size is too small to be 
able to ascertain very long run behaviour of the series. Moreover, one could argue that 
series may be forced to look stationary provided enough breaks are included. As a 
result, we must treat these result with caution: they may indicate a stationary behaviour 
of the REER over the very long run, but the sample size used and the above mentioned 
hyperinflation of the early 1960’s prevents us to rely on this indication.
2 6 These critical values were calculated, using a Fortran programme.
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All Variables in Logarithms. All ADF(1) tests.
Table 4.4.6. Model A: ‘Crash’ Hypothesis at Year TB . ADF Tests.
Sample 1967-1993. T=27.
Variable X a T„ V s X6 Y P Sterr
G R W C X M . 6 7 - . 4 8 - 3 . 4 5 2 . 1 2 3 . 3 7 , . 0 1 5 . 1 3 . 2 6 2 . 5 0 b . 0 0 1 . 3 4 . 0 8 6
G R W C X . 6 7 - . 4 7 - 3 . 4 4 2 . 0 8 3 . 3 6 , . 0 2 . 1 8 . 2 6 2 . 4 7 b . 0 0 1 . 3 9 . 0 8 7
G R W C M . 6 7 - . 5 0 - 3 . 5 6 2 . 2 4 3 . 5 0 , - . 0 1 - . 0 1 . 2 7 2 . 6 4 b . 0 0 1 . 3 0 . 0 8 5
G R C C X M . 6 7 - . 4 7 - 3 . 2 2 1 . 9 6 3 . 1 4 . . 0 3 . 2 2 . 3 1 2 . 4 5 b . 0 0 4 1 . 1 1 . 0 9 6
G R C C X . 6 7 - . 4 6 - 3 . 1 9 1 . 9 3 3 . 1 0 , . 0 4 . 2 8 . 3 1 2 . 4 L . 0 0 5 1 . 1 1 . 0 9 8
G R C C M . 6 7 - . 4 9 - 3 . 3 5 2 . 0 8 3 . 2 9 , . 0 1 . 0 8 . 3 1 2 . 6 1 b . 0 0 5 1 . 1 5 . 0 9 2
GRNCWCXM . 6 7 - . 4 9 - 3 . 5 0 2 . 1 6 3 . 4 2 , . 0 2 . 2 0 . 2 8 2 . 5 7 b . 0 0 1 . 3 1 . 0 8 8
G R N C W C X . 6 7 - . 4 8 - 3 . 4 6 2 . 1 0 3 . 3 8 , . 0 3 . 2 7 . 2 8 2 . 5 0 b . 0 0 1 . 3 2 . 0 8 9
G R N C W C M . 6 7 - . 5 2 - 3 . 6 5 2 . 3 3 3 . 5 9 , . 0 0 . 0 0 . 3 0 2 . 7 6 b . 0 0 1 . 3 0 . 0 8 6
GRNCCCXM . 6 7 - . 4 9 - 3 . 3 2 2 . 0 4 3 . 2 4 , . 0 3 . 2 5 . 3 4 2 . 5 6 b . 0 0 5 1 . 2 2 . 0 9 8
G R N C C C X . 6 7 - . 4 8 - 3 . 3 3 2 . 0 0 3 . 2 3 , . 0 4 . 3 1 . 3 4 2 . 5 3 b . 0 0 5 1 . 2 8 . 0 9 9
G R N C C C M . 6 7 - . 5 1 - 3 . 4 2 2 . 1 7 3 . 3 7 , . 0 1 . 0 8 . 3 5 2 . 7 2 b . 0 0 5 1 . 2 2 . 0 9 5
G R N O C W C . 6 7 - . 4 4 - 3 . 2 8 1 . 9 7 3 . 2 3 , - . 0 7 - . 7 6 . 2 0 2 . 3 2 b . 0 0 1 . 1 6 4 . 0 8 2
G R N O C C C . 6 7 - . 3 8 - 2 . 9 8 1 . 6 9 2 . 9 2 , - . 0 6 - . 6 2 . 1 9 2 . 1 3 b . 0 0 0 - . 0 1 . 0 8 4
G R O I L W C 1 . 5 6 - . 3 0 - 2 . 1 8 1 . 0 8 2 . 1 3 c . 2 1 1 . 7 1 a . 1 3 1 . 1 6 . 0 0 6 1 . 1 6 . 0 9 9
G R O I L C C 1 . 5 6 - . 3 0 - 2 . 0 3 1 . 1 0 2 . 0 5 c . 1 9 1 . 9 0 d . 1 1 1 . 2 3 . 0 0 6 1 . 2 5 . 0 7 7
GRCOMPWC1 . 5 6 - . 2 6 - 2 . 3 2 1 . 0 5 2 . 1 9 c . 1 5 1 . 2 3 . 1 5 1 . 3 9 . 0 0 2 . 3 6 . 0 9 7
GRCOMPCC1 . 5 6 - . 2 4 - 2 . 1 2 . 9 7 2 . 0 3 c . 1 4 1 . 2 3 . 1 4 1 . 4 2 . 0 0 1 . 3 4 . 0 8 7
X: proportion of the sample before the break.
1: break at 1982: i.e. step dummy is =1 for t>1982. In all other cases: break 1985. (step=l for t>1985) 
a denotes significance at 1%, b at 2.5%, c at 5% and d at 10% (t-statistics).
Critical Values for xa
X .50 .60 .70
2.5% -4.01 -4.09 -4.07
5% -3.76 -3.76 -3.80
10% -3.46 -3.47 -3.51
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All Variables in Logarithms. All ADF(1) tests.
Table 4.4.7. Model B: Change in Growth Hypothesis at Year TB . DF Tests.
Sample 1961-1993. T=34.
Variable X a Ta Tu T) Tq P Tp St-err.
GRW CXM .18 -.48 -3.77 2.74 3.04, .13 1.94d -.12 -1.82, .176
GRW CX .18 -.46 -3.70 2.64 2.97, .13 1.89d -.11 -1.76d .176
GRW CM .18 -.51 -3.90 2.94 3.18, .14 2.06c -.13 -1.94d .175
GRCCXM .18 -.43 -3.45 2.33 2.66, .12 1.63 -.10 -1.46 .189
GRCCX .18 -.40 -3.34 2.12 2.50, .11 1.50 -.09 -1.33 .184
G RCCM .18 -.48 -3.67 2.68 2.96, .14 1.91d -.12 -1.74d .191
GRNCW CXM .18 -.47 -3.69 2.67 2.96. .13 1.87d -.12 -1.74d .178
GRNCW CX .18 -.45 -3.62 2.56 2.88, .12 1.80d -.11 -1.68d .180
GRNCW CM .18 -.50 -3.85 2.89 3.12. .14 2.02, -.13 -1.89d .177
GRNCCCXM .18 -.41 -3.36 2.20 2.56s .11 1.55 -.09 -1.37 .193
GRNCCCX .18 -.38 -3.25 2.01 2.41, .10 1.43 -.08 -1.25 .189
GRNCCCM .18 -.47 -3.58 2.55 2.85. .13 1.82a -.11 -1.64 .195
GRNOCW C .18 -.59 -4.36 3.53 3.58, .18 2.42s -.17 -2.32c .167
GRNOCCC .18 -.52 -3.93 3.06 3.14. .15 2.01d -.13 -1.91d .173
GROILW C .18 -.48 -3.77 2.43 2.94. .15 1.96, -.12 -1.79d .182
G ROILCC .18 -.62 -4.66 3.31 3.84, .20 2.79, -.18 -2.61s .159
GRCOM PW C .18 -.44 -3.59 2.35 2.68s .12 1.65 -.11 -1.51 .188
G RCO M PCC .18 -.48 -3.81 2.63 2.91. .14 1.86d -.12 -1.72, .179
X: proportion of the sample before the break. Break is at 1965. 
a denotes significance at 1%, b at 2.5%, c at 5% and d at 10% (t-statistics).
Critical Values for Ta
X .10 .20
2.5% -3.94 -4.08
5% -3.65 -3.80
10% -3.36 -3.49
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4.5. Concluding Remarks.
This chapter has presented an overview of the main problems related to the 
definition and measurement of the real exchange rate. A set of REER indexes for the 
Indonesian rupiah has been computed and their statistical properties analysed. Unit 
root testing has been extensively used in order to ascertain the time series properties 
of the Indonesian REER. Their importance will become apparent in the empirical 
implementation of the models presented in the following chapter. As a conclusion, 
we have consistently rejected the hypothesis of REER stationarity except in those 
cases in which the full sample series have been used and/or two breaks in REER 
behaviour have been allowed. In those cases results show stationarity, but we should 
treat them more as indicative than as definitive. A much longer time series would be 
most appropriate, and results from a test based on a much larger sample size would 
be less suspicious.
The analysis of the REER behaviour has also served as a test on the long run 
PPP proposition. The rejection of the hypothesis of REER stationarity in the majority 
of cases implies that long run PPP cannot be confirmed. Incidentally, PPP should be 
tested on PPP defined REERs; all the tests based on trade theory defined REERs can 
thus be interpreted as robustness checks.
Note that the models used in chapter 5 are closely linked with the tradable 
versus non-tradable modelling tradition. Consequently, we use a trade theory defined 
REER. In particular, we have chosen GRWCPXM which considers all the trading
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partners and is constructed using trade shares, so that purchasing power in buying 
from and selling to trading partners is considered.
Finally, further research could bring a comparative perspective in order to 
determine whether the behaviour of the Indonesian REER matches other countries 
REERs.
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Appendix 10.
Table A.10.1. Average Individual Countries' Weights. Percentages of Exports 
(X), Imports (M) and Trade (XM) Relative to Total Indonesian Exports, 
Imports and Trade.
Japan (averages: X=41.2%, 
M=33.8%, XM=38.5%)
USA (averages: X=22.8%, 
M=20.4%, XM=21.9%)
Singapore (averages: X=11.1%, 
M=8.6%, XM=10%)
Germany (averages: X=4.4%, 
M=10.9%, XM=7%)
Netherlands (averages: X=4.5% 
M=3.7%, XM=4.2%)
Australia(averages: X=4.3% 
M =4.1%, XM=4%)
United Kingdom (averages: X=2.2%, 
M=4.7%, XM=3.2%)
Hong Kong (averages: X=1.7%, 
M=3.9%, XM=2.6%)
Korea (averages: X=2.5%, 
M=2.3%, XM=2.4%)
France (averages: X=.8%, 
M=3.2%, XM=1.9%)
Italy (averages: X=1.3%,
M=2.2%, XM=1.7%)
Malaysia (averages: X=1.7%, 
M=.9%, XM=1.3%)
Belgium (averages: X=1.2%, 
M= 1.2%, XM= 1.1%)
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Yearbook, various issues.
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Appendix 11. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrixes for Calculated 
REER and NEER.
Descriptive Statistics: Nominal Effective Exchange Rates. 
The present sample is: 1960 to 1993
Means
gnomrx
80.05
gnncrxm
82.75
gnomrm
80.13
gnnocrd
74.02
gnomrxm
79.98
gnercomp
62.40
gnomoil 
50.40 
dollar 
64.69
gnncrx
83.12
gnncrm
82.59
Standard Deviations
gnomrx gnomrm gnomrxm gnomoil gnncrx gnncrm
89.05 85.63 87.64 35.41 94.98 90.21
gnncrxm gnnocrd gnercomp dollar
92.95 58.93 46.56 60.54
Correlation matrixes
dollar gnomrxm gnncrxm gnnocrd gnomoil gnercomp
dollar 1.000
gnomrxm 0.9909 1.000
gnncrxm 0.9881 0.9998 1.000
gnnocrd 0.9901 0.9732 0.9691 1.000
gnomoil 0.8128 0.7379 0.7260 0.8422 1.000
gnercomp 0.9726 0.9377 0.9315 0.9866 0.9151 1.000
dollar gnomrx gnncrx gnnocrd gnomoil gnercomp
dollar 1.000
gnomrxm 0.9899 1.000
gnncrx 0.9866 0.9997 1.000
gnnocrd 0.9901 0.9711 0.9665 1.000
gnomoil 0.8128 0.7327 0.7189 0.8422 1.000
gnercomp 0.9726 0.9348 0.9276 0.9866 0.9151 1.000
dollar gnomrm gnncrm gnnocrd gnomoil gnercomp
dollar 1.000
gnomrm 0.9921 1.000
gnncrm 0.9900 0.9998 1.000
gnnocrd 0.9901 0.9765 0.9733 1.000
gnomoil 0.8128 0.7459 0.7367 0.8422 1.000
gnercomp 0.9726 0.9422 0.9373 0.9866 0.9151 1.000
gnomrx
gnomrx
1.000
gnomrm g nomrxm
gnomrm 0.9995 1.000
gnomrxm 0.9999 0.9998 1.000
gnncrx
gnncrx
1.000
gnncrm gnncrxm
gnncrm 0.9993 1.000
gnncrxm 0.9999 0.9997 1.000
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D e s c r ip t iv e  S ta t is t ic s :  R e a l  E f f e c t iv e  E x c h a n g e  R a te s .
T h e  p r e s e n t  s a m p le  is : 1 9 6 0  to  1 9 9 3
Means
grwcpix grwcpim grwcpxm grcpix grcpim grcpxm
125.2 125.9 125.4 120.5 118.8 119.7
grerdx grerdm grerdxm brerwcpi brercpi brerd
153.6 152.0 152.8 113.8 110.3 141.4
grncwcx grncwcm grncwcxm grnccpx grnccpm grnccpxm
127.1 127.6 127.2 121.1 119.6 120.2
grncdx grncdm grncdxm grnoccp grnocwcp grnocd
153.8 153.1 153.3 126.5 123.7 157.0
groilwc groilcc groild grcompcc grcompwc grcompd
78.30 78.84 82.12 107.5 102.0 119.9
Standard Deviations
grwcpix grwcpim grwcpxm grcpix grcpim grcpxm
68.17 67.77 68.01 67.14 58.05 63.60
grerdx grerdm grerdxm brerwcpi brercpi brerd
77.36 68.89 73.91 68.05 61.81 75.21
grncwcx grncwcm grncwcxm grnccpx grnccpm grnccpxm
70.30 68.58 69.57 67.59 59.15 63.74
grncdx grncdm grncdxm grnoccp grnocwcp grnocd
74.83 68.55 72.00 82.81 79.50 91.78
groilwc groilcc groild grcompcc grcompwc grcompd
38.83 37.22 31.27 70.85 65.18 66.71
Correlation matrixes
grwcpxm grncwcxm grnocwcp groilwc grcompwc
grwcpxm 1.000
grncwcxm 0.9997 1.000
grnocwcp 0.9807 0.9770 1.000
groilwc 0.8905 0.8957 0.8231 1.000
grcompwc 0.9902 0.9892 0.9845 0.9036 1.000
grcpxm grnccpxm grnoccp groilcc grcompcc
grcpxm 1.000
grnccpxm 0.9969 1.000
grnoccp 0.9028 0.8666 1.000
groilcc 0.9447 0.9430 0.8379 1.000
grcompcc 0.9339 0.9037 0.9929 0.8902 1.000
grerdxm grncdxm grnocd groild grcompd
grerdxm 1.000
grncdxm 0.9980 1.000
grnocd 0.9566 0.9376 1.000
groild 0.8031 0.8073 0.7269 1.000
grcompd 0.9673 0.9537 0.9783 0.8423 1.000
grwcpix grncwcx grnocwcp groilwc grcompwc
grwcpix 1.000
grncwcx 0.9998 1.000
grnocwcp 0.9797 0.9772 1.000
groilwc 0.8912 0.8951 0.8231 1.000
grcompwc 0.9901 0.9896 0.9845 0.9036 1.000
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grcompcc
grcpix
grcpix 
1.000
grnccpx 0.9973
grnoccp 0.9153
groilcc 0.9438
grcompcc 0.9444
grerdx
grerdx 
1.000
grncdx 0.9977
grnocd 0.9602
groild 0.8066
grcompd 0.9715
grwcpim
grncwcm
grnocwcp
groilwc
grcompwc
grwcpim
1.000
0.9996
0.9821
0.8887
0.9900
grcpim
grnccpm
grnoccp
groilcc
grcompcc
grcpim 
1.000 
0.9976 
0.8772 
0.9427 
0.9111
grerdm
grncdm
grnocd
groild
grcompd
grerdm 
1.000 
0.9985 
0.9489 
0.7961 
0.9577
grwcpix
grwcpim
grwcpxm
grwcpix 
1.000 
0.9995 
0.9999
grcpix
grcpim
grcpxm
grcpix
1.000
0.9948
0.9993
grerdx
grerdm
grerdxm
grerdx
1.000
0.9972
0.9996
grwcpxm
grcpxm
grerdxm
grwcpxm 
1.000 
0.9627 
0.8857
grwcpix
grcpix
grerdx
grwcpix
1.000
0.9703
0.8904
grnccpx grnoccp groilcc
1.000 
0.8841 
0.9443 
0.9190
1.000
0.8379
0.9929
1.000
0.8902
grncdx grnocd groild
1.000
0.9408
0.8107
0.9578
1.000
0.7269
0.9783
1.000
0.8423
grncwcm grnocwcp groilwc
1.000 
0.9769 
0.8956 
0.9884
1.000
0.8231
0.9845
1.000
0.9036
grnccpm grnoccp groilcc
1.000
0.8434
0.9392
0.8824
1.000
0.8379
0.9929
1.000
0.8902
grncdm grnocd groild
1.000
0.9342
0.8038
0.9485
1.000
0.7269
0.9783
1.000
0.8423
grwcpim grwcpxm
1.000
0.9998 1.000
grcpim grcpxm
1.000
0.9978 1.000
grerdm grerdxm
1.000
0.9988 1.000
grcpxm grerdxm
1.000
0.8200 1.000
grcpix grerdx
1.000
0.8326 1.000
1.000
grcompd
1.000
grcompwc
1.000
grcompcc
1.000
grcompd
1.000
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grwcpim
grcpim
grerdm
grwcpim
1.000
0.9458
0.8698
grncwcx
grncwcm
grncwcxm
grncwcx
1.000
0.9996
0.9999
grnccpx
grnccpm
grnccpxm
grnccpx
1.000
0.9951
0.9990
grncdx
grncdm
grncdxm
grncdx
1.000
0.9982
0.9997
grncwcxm
grnccpxm
grncdxm
grncwcxm
1.000
0.9458
0.8801
grncwcx
grnccpx
grncdx
grncwcx
1.000
0.9557
0.8851
grncwcm
grnccpm
grncdm
grncwcm
1.000
0.9317
0.8720
grnoccp
grnocwcp
grnocd
grnoccp
1.000
0.9994
0.8872
groilwc
groilcc
groild
groilwc
1.000
0.9947
0.9085
grcompcc
grcompwc
grcompd
grcompcc
1.000
0.9971
0.9121
grcpim grerdm
1.000
0.7972 1.000
grncwcm grncwcxm
1.000
0.9998 1.000
grnccpm grnccpxm
1.000
0.9984 1.000
grncdm grncdxm
1.000
0.9993 1.000
grnccpxm grncdxm
1.000
0.8097 1.000
grnccpx grncdx
1.000
0.8239 1.000
grnccpm grncdm
1.000
0.7911 1.000
grnocwcp grnocd
1.000
0.8863 1.000
groilcc groild
1.000
0.9018 1.000
grcompwc grcompd
1.000
0.9068 1.000
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D e s c r ip t iv e  S ta t is tic s : B i la te r a l  R e a l E x c h a n g e  R a te s  ( I n d o n e s ia  v e r s u s  U S A ) .
T h e  p r e s e n t  s a m p le  is : 1 9 6 0  to  1993
Means
brerwcpi brercpi brerd
113.8 110.3 141.4
Standard Deviations
brerwcpi brercpi brerd
68.05 61.81 75.21
Correlation matrixes
brerwcpi brercpi brerd
brerwcpi 1.000
brercpi 0.9879 1.000
brerd 0.8226 0.8040 1.000
grwcpxm grcpxm grerdxm
brerwcpi
brercpi
brerd
0.9779
0.9411
0.9501
Guide to Variables ’ Labels.
Variables have been labelled following a five fields coding procedure. This is 
outlined below and serves as a rough guide to the interpretation of the index names. 
Some minor deviations were introduced in a few cases.
The five fields refer to: 1) the averaging procedure used; 2) the type of 
exchange rate computed; 3) the countries selected in the calculation of the index; 4) 
the price index ratio used; and 5) the weights employed. They are described as 
follows:
1) Averaging procedure field
g / * / * / * / *  : denotes geometric weighted averaging
b / * / * / * / * : denotes geometric weighted averaging for bilateral
rate (Indonesia versus USA only)
2) Type of exchange rate field
* / n (or nom) 1*1*1* : denotes nominal effective exchange rate
* / r (or rer) 1*1*1*  : denotes real effective exchange rate
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3) Foreign countries field 
*1*1-  1*1*
*1*1  
* 1 * 1
* / * / oil
* / * / comp
4) Price index ratio field
* 1 * 1 * 1  wc(pi) / * : denotes
* / * / * /  cc(pi) / * : denotes
* / *  / * / d 1* : denotes
deflator
5) Weights field
* / * / * / * / x m : denotes
* 1 * 1 * 1 * l x : denotes
* 1*1*1*1  m : denotes
non competitors trading partners 
nominal non-oil competitors 
oil competitors
competitors (both oil and non-oil)
foreign WPI / domestic CPI 
foreign CPI / domestic CPI 
foreign GDP deflator / domestic GDP
trade weights (imports+exports shares) 
export weights 
import weights.
: unspecified fields denotes all trading partners 
nc / * / * : denotes
noc / * / * : denotes
1*1*  : denotes
1*1* : denotes
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CHAPTER 5
REAL EXCHANGE RATE MODELLING: 
THE CASE OF INDONESIA.
5.1. Introduction.
The real exchange rate (RER) is commonly used as a key indicator of the 
overall competitiveness of a country. The trade theory defined RER (see chapter 4) also 
signals long run intersectoral growth patterns, for instance the expansion of the tradable 
sector or the contraction of the agricultural sector.
The link between RER behaviour and economic performance has recently been 
emphasised in policy discussions and in the literature on economic development. In 
particular, the role of RER stability and of correct real exchange alignment is 
increasingly regarded as crucial in development strategies (Edwards and Ahamed, 
1986; Cottani, Cavallo and Khan, 1990; Edwards, 1988a, 1989 and 1994; Elbadawi, 
1994 and 1994; Harberger, 1986; Khan and Lizondo,1987; Pfeffermann, 1985; Pick 
and Vollrath, 1994; Serven and Solimano, 1992; White and Wignaraja, 1991 and 1992; 
Williamson, 1994).
RER stability reduces uncertainty and can thus result in attracting foreign 
capital and in stimulating domestic investments, given a greater confidence in the 
domestic and foreign business community in the country’s economic performance. 
Correct RER alignment results in internal and external equilibrium, for given 
sustainable macroeconomic conditions and economic policies, and can be conducive to
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greater equality. The consequences of misalignment can be critical for developing 
countries. In particular, overvalued exchange rates undermine the profitability of 
producing exports and import substitutes. Exports are hurt by reduced competitiveness. 
Incentives to produce import substitutes decline as relatively cheaper imports are 
stimulated, provided import restrictions are not imposed. If protection against imports 
is introduced, the costs to subsidise import competing industries can widen the fiscal 
deficit and resource allocation can be less efficient. Overvaluation, therefore, is 
particularly detrimental to export-led growth strategies. Widening current account 
deficits will be also reflected in increased borrowing requirements which exert 
pressures on the capital account and may worsen the external debt servicing burden. 
Another important effect of overvalued exchange rates is the negative impact on the 
agricultural sector. The decline in competitiveness and in relative prices caused by the 
overvaluation reduces incentives for farmers to produce1. This has dramatic welfare 
effects, given the key role of agriculture in countries at the early stages of development.
RER misalignment occurs when nominal exchange rates are not allowed to 
adjust fully in response to changes in economic conditions, such as unsustainable 
monetary and fiscal policies, trade and capital controls, increasing domestic inflation 
and costs. Determining the correct RER alignment requires the introduction of an 
equilibrium concept, relative to which misalignment can be established and the 
appropriate policy adjustments undertaken. Therefore, it is necessary to define an 
equilibrium level of the RER which reflects a country’s economic fundamentals. In 
practice, the quantification of RER disequilibrium is not easy. Purchasing power parity
1 Agriculture usually does not enjoy the same level of protection as industry does.
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(PPP) theory provides a simple way to estimating misalignment. However, as 
mentioned in chapter 4, PPP underestimates the role of economic fundamentals and 
does not offer a reliable guide to policy makers. An alternative approach is proposed by 
Edwards (1989) who presents a modelling approach to equilibrium and disequilibrium 
RER focused on the role of domestic and external determinants of the RER.
In this chapter we present two strictly related models for the RER and their 
empirical application for the case of Indonesia. We start with the modelling approach 
proposed by Edwards. A brief description of his model2 and of its implications 
precedes the empirical time series estimation for Indonesia. We then present a modified 
version of Edwards’ model, an Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) model, which 
develops the concept of equilibrium RER. Once again the empirical estimation is 
implemented for Indonesia and simulation exercises are conducted. Final remarks 
conclude the chapter.
5.2. Models of RER Determination: Edwards’ Approach.
5.2.1 The Model.
In modelling the behaviour of the RER we adopt the seminal approach 
proposed by Edwards (1989). He develops a highly stylised benchmark intertemporal 
general equilibrium model in order to analyse how the equilibrium RER reacts to real 
disturbances. Duality theory is applied in a two period framework. The model is
2 For a detailed description of the model see Edwards (1989, 1994).
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characterised by full employment, flexible prices, perfect competition and perfect 
foresight. This small open economy is composed of optimising producers and 
consumers and a government. Since there is no money or nominal assets, the model is 
completely defined in real terms.
Perfectly competitive firms maximise their profits in the two periods and 
produce three goods - exportables, importables and non-tradable goods. Constant 
returns to scale technology is assumed. Households maximise their present and future 
utility from the consumption of the three goods, subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint. The government has to balance the discounted value of its budget, that is, 
the equality must hold between the present values of government current and future 
expenditures and revenues. This implies that borrowing from abroad is possible; 
however, by the end of period two international debt must be repaid.
Equilibrium RER (ERER) is defined in terms of economic fundamentals and 
results in the simultaneous attainment of internal and external equilibrium across the 
two periods. Internal equilibrium requires current and expected future clearing of the 
non-tradable goods market. External equilibrium occurs when current account balances 
(current and future) satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint, that states that the 
discounted sum of current and future current accounts is zero. According to this 
definition of ERER, changes in the variables that affect internal and/or external balance 
will result in changes in the ERER. As a consequence, the RER itself is a function of a 
number of variables, or economic fundamentals, which determine the ERER. Using 
Edwards’ (1988) classification, fundamentals can be separated into external and 
internal. External fundamentals include terms of trade, capital flows and international 
transfers such as aid. Internal fundamentals can be further divided into those which are
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policy related such as exchange and capital controls, government expenditure and 
domestic investment, and those which are not affected by policy changes, most 
importantly technological progress. Given the two-period nature of the model, 
exogenous shocks will affect the ERER through intertemporal and intratemporal effects 
on resource allocation and consumption and production decision.
The attractiveness of Edwards’ modelling approach is that instead of a unique 
equilibrium value of the RER the model generates a vector of ERER, which will 
fluctuate over time. In contrast to the PPP alternative, misalignment of the RER is thus 
interpreted as a sustained departure of the RER from its equilibrium path, rather than 
being defined as deviation from a constant equilibrium value.
While in the long run RER depends only on real economic fundamentals, the 
dynamics of the RER in the short run is affected also by non-fundamental variables, 
such as nominal devaluation and monetary and fiscal policies. Therefore, the following 
equation is introduced:
A log RER, = 0 (log ERER, -  log RER„, ) - X (  MACROIMB,) + <p(NOMDEV,) (5.1) 
where ERER is the equilibrium RER, MACROIMB is an indicator of macroeconomic 
imbalances, i.e. of domestic monetary and fiscal policies, and NOMDEV is nominal 
devaluation.
Short run RER movements respond to three factors. First, there is a self- 
adjusting process of the RER to its equilibrium value, captured by the first, partial 
adjustment, term. The smaller is the speed at which the self-correcting process takes 
place, captured by the parameter 0, the slower is convergence towards equilibrium and 
the longer is the persistence of misalignment. Second, macroeconomic policies affect
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the RER, and this is captured by MACROIMB. Unsustainable macroeconomic policies 
lead to misalignment of RER. Finally, nominal devaluations (revaluations) are directly 
linked to the RER in the short run, and this is accounted for by NOMDEV. This term 
captures the impact effect of nominal devaluations (revaluations) on RER, although this 
effect does not necessarily last over the longer run.
However, the above dynamic model cannot be directly tested because ERER is 
not observable. According to the definition, the ERER is a function of economic 
fundamentals. Edwards thus proposes the following logarithmic specification for the 
ERER:
log ERER, = P0 +P, logTOT, + P 2 logGCA,+P3 log CAPCONTROLS,
+P4 log EXCHCONTROLS, + p, log TECHPRO, (5.2)
+p6 log INVY, + u,
where TOT are the external terms of trade, GCN is government consumption on non­
tradables, CAPCONTROLS is a measure of capital flows controls, EXCHCONTROLS 
is a measure of trade restrictions and exchange rate controls, TECHPRO is technical 
progress, INVY is the ratio of investment to the country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP), u is the error terms and the subscript t denotes time.
An equation which can be empirically tested is finally obtained after 
substituting the expression for ERER (5.2) in the dynamic equation for the RER (5.1).
log RER, =Yo+Y, log TOT, + y 2 log GCN, + y } log CAPCONTROLS,
+Y4 log EXCHCONTROLS, + y ,  log TECHPRO,
+Y6 log INVY, + (1 -  0) log RER,.t (5'3)
-X  MACROIMB, + <)> NOMDEV, + u,
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Moreover, if we exclude the influence of the non-fundamental variables, by 
imposing X = = 0, the long-run coefficients of the ERER equation can be computed as 
P i = y , /0 ■ This will generate estimated series of long-run ERERs.
The model allows for a formal analysis of the impact of changes in the 
fundamentals on the ERER. A brief summary of the theoretical expectation about the 
direction of ERER movements follows in the next section.
w h e re  y, = P , * 0  . F ro m  th e  e m p ir ic a l e s t im a te s  o f  y  / a n d  0  th e  p  , c a n  b e  d e r iv e d .
5.2.2. Fundamentals’ Disturbances to the ERER.
In order to study the response of the ERER to real disturbances, Edwards uses 
various simplified versions of the benchmark model for each particular distortion. This 
allows us to establish the sign (positive, negative or ambiguous) of the impact of 
changes in the level of the fundamentals on the ERER. The most significant results are 
described in this section3.
Terms of Trade. A worsening of the terms of trade (that is a decrease) implies a 
higher price for importables relative to that of exportables. Real income is reduced and 
the demand for tradables declines. To restore equilibrium there has to be a reduction in 
the relative price of non-tradables, i.e. a real depreciation. However, a substitution
3 For the detailed formal analysis see Edwards’ (1989).
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effect and intertemporal ramifications4 lead to a shift to consuming more non-tradables, 
given the higher price for tradables. This will put pressure on the non-tradable price. 
Theoretically, the final effect of a deterioration of the terms of trade is ambiguous; 
however, it is commonly believed that the income effect dominates the substitution 
effect and statistical evidence supports this view. As a result, worsening terms of trade 
are usually expected to cause an ERER depreciation.
Government Consumption. An increase in government consumption due to an 
increase in the proportion of non-tradables will induce demand pressure in the non­
tradable goods market and thus an equilibrium real appreciation. The greater is the 
marginal propensity to consume non-tradables, the larger will be the real appreciation. 
On the contrary, if the increase in government consumption falls mainly on tradable 
goods, then an equilibrium real depreciation is expected. These results may become 
ambiguous when both tradable and non-tradable consumption rise.
Exchange Rate and Capital Controls. Relaxation of exchange rate and capital 
controls encourages capital inflows and foreign borrowing. Higher demand will ensue 
and to maintain internal equilibrium an increase in the price of non-tradables is 
necessary, and thus an equilibrium real appreciation follows. However, since foreign 
borrowing has to be repaid in future periods, debt repayment will result in a real 
depreciation. Therefore, the long run effect is ambiguous.
4 Given the two period nature of the model, economic agents decisions involve both the present and 
the future period. As a result, the total substitution effect will consist of an intratemporal and an 
intertemporal component.
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Trade Controls. Following the imposition of, or increase in, tariffs a similar
outcome to the one related to terms of trade deterioration occurs. Higher import tariffs 
lead to a rise in import prices and consequently to a reduction in the demand for 
importables. Higher demand for non-tradables follows. In order to maintain 
equilibrium5 in the non-tradable market an increase in non-tradable prices is required 
and an equilibrium real appreciation follows. Similarly, trade liberalisation will usually 
lead to equilibrium real depreciation.
Technical Progress. According to the Balassa-Ricardo hypothesis countries 
experiencing faster productivity growth will face a real appreciation (see Balassa, 1964 
and Isard, 1995). This proposition on the negative link between technical progress and 
the RER is rooted in the PPP literature but can be easily fitted in the trade theory 
framework. The underlying hypothesis is that in all countries productivity gains are 
larger in the tradable sector than in the non-tradable sector and thus induce a tendency 
of the relative price of tradables to non-tradables to decline over time (i.e. a trade theory 
defined RER appreciation). Given that tradable goods prices are internationally 
determined, productivity growth differentials across countries and sectors will cause a 
PPP defined RER appreciation.
Investment. The effect of higher capital accumulation is dependent on its 
composition and goal6. For instance, investments in the housing sector will involve
5 In general, this is what we expect to happen, but results may become ambiguous if we take into account 
the initial level of the tariffs (see Edwards 1989).
6 Note that in Edwards’ model investment decisions will have intertemporal effects on the supply side 
(see Edwards, 1989, p.37).
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mainly the non-tradable sector and thus may induce an ERER appreciation. On the 
contrary, investment aimed at promoting the export sector may help restore 
competitiveness and thus cause an ERER depreciation. In general, it is not possible to 
establish the sign of its impact.
5.2.3. Empirical Estimation. The Indonesian RER.
In order to specify an empirical equation for the Indonesian RER we use 
Edwards’ equation (5.3). However, problems related to data availability arise. In fact, 
we have reliable time series data only for the terms of trade and the ratio of investment 
to GDP.
As a proxy to government consumption on non-tradables, for which we have no 
time series data, we use the ratio of government consumption (GC) to GDP. Since the 
government consumes both tradables and non tradables, the use of this proxy allows for 
an impact on the RER not only through changes in the level of non-tradable 
consumption, but also through changes in the composition of GC. GC may increase 
either for an increase in non-tradable consumption, given a fixed level of tradable 
consumption, or for the opposite situation, or even for an increase in both types of 
goods consumption. Therefore, results obtained when using this proxy must be 
interpreted with care. An operational definition for controls on capital flows in and out 
the country is difficult and time series data are not available. An eligible proxy is the 
lagged ratio of net capital flows to GDP. In preliminary dynamic estimations of the 
model, the short run coefficient for this proxy and its associated long run coefficient 
turned out to be consistently insignificantly different from zero. In order to save degrees
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of freedom, this variable is excluded7. Exchange rate and trade restrictions have been 
proxied by the ratio of tariff revenues to import plus exports. We include tariffs on 
exports, and thus exports in the denominator, because of the importance of revenues 
from oil export duties in Indonesia. Unfortunately, this proxy ignores non-tariff 
barriers, for which it is very difficult to obtain consistent time series data. As for 
exchange rate controls, these are not particularly relevant in the case of Indonesia. The 
related indicator of the black market exchange rate closely follows the nominal official 
rate. Finally, real GDP growth rate proxies technological progress. This is done 
frequently in the empirical literature to take into account the Ricardo-Balassa effect, 
which associate faster technological progress to real appreciation8.
Finally, the role of macroeconomic policy in RER behaviour is captured by 
MACROIMB. We have defined it as the ratio of fiscal deficit to previous period high 
powered money (DEH). This reflects fiscal policy, in particular, the monetisation of 
fiscal deficit. Various measures of monetary policy have also been included in 
MACROIMB in preliminary estimations, such as money growth, domestic credit 
growth and excess supply for domestic credit. However, all these variables proved not 
to add to the statistical significance of the model.
7 Specifically, we have adopted the general to specific modelling strategy in order to determine the 
dynamics of the model.
8 International differences in productivity growth in the tradable sector would cause discrepancies in 
the RER in different countries, ceteris paribus.
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The econometric specification for RER behaviour for Indonesia is then obtained 
from equation (5.3) by simply substituting some fundamentals with their relevant 
proxies:
log RER, = (1 -0 )  log RER,, +y0 + yl logINVY, + y1logTOT, + y 3log AIDY,
+ y 4 log G C^ +y¡GROWTH, +y6 log TAR, (5.4)
-  X DEH, +<(> NOMDEV, + u,
where the parameters correspond to those of equation (5.3) (and thus y, =P, * 0 , see 
equations (5.1) and (5.2)) and where INVY is domestic investment expressed as a ratio 
to GDP, TOT are the external terms of trade, AIDY are aid inflows expressed as a ratio 
to GDP, GCY is Government consumption expressed as a ratio to GDP, GROWTH is 
real GDP growth, TAR is the ratio of tariff revenues to the value of export plus 
imports, DEH is the ratio of fiscal deficit to previous period high powered money 
(DEH), NOMDEV is nominal effective exchange rate devaluation and «, is the error 
term.
To address the issues of the relevance of aid inflows and oil price shock for the 
determination of the Indonesian RER, we have introduced two further fundamentals, 
namely the ratio of aid inflows to GDP and the ratio of oil export price9 to import price 
(Poil)- Notice that this latter variable represents an alternative definition of the terms of 
trade10. Accordingly, two sets of regressions have been run: Model 1 and 2 use TOT 
while Model 3 and 4 use Poil- Models 1 and 3 include all the fundamentals of equation
(5.4) while Models 2 and 4 exclude some of them, namely GC, GROWTH and TAR.
9 More specifically, it is the unit export value of oil as defined in IMF, International Financial 
Statistics.
10 Given the great weight of oil exports for the Indonesian external trade, Poo. and TOT are closely related 
(see graph 1.4.1.2).
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The latter distinction has been introduced to emphasise the role of aid and of the 
external terms of trade (or oil price index)1 Note also that the relationship between aid 
and the RER can be interpreted in terms of the Dutch Disease effect of aid inflows even 
without considering sectors.
Equation (5.4) has been estimated dynamically over the sub-sample 1967-1993 
using OLS technique1 2 and the static long run solution has been derived. As in the 
estimation of the fiscal response model, we have deliberately excluded the period 1960 
to 1966 in order not to take into account the hyperinflation years. However, for 
completeness and comparison purposes, the estimates over the full sample are reported 
in appendix 13. Note that an impulse dummy for 1965 has been included in the full 
sample equations given the 1965 peak in inflation.
The dependent variable is the trade theory defined REER. Specifically, the 
index employed in the estimations is constructed using the ratio of all trading partners 
WPI’s to the Indonesian CPI and trade shares as weights in the geometric averaging. It 
corresponds to the index GRWCPXM constructed and analysed in chapter 4 (refer to 
chapter 4 for source of data and further details). NOMDEV is the corresponding 
NEER.
Data for GDP, investment, export, imports, the oil price index and high 
powered money are drawn from the IMF, International Financial Statistics (various 
issues). Data for government consumption and fiscal deficit are taken from the IMF,
11 Edwards (1989, 1994) uses alternative specifications of the estimation equation which exclude one 
or more fundamental. We have tested several versions of the model and the best performing models 
among them are reported here.
12 The econometric package used is PcGive 8.0.
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Government Finance Statistics (various issues). The figures for tariff revenues are 
obtained form the Bank of Indonesia, Report for the Financial Year (various issues) 
and have been adjusted for solar year. Aid dollar data come from OECD, 
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries (various 
issues) and have been converted to rupiahs using the IMF published exchange rate. 
Finally, World Bank, World Tables (various issues) are the source for the terms of 
trade series.
The following tables presents the results13: table 5.2.3.1 shows the results of the 
dynamic estimation and table 5.2.3.2 reports the results for the estimated long run 
solution. Appendix 14 reports the results obtained from Instrumental Variable 
estimation of Models 1 to 4 where the endogenous variable (the ‘instrumented’ 
variable) is nominal devaluation. Note that since the estimated equations are expressed 
in logarithmic terms the estimated coefficients can be readily interpreted as elasticities.
Time series properties of the real exchange rates have been described in chapter 
4. Formal unit root tests for all the regressors are reported in appendix 12. As can be 
seen from tables A. 12.1 to A. 12.3, none of the variables are 1(2), some of them, namely 
NOMDEV, GROWTH and DEH, are unambiguously 1(0) and all the others are shown 
to have a unit root14. Appendix 15 provides a brief guide to the diagnostic tests used.
13 A denotes first differences.
14 To be precise, the results hold unambiguously over the subsample. Over the period 1960-93 
logGCY does not appear to have a unit root.
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Table 5.2.3.I. Edwards’ Model OLS Estimates. Sample: 1967-1993.
MODEL 1 
Coeff (t-value)
MODEL 2 
Coeff (t-value)
MODEL 3 
CoefT (t-value)
MODEL 4 
Coeff (t-value)
log RER.| 0.66 (11.35” ') 0.75 (15.67'” ) 0.67 (10.13***) 0.75 (14.80***)
CONSTANT 1.84 (3.51'") 1.01 ( 3.89” *) 1.49 (2.78**) 0.83 ( 3.37*“ )
log INVY 0.22 (3.89'” ) 0.25 (4.34*") 0.23 ( 3.74*“ ) 0.26 ( 4.20***)
log TOT -0.22 (-4.33” ’) -0.16 (-4.50***)
lOg PoiL -0.16 (-3.57***) -0.12 (-4.20***)
A log AIDY 0.27 ( 4.52” *) 0.19 ( 3.27***) 0.20 ( 3.08*’*) 0.14 (2.33*)
A log GCY -0.22 (-2.51“ ) -0.20 (-2.06*)
GROWTH 0.009 ( 1.95*) 0.008 ( 1.60)
log TAR -0.10 (-1.93”) -0.09 (-1.52)
NOMDEV 0.20 (2.10” ) 0.39 (5.47***) 0.26 (2.69” ) 0.43 (5.71***)
DEH 0.09 (1.14) 0.19 ( 2.44” ) 0.07 ( 0.82) 0.17 (2.10*)
* , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1%, respectively.
Diagnostic Tests
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
I P 0.987 0.980 0.984 0.979
F-test on Regressors 144 (0.00) 166.1 (0.00) 119.7(0.00) 155.2 (0.00)
o 0.041 0.047 0.045 0.048
Durbin Watson 1.96 1.89 1.90 1.84
RSS 0.029 0.044 0.035 0.047
AR2 F 0.59 (0.57) 0.08 (0.92) 0.36 (0.70) 0.17(0.84)
ARCH 1 F 1.68(0.21) 0.49 (0.49) 0.92 (0.35) 1.19(0.29)
Normality x2 1.20(0.55) 1.09(0.58) 0.05 (0.97) 1.60(0.45)
RESET F 2.19(0.16) 2.49(0.13) 2.95(0.10) 3.10(0.10)
x ,2f 0.45 (0.89) 0.63 (0.77)
VIT 0.053 0.045 0.085 0.066
JIT 2.29 1.94 2.04 1.94
Restrictions* on log AIDY 0.098 (0.76) 0.0001 (0.99) 0.002 (0.96) 0.020(0.89)
Restrictions* on log GCY 0.062(0.81) 0.004 (0.95)
Joint Restriction* on
log AIDY and log GCY 0.070(0.93) 0.004 (0.99)
Significance levels in parentheses.
a: F-tests on the following three sets of coefficient restrictions: 1) log AIDY=log AIDY.,; 
2) log GCY=log GCY.,; 3) log AlDY=log AIDY., and log GCY=log GCY., jointly.
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Table 5.2.3.2. Edwards’ Model OLS Estimates. Sample: 1967-1993. 
Long-run Solutions: Solved Static Long-Run Equations.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
CONSTANT 5.50 (0.92” ) 4.12 (0.70” ) 4.55 (0.98” ) 3.34 ( 0.66” )
log INVY 0.66 (0.19") 1.04 ( 0.20**) 0.71 (0.22**) 1.05 (0.20“ )
log TOT 
log Poil
-0.66 (0.10” ) -0.66 (0.13**)
-0.50 ( 0.09” ) -0.51 (0.10**)
A log AIDY 0.80 (0.18") 0.77 (0.26**) 0.60 ( 0.22” ) 0.57 ( 0.27” )
A log GCY -0.66 ( 0.24” ) -0.60 ( 0.27” )
GROWTH 0.027 (0.013*) 0.024 (0.015)
log TAR -0.30 (0.13” ) -0.27 (0.15)
NOMDEV 0.59 ( 0.34*) 1.61 (0.47**) 0.81 (0.40*) 1.73 (0.49**)
DEH 0.28 ( 0.26) 0.80 (0.37**) 0.23 ( 0.29) 0.69 (0.37*)
Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** denote 10% and 5% significance level, respectively.
Diagnostic Tests.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Wald Test x2 137.5 (0.00) 56.7 (0.00) 109.3 (0.00) 54.4 (0.00)
Unit Root t-test -5.72* -5.08* -4.93* -4.88*
For Unit Root t-test * denotes 5% significance level.
The equations perform well and there is no evidence of mis-specification. 
Moreover, cointegration is not rejected in any equation (see table 5.2.3.2)15. Results also 
support Edwards’ view that nominal and real variables influence RER behaviour.
In general, the signs of the coefficients meet theoretical expectations and are 
significant, with some exceptions, most importantly real growth and DEH, and will be 
discussed in turn.
The positive and highly significant impact of investment suggests that 
investment in infrastructures and in export promotion has been successful in increasing
15 The cointegration test used is the standard Pc-Give unit root tests for the residuals, which indicates 
cointegration if it is significant.
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competitiveness. It should be reminded that the theoretical sign of the effect of 
investment on the ERER is ambiguous, as it depends on its composition and purpose. 
Similar results are obtained by Edwards (1989) and Pick and Vollrath (1994), although 
the size of the estimated coefficients is smaller in their works16. Note also the 
robustness of the coefficients, which range between .22 in model 1 and .23 in model 4 
in the short run, while in the long run there is a larger difference between models 1 and 
3 (with coefficients of .66 and .71) and the more restricted models 2 and 4 (with 
coefficients of 1.04 and 1.05).
There is evidence of a negative and highly significant impact of the terms of 
trade and of the real price of oil on the ERER. Comparing the two sets of regressions 
which use the terms of trade, model 1 and 2, with those which use the real price of oil, 
model 3 and 4, we can observe a slightly larger effect of the terms of trade relative to 
the real price of oil. This is more evident in the long run solution, where results are 
particularly robust, with -.66 for TOT and -.50/-.51 for Poil A s mentioned above, given 
the large proportion of oil exports among Indonesian exports, the real price of oil is 
used as an alternative definition for the terms of trade. The RER appreciation which 
followed the 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks can thus be partly ascribed to the increase 
in the real price of oil. Although theoretically the effect of the terms of trade is 
ambiguous, our results confirm the common belief that the income effect dominates the 
substitution effect, which implies an equilibrium depreciation following worsening 
terms of trade. This is also in line with results obtained by Cottani, Cavallo and Khan 
(1990), Edwards (1989 and 1994), and Pick and Vollrath, although the size of the
16 Coefficients on investment range between: .073 and .148 in Edwards’ pooled regressions and -.015 
in Pick and Vollrath’s pooled regressions, who use a RER definition which is the inverse of ours, so 
that the negative sign compares to our results.
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estimated coefficients shows a great variability among these works. In contrast, White 
and Wignaraja (1992) obtain a positive sign17.
As predicted by the theory, higher tariffs are shown here to induce an 
equilibrium real appreciation. However, the estimated coefficients for tariffs is 
moderately significant in model 1 (at 10%) and insignificant in model 3, while in the 
long run results for model 1 indicate a highly significant coefficient of -.30 and confirm 
an insignificant impact of tariffs for model 3. The short run findings confirms Edwards’ 
(1994) results and suggests that the chosen proxy for trade controls, tariffs, may not be 
appropriate.
In contrast to theoretical expectations, the sign on real growth is positive 
although significant at 5% in model 1 and insignificant in model 4, and the same is 
obtained in the long run estimation. Once again, this may suggest that real growth is not 
a good proxy technological progress.
A notable feature of our empirical estimation is the finding that aid inflows and 
government consumption in differences not levels affect the ERER. We found that the 
specification using differenced logarithms performs better and simple F-tests, reported 
in table 5.2.3.1, provide statistical evidence for this finding. Both the growth rates of 
aid and of government consumption significantly affect the RER, positively and 
negatively, respectively, in the short run as well as in the long run. An increase in the 
rate of aid inflows leads to real depreciation, while accelerating public consumption 
causes real appreciation. As for aid, this results appear to contrast theoretical arguments
17 Coefficients on the terms of trade range between: -4.7 and -.07 in Cottani et.al.'s pooled regressions; 
-003 and -.062 in Edwards’ (1994) pooled regressions; .078 in Pick and Vollrath’s pooled regressions, 
who use a RER definition which is the inverse of ours, so that the positive sign compares to our 
results; .121 in White and Wignaraja time series regression for the case of Sri Lanka.
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that aid and capital inflows in general may induce real appreciation, a view which finds 
support in some empirical studies (see White and Wignaraja, who use aid inflows, and 
Cottani et. al., Edwards, Pick and Vollrath, who use capital inflows). However, the 
comparison with other empirical works is not straightforward given the different way in 
which aid influence the ERER, that is in differences and not in levels. In addition, it 
will be shown in the simulation exercise, presented in the next section, how aid 
contributed to stabilise, at least partly, RER behaviour. Our results confirm the need to 
interpret the macroeconomic impact of aid in dynamic terms, which we have stressed in 
chapter 3. The economic interpretation is that increasing aid inflows provide additional 
resources for implementing export oriented investments. This is confirmed by our 
earlier finding of aid’s pro-investment bias in the fiscal response model presented in 
chapter 3. In addition, growing aid inflows may signal the business community, both 
domestic and foreign, of restored creditworthiness, of recipients’ ability to use 
effectively additional resources and of good economic prospects. It should be stressed 
that the main issue here is not a sectoral analysis of the possible Dutch disease effect of 
aid on the RER, but rather on the role of aid inflows in influencing RER behaviour. 
However, even if sectoral issues are not considered here, as the RER represents the 
relative tradable/non-tradable price, the impact of aid on the real exchange rate can be 
linked to Dutch disease analysis.
As for government consumption, the interpretation of its impact on the ERER is 
more intuitive. Ever increasing public spending accelerates internal demand and is most 
likely to exhibit a pro-non-tradable bias, thus generating downward pressures on the 
ERER.
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The disequilibrium sources of the RER dynamics are captured by the ‘non­
fundamental’ disturbances, namely lagged RER, nominal devaluation and the measure 
of macroeconomic imbalance DEH (see equation (5.1)). Remember that the coefficient 
on lagged RER corresponds to (1-0). As in equation (5.1), it gives an indication of the 
speed of adjustment of the RER to its equilibrium level. The estimated coefficients are 
highly significant in all regressions, but are slightly smaller than the values found by 
Edwards (ranging between .74 and .96) and White and Wignaraja (.82), although they 
are comparable to the value of .754 obtained by Pick and Vollrath. In economic terms, 
our results imply a moderately slow self-adjustment process of the RER to its 
equilibrium level, other things given.
Nominal devaluation significantly affects RER and has the correct sign. Its 
impact is relatively small when compared to Edwards’ estimates of more than .40, but 
is closely comparable to Pick and Vollrath coefficient of .24. The implication of our 
results is that a nominal devaluation will be only partly reflected in RER depreciation, 
by inducing on impact a real depreciation which will range between 20% and 43%.
As for DEH, the corresponding coefficients are insignificnat in models 1 and 3, 
and significant in the more restricted models 2 and 4, both in the short and in the long 
run. The estimated coefficients are not very robust and, contrary to Edwards’ findings, 
are positively signed, suggesting real depreciation coupled with growing monetised 
fiscal deficit.
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5.2.4. Equilibrium RER.
An estimate of the equilibrium RER is obtained from the empirical equation for 
RER. In order to derive the ERER, we have to assume that no macroeconomic 
imbalances are present and that no nominal devaluation is occurring. This amounts to 
imposing that the coefficients of DEH and NOMDEVXM be equal to zero in equation 
(5.3). The parameters of ERER equation (equation (5.2)) are then calculated using the 
estimated coefficients of the regressions. In fact, these correspond to the long-run 
estimated coefficients on the fundamentals obtained in the solved static long run 
equations. Finally, ERER is computed using equation (5.3) and five years moving 
averages of the fundamentals, in order to smooth their time series behaviour18.
From the estimate of the ERER it is possible to derive an indication not only of 
the ERER variability induced by changes in the levels of its fundamentals, but also of 
the deviation of the actual RER from its equilibrium level.
The following graph illustrates the estimated ERER obtained from model 1 
(ERER i, which includes the terms of trade among the fundamentals) and 3 (ERERj, 
which includes the real price of oil among the fundamentals). The calculated 
percentage misalignment of the RER with respect to the ERER is also plotted. The 
formulas used in the calculations are also reported below.
18 The rational behind the choice of a five year time span for the moving averaging will be made clear 
in the next subsection. In short, we find a shock will be absorbed by simple RER self-adjustment in 
around 5 years.
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Graph 5.2.4.I. Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates and Misalignment.
RER ------------  E R E R l----------  Misalignment^ (%) M O D E L  1
R E R -------------  ER ER 3  ------- Misalignment} (•/•) M O D E L  3
Where MA(.) is the moving average operator and for Model 1: 
log ERER|= 5.50 +0.66*MA(log INVY)-0.66*MA(log TOT)
-0.30*MA(log TAR) +O.027*MA(GROWTH)
+0.80*MA(Alog AIDY) -0.66*MA(Alog GCY)
Misalignment|=( ERERi-RER) / ERERi*100
and for Model 3:
log ERER3 = 4.55 +0.71 *MA(log INVY) -0.50*MA(log Pon.)
-0.27*MA(log TAR) +0.024*MA(GROWTH)
+0.60*MA(Alog AIDY) -0.60*MA(Alog GCY)
Misalignment3=( ERER3-RER) / ERER3* 100 
Note that positive misalignment reflects overvaluation.
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The figures support Edwards’ proposition on the variability of the ERER, 
which therefore partly explain the actual RER variability. The two calculated ERER 
indices provide conflicting evidence for the pre-oil boom period. This is hardly 
surprising, given the relatively smaller weight of the oil sector in the Indonesian 
economy up to the early 1970’s. The RER observed overvaluation after the 1973 oil 
price shock is reflected in positive misalignment for both ERER’s between 1974 and 
1978. The 1978 devaluation can be seen as being successful in reversing the rising 
appreciation of previous years and also in delaying the effects of the 1979 oil price 
shock. In fact, the second oil shock appears to have caused real appreciation in 1981. 
The devaluation in 1982 inaugurates a period of large negative misalignment, that is, of 
RER depreciation well above the equilibrium depreciation. In this respect, the 1986 
devaluation appears to have widened even more the gap between the RER and its 
equilibrium level, thus demonstrating the strong pro-export stance of policy makers. 
The new exchange rate policy of the early 1990’s, as mentioned in chapter 1 and 4, is 
aimed at maintaining a constant RER. From the graph, it appears not only that RER 
variability has considerably declined, but also that misalignment is now smaller than in 
previous decades. The economic implication is that actual RER reflects more 
realistically the Indonesian economy. What will happen under the newly introduced 
floating exchange regime (1997) will strongly depend on the policy makers’ ability to 
closely monitor the behaviour of the fundamentals, given that nominal devaluation and 
monetary policy instruments cannot be relied upon anymore.
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5.2.5. Final Remarks on Edwards’ Approach.
To sum up, Edwards’ approach has a number of advantages, but also some 
shortcomings. It is elegant though simple and gives a dynamic perspective to the issue 
of misalignment. Defining the RER in terms of fundamental determinants is more 
appealing than the PPP constancy (or relative constancy) statement. There exists a set 
of equilibrium values for the RER which are allowed to vary over time. Moreover, the 
model allows for short to medium run effects from non-fundamentals. Macroeconomic 
imbalances and nominal devaluations (revaluations) do affect the RER in the short to 
medium run (see also Isard, 1995), even if in the longer run their effect may disappear.
However, the presence of nominal devaluation in the empirical (reduced form) 
equation is a cause for concern. Given that the RER is defined as the ratio of tradable 
price to non-tradable price, in practice tradable price is obtained as the product of 
nominal exchange rate (NER) and international price (variously defined). NER is 
therefore present in both the right and the left hand side of the equation. Excluding 
nominal devaluation ‘tout court’ would eliminate any source of short-run fluctuation 
directly caused by nominal devaluations (revaluations). The existing empirical 
literature (Edwards, Pick and Vollrath, White and Wignaraja) consistently uses nominal 
devaluation as explanatory variable and its effect is always shown to be relevant. In 
following this empirical tradition we introduce an error correction equation for the 
Indonesian RER, which will be discussed in the next section. The error correction 
specification conceptually justifies the presence of nominal devaluation in the short run 
dynamic equation.
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Another way to solve this problem is to explicitly model NER as an 
endogenous variable in the system. However, given that the model is completely real, 
this would complicate substantially the model. Moreover, the issue of NER 
determination is still a matter of debate. This particular aspect of RER determination is 
beyond the scope of this study and represents a fruitful future extension of the model 
and of RER determination research agenda.
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5.3. An Error Correction Model for the RER.
Edwards’ empirical specification for the ERER can be reinterpreted in terms of 
the Error Correction Model (ECM). Engle and Granger (1987) show that an adequate 
representation of cointegrated processes is given by the ECM.
More formally, consider a dependent variable y, and a set of n explanatory 
variables x„, where i=l,..,n. Suppose they all are non stationary, i.e. they contain a 
stochastic trend, and are integrated of the same order l 19. If there exists some linear 
combination of these series such that the disturbance term u, from regressing y, on the n 
Xu's is stationary, i.e. of order 1(0), then y, and the n x,,'s are defined as cointegrated. 
Less technically, cointegrated series form an equilibrium long-run relationship and 
move together closely over time: even though they are themselves non stationary their 
relationship converges over time towards a long run equilibrium20. Moreover, the error 
correction theorem states that an error correction model exists for these cointegrated 
series (and conversely, that an ECM generates series which are cointegrated).
The error correction specification also represents a reparameterisation of a 
dynamic model. The error correction term reflects deviations from the long run 
equilibrium relationship and the coefficient attached to it measures the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium. The impact effect is captured by the coefficients on the 
differenced explanatory variables. The appeal of the ECM lies therefore not only in its
19 A set of variables are said to be integrated of the same order d, 1(d), if they have to be differenced d 
times to become stationary. 1(1) variables need therefore to be differenced once.
2,1 Note that the absence of cointegration gives rise to the problem of spurious regression.
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statistical properties (classical inference is valid) but also in the long run and short run 
information on the properties of the process considered.
If a cointegrating relationship holds between the RER and its fundamental 
determinants, an ECM representation is an appropriate specification for the underlying 
data generating processes, as shown by Engle and Granger. More specifically, we can 
specify a long-run static (cointegrating) relationship and its related short-run dynamic 
model, the ECM representation.
Elbadawi (1994) presents an ECM model for the RER, which he then tests for 
the cases of Chile, Ghana and India. His model is related to Edwards’ approach to 
modelling the behaviour of the RER in relation to its fundamentals, but is more 
parsimonious and assumes a forward looking behaviour for the ERER. The ECM 
modelling approach presented here is based on the RER model by Edwards, described 
in the preceding section. Therefore, it differs from Elbadawi’s model not only on the 
theoretical ground but also at the empirical level, as different fundamentals are used, 
although a loose comparison can be established.
5.3.1. ECM Econometric Specification.
The econometric specification for RER behaviour for Indonesia is obtained 
from equation (5.4) by simply leaving out nominal devaluation and macroeconomic 
imbalances (DEH):
log RER, =  (1 - 0 )  log RER,_, +  Y0 +  Y, l°g 1NVY, +  Y2 log TOT, +  Y3 log AIDY,
+ y4 log GCY, + y¡GROWTH, + y 6 log TAR, + u, ( '
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where the parameters correspond to those of equation (5.3) (and thus y¡ =p, * 0 , see 
equations (5.1) and (5.2)) and the variables are defined as above (see equation (5.4)). 
The long run solution of equation (5.5) can then be derived and tested for cointegration 
and is given by:
log RER = P0 + P j log INVY + P2 log TOT + P3 log AIDY
+P4 log GCY + p5GROWTH + P6 log TAR+ u ( ' ’
where p,- = y, / 0 . Note that equation (5.6) is directly comparable to the ERER
specification of Edwards’ model (i.e. equation (5.2)). If cointegration in equation (5.6)
is not rejected, this equation can then be interpreted as the long run cointegrating
equilibrium relationship between the RER and its fundamentals and can be rewritten in
an ECM specification as follows:
Alog RER, = Yo +Y,Alog/)VV}^ + y 2Alog TOT, + y 3Alog AIDYt
+ y 4AlogGO; +Y ¡GROWTH, +y„ A log TAR, (5.7)
-QECM,., -  X DEH, +<(> NOMDEV, +u,
where A is the first difference operator and the parameters are as above. The 
coefficients y¡’s, can be reinterpreted as the impact effects of changes in the 
fundamentals. A self correcting mechanism is then given by the correction term ECM,. 
i, which is defined as:
ECM,., = log RER,., -  (P0 + P, log INVY,., + P2 log TOT,., + P, log AIDY,.,
+ P4 logGCY,_, + &GROWTH,., + p6 log TAR,.,) ' }
This represents the RER short run deviation from its long run equilibrium level, as the
terms in parenthesis incorporate the long run response, the P, ’s, of the RER to the
fundamentals. The advantage of the ECM specification is given by its ready economic
interpretation: changes in the fundamentals’ levels modify the equilibrium RER and
thus call for an adjustment in the next period. The coefficient attached to the error
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correction term, 9, represents the feedback effect which removes disequilibrium each 
period following the resulting deviation. Therefore, it gives a measure of the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium. A negative deviation implies a short term overvaluation 
which will be partly removed by the self correcting mechanism in the next period 
through a real devaluation, given the negative sign of 0. The higher is the value of 0 the 
quicker the adjustment. Moreover, this parameter can be manipulated to derive the 
numbers of years necessary to eliminate a given percentage of exogenous shocks. The 
following formula can be used to compute the number of years it will take for the 
automatic adjustment to absorb an exogenous shock:
logy = n o g ( l - 0 )  (5.9)
where y is the percentage adjustment still to take place after T years, 0 is as defined 
above and T is the number of years required to clear a proportion of (1-y) of the 
shock21.
In addition to the response to temporary changes in the fundamentals, short run 
dynamics may be influenced by macroeconomic imbalances and nominal devaluation. 
The terms NOMDEV and DEH, defined as in previous paragraph, capture these effects.
The ECM model described thus far can be shown to be equivalent to Edwards’ 
partial adjustment specification of RER dynamics. Equation (5.1) is equivalent to 
equation (5.7) once the ERER, as defined in equation (5.4), is substituted into the 
partial adjustment term of equation (5.1). Conversely, if the long run specification (5.6) 
is interpreted as describing ERER, then the ECM term can be reinterpreted as:
21 An exogenous shock will be absorbed by 6 in the first year following the shock, leaving out a 
residual (1-0) times the shock. The adjustment in the second year will be equal to 6(1-8) times the 
shock, while in the third year this will be given by 6(1-0)2 times the shock, and this continues until we 
have a residual ( 1-6)T times the shock at the T-th year. A logarithmic transformation of ( 1-8)T gives the 
formula (5.9).
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ECM,_, = log RER,_, -  log ERER, X (5.10)
Therefore, if we add and subtract 0 p0, 0 P/ log 1NVY,, 0 p2 log TOT,, 0 p5 log AIDY,, 
0 P^  log GCY,, 0 Pj GROWTH,, 0 P« log TAR, to equation (5.7), we obtain equation 
(5.1), given that 0*P,’s=y,’s.
5.3.2. Econometric Estimation.
The econometric estimation of the ECM model is implemented in three steps: 
first, we estimate the dynamic equation (5.5); second, the long run relation, equation 
(5.6), is derived and tested for cointegration; third, the ECM model, equation (5.7), is 
estimated. Note that the RER short run dynamics is fully captured by the ECM 
specification and not by equation (5.5), which represents the short run counterpart of 
the equilibrium RER.
The same variables and time sample used in the estimation of Edwards’ model 
are also used here. As in the above estimations, we run two sets of regressions: Model 
5, 7 and 8 use TOT while Model 6, 9 and 10 use Poil- Models 8 and 10 exclude A 
logTAR given its insignificance (see results for Models 7 and 9).
The following tables presents the results22: table 5.3.2.1 shows the results of the 
dynamic estimation and the estimated long run solution, while table 5.3.2.2 shows the 
results from the ECM regressions. The final table 5.3.2.3 reports the tests for the ECM
22 As noted above, A denotes the difference operator.
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model reduction. As noted above, since the equations are expressed in logarithmic 
terms the estimated coefficients can be readily interpreted as elasticities.
Time series properties of the real exchange rates have been described in chapter 
4. Formal unit root tests for all the regressors are reported in appendix 12 and have 
been already commented in paragraph 5.2.3. Appendix 15 provides a brief guide to the 
diagnostic tests used.
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Table 5.3.2.I. Dynamic Model OLS Estimates. Short Run and Long Run
Cointegrating Regressions Sample: 1967-93.
M ODELS MODEL 6 MODEL 5 MODEL 6
Short Run Long Run
Coeff (t-value) Coeff (t-value) Coeff (SLErr.) Coeff (SLErr.)
log RER_i 0.60 (11.41’") 0.60 ( 8.87***)
CONSTANT 2.43 (5.49’“ ) 2.21 (4.14***) 6.05 ( 0.63***) 5.49 ( 0.72***)
logINVY 0.20 ( 3.86*“ ) 0.18 (2.97***) 0.50 (0.12***) 0.44 ( 0.15*“ )
log TOT 
log Poil
-0.26 (-5.25*“ )
-0.20 (-3.84***)
-0.64 (0.08***)
-0.49 ( 0.08" ’)
A log AIDY 0.34 (8.18***) 0.31 (6.03***) 0.85 (0.15*“ ) 0.78 (0.20***)
A log GCY -0.32 (-3.98***) -0.32 (-3.46***) -0.79 (0.21***) -0.81 (0.25** )
GROWTH 0.014 ( 3.42***) 0.014 ( 2.94*“ ) 0.034 ( 0.01***) 0.035 (0.01**')
log TAR -0.17 (-3.81***) -0.17 (-2.99***) -0.42 ( 0.09***) -0.41 (0.11** )
Note: for t- values °, * , **, *** denote respectively 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1% significance levels.
Diagnostic Tests
MODEL 5 
Short run
MODEL 6 MODEL 5 
Long Run
MODEL 6
R2 0.984 0.977
F-test on Regressors (Short Run) 163.5 (0.00) 117.8 (0.00)
Wald x2 (Long Run) 174.6(0.00) 127.01 (0.00)
a 0.044 0.051
Durbin Watson 2.41 2.52
RSS 0.037 0.051
Unit Root t-test -7.65*** -5.97*“
AR2 F 1.07(0.37) 1.92(0.18)
ARCH 1 F 0.11 (0.74) 0.38 (0.55)
Normality x2 0.43(0.81) 0.29 (0.86)
RESET F 1.10(0.31) 0.90(0.35)
X,2F 0.25 (0.98) 0.27 (0.97)
VIT 0.106 0.226
JIT 1.15 1.02
Restrictions* on log AIDY 0.063 (0.80) 0.904 (0.35)
Restrictions* on log GCY 0.201 (0.66) 0.038 (0.85)
Joint Restriction* on
log AIDY and log GCY 0.154(0.86) 0.507(0.61)
Significance levels in parentheses. For Unit-Root t-test * and *** denote 5% and 1 %, respectively, 
a: F-test on the following three sets of coefficient restrictions: 1) log AIDY=log AIDY.i;
2) log GCY=log GCY.,; 3) log AIDY=log AIDY.i and log GCY=log GCY., jointly.
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Table S.3.2.2. ECM Mode! O LS Estimates. Sample: 1968-93.
MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10 
Coeff (t-value) Coeff (t-value) CoefT (t-value) Coeff (t-value)
CONSTANT 
A log INVY., 
A log TOT 
A log P 0 il 
A A log AIDY 
A A log GCY 
GROWTH 
A log TAR 
NOMDEV 
NOMDEV., 
DEH 
ECM.,
-0.07 (-3.14***) 
-0.18 (-2.69") 
-0.15 (-2.80” )
0.16 (3.81"’) 
-0.15 (-3.54*") 
0.007 ( 2.16’) 
-0.06 (-1.21) 
0.48 ( 5.97” ’) 
-0.26 (-4.80’") 
-0.14 (-2.81") 
-0.47 (-8.40’")
-0.06 (-2.93’") 
-0.19 (-2.75") 
-0.11 (-2.55")
0.13 (3.81’") 
-0.14 (-3.28” ’) 
0.007 ( 2.02’)
0.51 (6.64"') 
-0.27 (-4.86’") 
-0.13 (-2.65") 
-0.46 (-8.19’")
-0.07 (-3.08’’’) 
-0.16 (-2.35*)
-0.11 (-2.39*) 
0.15 (3.74"*) 
-0.16 (-3.57"*) 
0.007 ( 2.07’) 
-0.04 (-0.71) 
0.50 ( 6.45*") 
-0.24 (-4.45*") 
-0.12 (-2.32*) 
-0.46 (-7.66***)
-0.07 (-3.06” *) 
-0.16 (-2.38*)
-0.09 (-2.41*) 
0.14 (3.80"*) 
-0.15 (-3.55’” ) 
0.007 ( 2.08*)
0.51 (6.82***) 
-0.24 (-4.51’” ) 
-0.12 (-2.30*) 
-0.45 (-7.75***)
Note: for t- values * , **, *** denote respectively 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1% significance levels.
Diagnostic Tests
MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10
R2 0.953 0.948 0.946 0.944
F-test on Regressors 30.5 (0.00) 32.7 (0.00) 26.3 (0.00) 30.1 (0.00)
o 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.034
Durbin Watson 1.70 1.80 1.87 1.89
RSS 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.019
A R2 F 0.68 (0.52) 0.51 (0.61) 0.64 (0.54) 0.52 (0.60)
ARCH 1 F 0.16(0.69) 0.05 (0.82) 0.29 (0.60) 0.44 (0.52)
Normality x1 0.16(0.92) 2.13(0.34) 0.33 (0.85) 0.80 (0.67)
RESET F 0.09 (0.77) 0.12(0.74) 0.01 (0.92) 0.003 (0.96)
VIT 0.396 0.380 0.168 0.202
JIT 2.67 1.86 2.00 1.50
Restrictions* on log AIDY 0.399 (0.54) 0.199(0.66)
Restrictions* on log GCY 0.0004 (0.98) 0.029 (0.87)
Joint Restriction* on
log AIDY and log GCY 0.200 (0.82) 0.127(0.88)
F-testb Ecm(pos)_i=Ecm(neg)., 0.11 (0.75)c 0.02 (0.88)d 0.14 (0.71 )e 0.20 (0.66)f
Significance levels are indicated in parentheses.
a: F-test on the following three sets of coefficient restrictions: 1 ) A log AIDY=A log AIDY.i;
2) A log GCY=A log GCY.,; 3) A log AIDY=A log A1DY., and A log GCY=A log GCY., jointly, 
b: F-test on the restriction that the coefficients on positive and negative values of the Ecm are the same, 
c: Coefficient on positive and negative values of Ecm.| respectively: -.50 and -0.45. 
d: Coefficient on positive and negative values of Ecm., respectively: -.47 and -0.45. 
e: Coefficient on positive and negative values of Ecm., respectively: -.41 and -0.48. 
f: Coefficient on positive and negative values of Ecra, respectively: -.40 and -0.48.
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Table 5.3.2.3. Tests for ECM Model Reduction.
Model Reduction Degrees of 
Freedom
Model with A log TOT 
Test (Significance Level)
Model with A log P 0 ,l 
Test (Significance Level)
Model 1-4 2 Ff 1,12) 1.05 (0.33) 1.63 (0.22)
Model 1 -4 3 F(3,12) 0.48 (0.70) 0.63 (0.61)
Model 2 -4 3 F(2,13) 0.20 (0.82) 0.13 (0.88)
Model 1-4 4 F(4,12) 0.69 (0.61) 0.59 (0.67)
Model 2 -4  4 F(3,12) 0.57 (0.64) 0.23 (0.87)
Model 3 4 4 F(l,15) 1.48 (0.24) 0.50 (0.49)
Model 1: Variables: CONSTANT, A log INVY, A log INVY.,, A log TOT (or A log P0IL), A log AIDY, 
A log AIDY.,, A log GCY, A log GCY.,, GROWTH, A log TAR, NOMDEV, NOMDEV.,, DEH, ECM 
(k=14).
Model 2: Variables: CONSTANT, A log INVY.i, A log TOT (or A log Poil), A log AIDY, A log AIDY.i, 
A log GCY, A log GCY.,, GROWTH, A log TAR, NOMDEV, NOMDEV.,, DEH, ECM.,, (k=13).
Model 3: Variables: CONSTANT, A log INVY.,, A log TOT (or A log PonJ, AA log AIDY, AA log 
GCY, GROWTH, A log TAR, NOMDEV, NOMDEV.,, DEH, ECM.,, (k=l 1).
Model 4: Variables: CONSTANT, A log INVY.,, A log TOT (or A log P0IL), AA log AIDY, AA log 
GCY, GROWTH, NOMDEV, NOMDEV.,, DEH, ECM.,, (k=10).
All the equations perform well and there is no evidence of mis-specification. In 
particular, the PcGive unit root tests shown in table 5.3.2.1 reject the null of no 
cointegration at 1% significance level for both Models 5 and 6 and thus suggest a 
cointegrating long run relationship between the RER and the fundamentals. Since the 
long run relationship is well determined, the error correction representation is a valid 
transformation of equation (5.5). The final short run dynamic model, see table 5.3.2.3, 
is then obtained using a general to specific sequential procedure, and the relevant F- 
tests are reported in table 5.3.2.3.
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Unsurprisingly, the estimated coefficients confirm the results obtained from the 
estimation of Edwards’ model (refer to paragraph 5.2.3 for their interpretation). Their 
signs are the same, although there are some slight differences in their magnitude, most 
notably the impact of aid and of government consumption. For instance, comparing 
Model 3 (table 5.2.3.1) with Model 6 (column 3, table 5.3.2.1), we can see that the 
impacts of aid and of government consumption rise from 0.20  to 0.31 and from -0.20 
to -0.32, respectively. Other notable differences are that results here are more robust 
across each set of regressions (i.e. across Models 5 and 6 and across Models 7 to 10) 
and that all the coefficients are highly significant, with the only exception of lagged 
tariffs in Models 7 and 923. As in previous regressions, the specification using 
differenced logarithms for aid inflows and government consumption perform better and 
simple F-tests, reported in table 5.3.2.1, provide statistical evidence for this finding. 
The same is found for the ECM regressions, where second differences are used and 
tested in a similar way (see table 5.3.2.2).
The ECM model discussed above explains the sources of short run dynamics of 
the RER: transitory movements in the fundamentals, macroeconomic imbalances, 
nominal devaluation and the self correcting mechanism. These will be discussed in 
turn.
As for transitory movements in the fundamentals, all of them but tariffs 
influence the RER in the short run. In general, their effect is consistent with the long 
run impacts, suggesting that worsening terms of trade, declining real oil price,
23 In particular, all the coefficients are significant at the 1% level in Models 5 and 6. For the ECM 
regressions, almost all the coefficients are significant at the 5% level, with few exceptions, namely real 
growth in Models 8 and 9, significant at the 10% level, and tariffs, insignificant in Models 7 and 9.
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accelerating aid inflows, decelerating government consumption and higher real growth 
lead to RER depreciation. However, as noted above, temporary changes in trade 
restriction, captured by A log TAR, do not exhibit a significant impact. In addition, in 
the ECM regression we found A log INVY to be significant only after on period, i.e. 
lagged, and with an opposite sign with respect to the long run impact. The 
interpretation is that higher investment leads to real equilibrium depreciation, but 
temporary movements will be felt in the next period following the increase. Since these 
have a negative impact (i.e. cause RER appreciation), they will almost entirely offset 
the ERER depreciation, but only in the short run. This result is interesting, as it shows 
the possibility of RER fluctuations arising after temporary shocks around the ERER.
Macroeconomic imbalances, proxied by DEH, lead to real appreciation, so that 
monetisation of fiscal deficit lead to real appreciation. This is in contrast to what was 
found in the estimation of Edwards’ model, but meets theoretical expectations on the 
direction of its influence. It should be noted, that the coefficients on DEH where not 
particularly robust across Model 1 to 4, while in the ECM regressions they are robust 
and always significant at the 5% level.
As for nominal devaluation, the interesting finding is that on impact it explains 
around 50% of RER short run variation, which is higher than in the corresponding short 
run version of Edwards’ model regressions. However, in the period following the 
devaluation episode, less than half of the nominal devaluation will be offset, although 
the total effect (impact plus lagged) is still positive. Given the high statistical 
significance of the coefficients attached to NOMDEV and lagged NOMDEV, this 
suggests that nominal devaluations may help convergence towards a higher ERER, that
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is real equilibrium depreciation. The same conclusion is drawn by Elbadawi for Chile 
and India.
Finally, the highly significant and robust coefficients on the error correction 
term in Models 7 to 10 strongly support the ECM approach in modelling RER short run 
dynamics. The estimated values for 0 range between .45 and .47 and show that RER 
adjusts moderately slowly to deviations from its equilibrium value, other things given. 
This implies that if changes in the fundamentals determine an ERER depreciation 
relative to the observed RER, in the subsequent period the dynamic self correcting 
mechanism will clear almost 50% of this disequilibrium and the RER will depreciate. 
Our estimate of the speed of adjustment is considerably lower than Elbadawi’s values 
of .78 to .67, but confirm our earlier finding of a moderately slow adjustment process. 
The estimated (l-0)’s in Models 1 to 4 (see table 5.2.3.1) range between .66 and 75, 
thus the 0’s range between .44 and .35. Therefore, according to Edwards’ model, the 
speed of adjustment is even slower. We have also tested whether a negative ECM has 
the same impact of a positive ECM using F-tests reported at the bottom of table 5.3.2.2. 
These show that the restriction that coefficients on positive and negative values of the 
ECM are the same cannot be rejected.
Using the formula (5.9) and the mean value of the estimated 0 ’s (-0.46), we 
have also found that in general the self correcting mechanism will clear 50%, 90% and 
99.9% of an exogenous shock in 1.12, 3.74 and 7.47 years, respectively. In other words, 
in less than four years 90% of an exogenous shock will be automatically absorbed. By 
the end of the fifth year, there will only be a residual 2 % of the shock to be cleared.
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This justifies the choice of a five period moving average in the calculation of the ERER 
(see paragraph 5.2.4. and paragraph below).
The following graph illustrates the historical pattern of the error correction 
terms obtained from Model 5 (ECM5) and 6 (ECM*). These represent percentage 
deviations of the actual RER to its long run path over the period 1968-93 and are 
predominantly negative24. In particular, it can be seen that RER was considerably off 
equilibrium during the oil boom era and in the years immediately preceding the main 
devaluation episodes (1978, 1983 and 1986).
Graph 5.3.2.1. Dynamic Cointegrating Relations: Error Correction Terms for 
Model 5 (ECMS) and Model 6 (ECM«) 1968-1993. (Percentages)
E C M j ---------  ECM6
24 The mean for both ECM, and ECM6 is -.03.
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5.3.3. Equilibrium RE R.
As in the preceding section on Edwards’ model, we have derived an estimate of 
the equilibrium RER and the corresponding measure of misalignment. The long run 
solution estimated parameters for both Model 5 and 6 have been used together with five 
years moving averages of the fundamentals. While in theory the ERER’s obtained from 
Edwards’ model and from the ECM approach should correspond, in practice, this may 
not happen. In fact, the long run coefficients used in the first case are obtained from the 
static long run solution of the estimated dynamic model, which includes nominal 
devaluation and macroeconomic imbalances alongside the fundamentals. Even if non­
fundamentals’ disturbances are not included in the actual calculation of the ERER, they 
implicitly influence the ERER via the estimated coefficients on the fundamentals25, 
except when they are not shown to be significant. In contrast, the estimated ERER 
obtained with the ECM approach is not influenced by temporary disturbances. This 
explain the slight discrepancies in the two sets of estimated ERER and in the 
corresponding measure for misalignment.
The graph below illustrates the behaviour of the estimated ERER for Models 5 
(ERER5) and 6 (ERERé) and the corresponding measures of misalignment. The 
formulas used in the calculations are also reported.
25 Since nominal devaluation and macroeconomic imbalance are generally significant in Models 1 to 4, 
their omission would alter the value of the other coefficients.
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Graph 5.3.3.I. Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates and Misalignment.
Where MA(.) is the moving average operator and for Model 5: 
log ERER5= 6.05 +0.50*MA(log INVY) -0.64*MA(log TOT)
-0.42*MA(log TAR) +O.034*MA(GROWTH)
+0.85*MA(Alog AIDY) -0.79*MA(Alog GCY)
Misalignments^ ERER5-RER) / ERER5* 100
and for Model 6:
log ERER« = 5.49 +0.44*MA(log INVY) -0.49*MA(log Poil)
-0.41 *MA(log TAR) +0.035*MA(GROWTH)
+0.78*MA(Alog AIDY) -0.81 *MA(Alog GCY)
Misalignment6=( ERER«-RER) / ERERs* 100
A comparison between graph 5.2.4.1 and the above figure shows that 
differences between ERERi.j and ERER5l6 are more marked in the pre-oil boom period,
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especially for the ERER which includes the real price of oil. Once again, this can be 
imputed to the relatively smaller weight of the oil sector before the oil boom. However, 
the historical pattern of misalignment basically coincide after 1973 and confirm our 
earlier economic interpretation of misalignment (refer to paragraph 5.2.4).
It is also useful to compare the graphical patterns of the ECM and 
misalignment. Although they both describe disequilibrium patterns, these appear to be 
different. As noted above, the ECM describes the short run deviation of the actual RER 
from its long run equilibrium. This in turn is the cointegrating long run relation 
between the RER and its fundamentals. However, the measure of ERER which we 
obtain does not coincide with the long run estimated RER, because five years moving 
averages of the fundamentals are used in the calculation of the ERER instead of their 
actual values. Therefore, while the ECM reflects also temporary movements in the 
fundamentals, the calculated misalignment is obtained after smoothing out short run 
fluctuations in the fundamentals. This explains the different behaviour and the grater 
variability of the ECM compared to misalignment. In economic terms, we can interpret 
the ECM and misalignment as a measure of short run and long run disequilibrium, 
respectively, and can be both useful in policy making.
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5.3.4. Simulation Exercise.
The question what would have happened to the Indonesian RER if a series of 
events had not happened can be answered simulating the ECM model described and 
estimated above26. In particular, we address the following questions: how much have 
aid inflows contributed to RER stability?; what has the role of government 
consumption been?; what would have happened to the RER had the oil price shocks 
not taken place?; what would have been the response of the RER in the absence of 
corrective nominal devaluations?; how much do trade controls influence the RER?; 
what is the overall effect of policy making on the RER? The simulations give an 
answer to past events and may thus offer a guide for the future.
The following graphs show the percentage difference between the base RER 
and the simulated RER which exclude some of the fundamentals or some exogenous 
shock. In particular, graph 5.3.4.1. refers to the simulation where Alog AIDY is zero, 
which implies either a constant flow of aid or no aid; graph 5.3.4.2 refers to the 
situation where government consumption grows at a constant rate; graph 5.3.4.3 
demonstrates aid and government consumption’s contribution to RER stability; graph 
5.3.4.4 shows the hypothetical RER behaviour in the absence of the oil price shocks; 
the next graph describes how much the devaluations of 1978, 1983 and 1986 
contributed to preventing real appreciation; graph 5.3.4.6 demonstrate the negative 
effect of trade controls on Indonesian competitiveness; the final graph summarises 
the impact on the RER of the policies implemented by the government.
26 Simulations have been carried out using TSP386 and the parameters' estimates from Model 7. RER 
behaviour in the absence of oil price shocks has been simulated using Model 9 estimated parameters.
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Percentage Difference (DIFF-AID) Between the RER Simulated Without Aid (RER- 
NO-AID) and the Simulated Base RER (RER).
DIFF-AID
Graph 5.3.4.I. Aid’s Contribution to RER Behaviour.
Graph 5.3.4.2. Government Consumption’s Contribution to RER Behaviour.
Percentage Difference (DIFF-GC) Between the RER Simulated Without Government 
Consumption (RER-NO-GC) and the Simulated Base RER (RER).
RER;__________  RER-NO-GC:.
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Graph 5.3.4.3. RER Variability With and Without Aid 
and Government Consumption.
Annual Percentage Changes of Simulated Base RER (DRER), the RER Simulated 
Without Aid (DRER-NO-AID) and the RER Simulated Without Government 
Consumption (DRER-NO-GC).
DRER:________  DRER-NO-AID:.
A
A , A \  a
-A  /  .. N 1. /  \V  \  /Vs.
/  v \  Ü 7 V / \ f  v 3
1 9 7 0  1 9 7 9  1 9 8 0  1 9 8 9  1 9 9 0  1 9 9 9
DRER:________  DRER-NO-GC:_____
Graph S.3.4.4. The Oil Price Shocks’ Contribution to RER Behaviour.
Percentage Difference (DEFF-73, DIFF-79, DIFF-84) Between the RER Simulated 
Without the 1973, 1979 and 1982/84 Oil Price Shocks (RER-73, RER-79, RER-84, 
respectively) and the Simulated Base RER (RER).
D B T 7J:____  DIFF-79:____  DIFF-84:-----
RER, RER-73, RER-79 and RER-84 in logarithms. 
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Graph S.3.4.5. Nominal Devaluations’ Contribution to RER Behaviour.
Percentage Difference (DEV-78, DEV-83, DEV-86) Between the RER Simulated 
Without the 1978, 1983 and 1986 Nominal Devaluations (RER-78, RER-83, RER- 
86, respectively) and the Simulated Base RER (RER).
DEV-78:_____ DEV-83:_____  DEV-86:
HER:____  HER 78 :____  RER-83:-----  RER 86:
RER, RER-78, RER-83 and RER-86 in logarithms.
Graph S.3.4.6. Tariffs’ Contribution to RER Behaviour.
Percentage Difference (DIEE-TAR) Between the RER Simulated Without the Tariffs 
(RER-NO-TAR) and the Simulated Base RER (RER).
DIET-TAR
RER and RER-NO-TAR in logarithms. 
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Percentage Difference (DIFF-POL78, DIFF-POL83, DIFF-POL86) Between the RER 
Simulated Without Government Consumption, Tariffs and Nominal Devaluations in 
1978, 1983 and 1986 (RER-NO-POL78, RER-NO-POL83 and RER-NO-POL86, 
respectively) and the Simulated Base RER (RER).
Graph S.3.4.7. Policy Impact on RER Behaviour.
DDT-POL78
DHT-POL78:_
DIFF-POL86:.
RER, RER-NO-POL78, RER-NO-POL83 and RER-NO-POL86 in logarithms.
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Note that in all graphs percentage differences between the RER simulated 
without some of the fundamentals, or policy measures, and the simulated base RER 
denote real depreciation if positive, while negative values denote real appreciation. 
These differences can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, they show the 
real devaluation or appreciation that the RER would have undergone in the absence 
of external shocks or policy intervention. On the other hand, the contribution of such 
events is singled out and reflected in the differences.
In commenting the results from Models 1 to 9, we discussed the sign and size 
of the impact o f fundamentals and non-fundamental disturbances on RER behaviour. 
The historical perspective which is offered by the simulation exercise can enrich the 
above discussion.
From the econometric estimations we found that aid and government 
consumption influence the RER in differences and not in levels. In particular, an 
acceleration in aid inflows leads to real depreciation, while expansive public 
spending causes real appreciation. Inspection of graph 5.3.4.1 and 5.3.4.3 shows that 
aid has reduced RER variability especially during the oil boom and in the late 1980’s 
and early 1990’s. Moreover, the marked increase in aid inflows during the years 
1986-88 (namely, 25% in 1986, 61% in 1987 and 16% in 1988) prevented a real 
appreciation o f almost 20%. The point we made in paragraph 5.2.3 of aid signalling 
the business community restored creditworthiness, government’s ability of using 
effectively additional resources and good economic prospects is reinforced here by an 
additional perspective. The upper part of graph 5.3.4.3 clearly shows that in the 
absence of aid, or with constant aid inflows, the RER would have more volatile, or, 
conversely, aid provides a financial cushion to reduce RER variability. A volatile
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RER fosters business uncertainty: on the internal side, domestic investment suffers 
from the lack of confidence and stability; while on the external side, foreign 
investment and private capital are not attracted by a situation of instability. 
Therefore, given the link of the RER with uncertainty, aid may play an important role 
in promoting stability and business confidence, thus boosting investment prospects 
and opportunities. Latest development appear to confirm this finding. By the end of 
October 1997 Indonesia obtained from the IMF a package of aid worth 23 billion 
dollars aimed at restoring economic agents’ confidence in the Indonesian economy 
and at stabilising financial markets on the wake of the recent turmoil in East Asian 
financial markets27.
Similar considerations can be made of public spending, although the scale of 
its impact is smaller (see graphs 5.3.4.2 and 5.3.4.3). The mean value of DIFF-NO- 
AID is 2.8% as opposed to a mean value of 2.1% of D1FF-NO-GC. Moreover, while 
DIFF-AID ranged between -19% and 17%, DIFF-GC ranged between -4% and 7% 
and. Note that these extremes correspond to a 16% drop government consumption 
growth in 1987 and to a 23% increase in 1975, respectively.
While aid can be negotiated but not controlled by the Indonesian government, 
public spending can play an active role in determining RER behaviour. Fiscal policy 
is thus confirmed to be important with respect to competitiveness.
Turning to the oil shocks’ contribution to RER behaviour, from graph 5.3.4.4 
we can observe a strong negative link. According to our simulations, the 1973 oil 
price shock has determined a massive real appreciation of 15% in 1975, which would 
have risen to a maximum 22% in 1981 in the hypothetical case of the absence of the
27 Source: Corriere della Sera, November the 1“ 1997.
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1973 shock and the occurrence of the 1979 shock. The effect on the RER of the
second oil shock was smaller and reached 9% in 1981. Finally, the drop in real oil 
prices in 1982/84 has contributed to a real depreciation of more than 10% in the late 
1980’s.
The interesting feature of the simulations without the 1978, 1983 and 1986 
nominal devaluations is the relatively long persistence period of their effects (see 
graph 5.3.4.5). The 50% devaluation in 1978 affected the RER until 1981, with a 
peak in its effectiveness in 1980, when the RER depreciated by 12% in the 
simulation, that is other things given. Had the 37% devaluation not taken place in 
1983, then the RER would have suffered, ceteris paribus, an immediate appreciation 
of 14%, a figure close to the effect of the 1986 50% devaluation (16%). From the 
simulations we also find that, on average, the effects of the three nominal devaluation 
episodes lasted six years.
The theoretical argument that trade controls lead to real appreciation is 
strongly supported by graph 5.3.4.6. Without tariffs, the RER would have been 
largely devalued, especially until the 1980’s, when trade liberalization became more 
effective. It is thus important to monitor trade controls as they appear to impede 
competitiveness and represent a powerful policy instrument to promote 
competitiveness.
Finally, graph 5.3.4.7 presents combined simulations of policy tools influence 
on the RER. Government consumption, tariffs and nominal devaluation appear to 
influence markedly RER behaviour. The strong real appreciation they seem to have 
caused is mainly driven by the influence of trade controls. However, policy matters
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and can play a role not only in contrasting excessive appreciation, but also in 
stabilising the RER.
Looking ahead, the Indonesian government faces a period of exchange rate 
instability after the decision, in 1997, to opt for a flexible exchange rate and given the 
recent instability in East Asian financial markets. Fiscal policy and trade 
liberalisation should be closely monitored to influence RER behaviour. In addition, 
given aid’s role in stabilising the RER, the negotiation of aid deals may take 
advantage of this positive side effect of aid.
5.5. Conclusions.
This chapter has presented an analysis of the Indonesian RER based on 
Edwards’ approach and on its extension in terms of an ECM model. We have 
emphasised misalignment and short run disequilibrium issues. The Indonesian RER 
appears to have suffered from misalignment during the period under investigation 
(1968-1993), especially during the oil boom era and until the early 1990’s. The 
results from the empirical estimation of RER behaviour show, among other things, that 
aid and the real price of oil do matter. Both act as fundamental determinants of RER 
behaviour and most importantly contribute to RER stability and the simulation exercise 
confirms this finding. Also, we find that a worsening in the terms of trade lead to real 
depreciation, a result which is in line with most empirical studies. Unsurprisingly, we 
find trade controls to hamper competitiveness. Domestic investment, on the contrary, 
appear to restore competitiveness. We do not find empirical evidence of a Bela-Balassa 
effect on the RER, that is technological progress linked to real appreciation, although
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this may be due to the use of real growth as a proxy to technological progress. Finally, 
our finding show that nominal devaluations have a relatively long-lasting effect on the 
RER in contrast to the view that nominal devaluation do not influence RER behaviour.
Exogenous shocks such as oil price sharp movements or aid inflows influence 
competitiveness but can hardly be influenced by policy makers. However, the 
Indonesian government can use fiscal policy, trade measures and investment incentives 
as a tool to influence and stabilise the RER. Correct RER alignment and stability have 
positive effects on competitiveness, on the domestic and foreign business community 
and on the overall economic prospects.
These results cannot be generalised and further research is necessary to compare 
the Indonesian case with other experiences in order to possibly draw a general lesson. 
In particular, the relationship between aid and the RER has not been widely studied. 
The widespread concern has been on the Dutch disease effect of aid or other external 
shocks. Our analysis has not be focused on this, but rather on more aggregated 
economic features of the Indonesian economy.
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Appendix 12. Unit Root Tests for Regressors.
Table A.12.1. Unit Root Tests Full Sample: 1960-93.
x, tat tax <J>3 <«>2 Xu «6, X
log AIDY -2.65 -0.76 1.45 3.58 2.39 -2.58 1 .5 9 3.33 -1.99
log INVY* -1.31 0.94 1.74 1.36 3.20 -1.36 1 .8 6 4.39 0.99
log TOT -0.95 0.22 1.15 0.76 0.61 -1.23 1.30 0.91 0.40
log PoiL -0.80 -0.01 1.13 0.74 0.63 -1.24 1.33 0.97 0.42
NOMDEV -3.61 -2.05 2.51 6.58 4.39 -2.85 1.50 4.06 -2.38
DEH -4.06 2.13 -2.54 8.26 5.51 -3.28 -1.40 5.37 -2.92
GROWTH -4.34 1.21 2.30 9.43 6.28 -4.14 3.69 8.57 -1.59
log TARb -3.41 -2.31 2.96 5.81 3.97 -2.34 1.88 2.86 -1.42
log GCY -4.10 2.32 3.93 8.60 5.74 -3.22 3.19 5.19 -0.39
Critical
values: 3 II o n=50 3 II O n=50
O»nIIc n=50
5% -3.55 2.81 3.14 6.73 5.13 -2.95 2.56 4.86 -1.95
2 . 5 % 3.18 3.47 7.81 5.94 2.89 5.80
1 % -4.26 3.60 3.87 9.31 7.02 -3.64 3.28 7.06 -2.63
Note: all tests are ADF(O) tests except where indicated. For a formal explanation of the tests and of the 
statistics reported in the table refer to chapter 4, paragraph 4.4.1. 
a: ADF(2) for log INVY. 
b: ADF(l) for log TAR.
Table A.12.2. Unit Root Tests. Sub-Sample: 1967-93.
x. Xur tax <t>3 o 2 Xu X«u «*>1 X
log AIDY* -1.54 -0.38 0 .5 3 0.95 0.68 -1.72 0.57 1.90 -1.89
log INVY -3.20 2.60 3.6 6 7.00 7.17 -2.40 2.60 5.86 1.98
log TOT -0.82 -0.38 1.24 1.18 0.92 -1.51 1.58 1.36 0.45
log Poil -0.76 -0.68 1.47 1.54 1.24 -1.63 1.74 1.66 0.51
NOMDEV -10.69 0.05 0.71 69.24 49.60 -12.01 2.37 77.49 -11.27
DEHk -34.98 3.61 -5.01 712.86 502.83 -28.44 -3.34 479.75 -25,82
GROWTH -5.23 -0.96 4.06 13.84 9.26 -5.18 4.93 13.48 -1.18
log TARC -3.42 -2.98 3.16 5.86 4.20 -1.47 0.98 1.40 0.18
log GCY -2.68 1.07 2.69 3.62 2.43 -2.46 2.46 3.05 0.95
Critical
values:
5% -3.59
n=25
2.85
n=25
3.20
n=25
7.24
n=25
5.68 -2.97
n=25
2.61
n=25
5.18 -1.95
2.5% 3.25 3.59 8.65 6.75 2.97 6.30
1% -4.34 3.74 4.05 10.61 8.21 -3.70 3.41 7.88 -2.65
Note: all tests are ADF(O) tests except where indicated. For a formal explanation of the tests and of the 
statistics reported in the table refer to chapter 4, paragraph 4.4.1. 
a: ADF(l) for log AIDY. 
b: ADF(1) for DEH. 
c: ADF(1) for log TAR.
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Table A.12.3. Unit Root Tests for Differenced Variables.
1962-1993 1968-1993
Constant No C onstant Constant No Constant
tu X Xu X
A log AIDY -7.12 -7.24 -8.06 -8.30
A log INVY -7.03* -6.31* -8.37* -6.45
A log LTOT -4.81 -4.85 -4.32 -4.35
A log PoiL -4.51 -4.55 -4.12 -4.12
A NOMDEV -6.88 -6.98 -10.28 -9.86
A log DEH -7.51 -7.63 -9.54 -8.82
A log TAR -3.83 -3.83 -7.86 -4.73
A log GCY -10.93 -11.09 -9.63 -9.77
Critical
values:
5% -2.96 -1.95 -2.97 -1.95
1% -3.65 -2.64 -3.70 -2.65
Note: all tests are ADF(O) tests except where indicated. For a formal explanation of the tests and of the 
statistics reported in the table refer to chapter 4, paragraph 4.4.1. 
a: ADF( I) for A log INVY.
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Appendix 13. Edwards’ Model: Full Sample OLS Estimates.
Table A.13.1. Edwards’ Model OLS Estimates. Sample: 1961-1993.
log RER .1  
CONSTANT 
log INVY 
log TOT 
log PoiL 
A log AIDY 
A log GCY 
GROW TH 
log TAR 
NOMDEV 
DEH
Dummy 1965
MODEL 1 
CoefT (t-value)
0.74 (23.26’") 
0.87 (2.53” ) 
0.26 (5.37*” ) 
-0.13 (-3.51” ')
0.15 (3.33” *) 
-0.26 (-2.55” ) 
0.006 ( 1.27) 
-0.013 (-0.37) 
0.36 (3.89*” ) 
0.08 (2.51” ) 
-0.54 (-5.25” *)
MODEL 2 
Coeff (t-value)
0.75 (29.56***) 
0.80 ( 4.42*” ) 
0.28 (7.59***) 
-0.13 (-4.20***)
0.08 (2.23*)
0.51 (7.86***) 
0.12 (4.90***) 
-0.66 (-6.84***)
MODEL 3 
CoefT (t-value)
0.73 (22.91***) 
0.94 (2.88***) 
0.26 (5.62***)
-0.12 (-4.03*” ) 
0.13 (2.99***) 
-0.24 (-2.51” ) 
0.005 ( 1.16) 
-0.028 (-0.83) 
0.37 (4.26***) 
0.08 ( 2.84” *) 
-0.61 (-5.97***)
MODEL 4 
CoefT (t-value)
0.75 (31.15***) 
0.72 (4.58***) 
0.29 (8.47*” )
-0.12 (-4.95***) 
0.06 ( 1.83°)
0.52 ( 8.64***) 
0.13 (5.30***) 
-0.70 (-7.73***)
°, * , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1%, respectively.
Diagnostic Tests
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
R2 0.986 0.981 0.987 0.984
F-test on Regressors 153.6(0.00) 184.3(0.00) 171.5(0.00) 214.6(0.00)
o 0.051 0.056 0.049 0.052
Durbin Watson 1.65 1.53 1.69 1.58
RSS 0.058 0.078 0.052 0.067
AR 2 F 0.47 (0.63) 1.38(0.27) 0.31 (0.74) 0.78 (0.47)
ARCH 1 F 2.04(0.17) 0.24 (0.63) 3.07 (0.09) 1.31 (0.26)
Normality x2 0.27 (0.87) 2.44 (0.29) 0.25 (0.88) 3.46(0.18)
R ESETF 1.95(0.18) 3.06 (0.09) 1.30(0.27) 2.43(0.13)
X,2F 1.86(0.16) 1.14(0.42)
Significance levels in parentheses.
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Table A.13.2. Edwards’ Model OLS Estimates. Sample: 1961-1993. 
Long-run Solutions: Solved Static Long-Run Equations.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
CONSTANT 3.37 (0.99") 3.24 (0.48") 3.41 (0.86") 2.86 (0.41” )
log INVY 1.02 ( 0.25” ) 1.12 (0.18") 0.95 ( 0.22") 1.13 (0.16” )
log TOT 
log PoiL
-0.51 (0.12") -0.55 (0.13")
-0.46 (0.09") -0.48 ( 0.09")
A log AIDY 0.60 (0.18") 0.31 (0.14") 0.48 (0.16") 0.24 (0.13*)
A log GCY -0.99 ( 0.36") -0.86 ( 0.32")
GROWTH 0.023 ( 0.02) 0.019(0.02)
log TAR -0.05 (0.13) -0.10 (0.12)
NOMDEV 1.40 (0.45") 2.08 (0.34") 1.36 ( 0.40") 2.07 (0.30")
DEH 0.29 (0.13") 0.51 (0.11") 0.30 (0.11") 0.50 (0.10")
Dummy 1965 -2.10 (0.47") -2.68 (0.50") -2.22 (0.42” ) -2.76 (0.45")
Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** denote 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
Diagnostic Tests.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 M ODEL 3 MODEL 4
Wald Test x2 102.7 (0.00) 77.6 (0.00) 129.0(0.00) 96.0 (0.00)
Unit Root t-test -8.11"’ -9.61"’ -8.66*" -10.55’"
For Unit Root t-test * and *** denote respectively 5% and 1% significance level.
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Appendix 14. Edwards’ Model Instrumental Variable Estimates.
Table A.14.1. Edwards’ Model Instrumental Variable Estimates. Sample: 1967-
1993.
log RER., 
CONSTANT 
log INVY 
log TOT 
log PoiL 
A log AIDY 
A log GCY 
GROWTH 
log TAR 
NOMDEV 
DEH
MODEL 1 
Coeff (t-value)
0.65 ( 8.90*") 
1.98 ( 2.99*’”) 
0.22 (3.62'") 
-0.23 (-3.99*")
0.28 ( 3.60*") 
-0.24 (-2.23') 
0.01 ( 1.81’) 
-0.12 (-1.69’) 
0.15 (0.96) 
0.08 ( 0.77)
MODEL 2 
Coeff (t-value)
0.75 (15.17"') 
1.03 (3.87'") 
0.25 (4.32"’) 
-0.16 (-4.47*")
0.20 ( 3.02’")
0.36 ( 3.25"') 
0.19 (2.22')
MODEL 3 
Coeff (t-value)
0.64 ( 7.67*” ) 
1.77 ( 2.60") 
0.22 (3.21’")
-0.18 (-3.48'") 
0.24 (2.68” ) 
-0.25 (-2.01’) 
0.011 ( 1.65) 
-0.12 (-1.58) 
0.15 (0.82) 
0.02 (0.19)
MODEL 4 
Coeff (t-value)
0.75 (14.25’") 
0.85 (3.37'") 
0.26 ( 4.05'")
-0.12 (-3.97"’) 
0.17 (2.23’)
0.36 (2.78’") 
0.15 ( 1.72’)
°, * , **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1%, respectively. 
Additional Instruments used: LTOTWB.i, DLAY.i, NOMDEVXM.i.
Diagnostic Tests
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
IV X2 4.58 (0.10) 4.64(0.10) 2.17(0.34) 3.30(0.19)
rv  p=o 1276.3 (0.00) 967.7 (0.00) 995.5 (0.00) 873.0(0.00)
a 0.042 0.047 0.047 0.049
R FC 0.045 0.066 0.055 0.074
Durbin W atson 2.08 1.96 2.19 1.97
RSS 0.029 0.044 0.037 0.049
A R 2 x2 1.21 (0.55) 0.18(0.91) 0.82 (0.66) 0.29 (0.86)
ARCH 1 F 1.01 (0.33) 0.10(0.76) 0.12(0.73) 0.16(0.70)
Normality x2 1.08(0.58) 0.36 (0.83) 0.51 (0.77) 0.53 (0.77)
X|J F 0.51 (0.85) 0.74 (0.69)
Significance levels in parentheses.
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Table A.14.2. Edwards’ Model Instrumental Variable Estimates. Sample: 1967-
1993. Long-run Solutions: Solved Static Long-Run Equations.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
CONSTANT 5.65 (0.98” ) 4.13 (0.70” ) 4.90 ( 1.00” ) 3.38 (0.67” )
log INVY 0.62 ( 0.22") 1.02 ( 0.20” ) 0.61 (0.24” ) 1.01 (0.21” )
log TOT -0.66 ( 0.10**) -0.65 (0.13” )
log PoiL -0.49 ( 0.09” ) -0.48 (0.11” )
A log AIDY 0.81 (0.18” ) 0.81 (0.28” ) 0.66 ( 0.22") 0.66 ( 0.32” )
A log GCY -0.69 ( 0.25” ) -0.69 ( 0.29")
GROWTH 0.028 ( 0.01") 0.03 ( 0.02)
log TAR -0.33 (0.15” ) -0.34 (0.16” )
NOMDEV 0.44 (0.53) 1.45 (0.59” ) 0.42 (0.59) 1.43 (0.64” )
DEH 0.22 ( 0.30) 0.75 (0.39“) 0.06 ( 0.34) 0.60 (0.39)
Standard errors in parentheses. * and ** denote 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
Diagnostic Tests.
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Wald Test x2 147.8(0.00) 57.8 (0.00) 123.2 (0.00) 54.2 (0.00)
Unit Root t-test -4.79* -5.03' -4.33 -4.82'
For Unit Root t-test * and *** denote respectively 5% and 1% significance level.
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Appendix 15. Abbreviations for Diagnostic Tests.
R2 Coefficient of determination of the regression
F-test on 
Regressors F-test on the joint significance of all explanatory variables except the constant
RSS Residual sum of squares
a Standard error of the regression
R F o Reduced Form o (Instrumental variables estimation)
Durbin
Watson Durbin Watson test for first order autocorrelation
iv  x2 
IV p=o
X2 test for the validity of the choice of the instrumental variables used
X2 test on the joint significance of reduced form explanatory variables except 
the constant
AR2F,
A R 2 X2
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation up to 
the second lag (F- and x2 forms).
ARCH 1 F LM F-test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity up to the first lag
NX2
X,2F
Doomik and Hansen x2 test for univariate normality of the residuals 
White’s F-test for heteroscedasticity using squares
RESETF Ramsey’s general F-test of misspecification
VIT Variance instability test
JIT
Wald x2
Joint instability test for all the parameters in the model
Wald x2 test on the joint significance of long-run coefficients (except the 
constant)
Unit Root 
t-test Pc-Give unit root test: if significant, it indicates cointegration
These tests are the standard output of the econometric package used, PcGive 8.0 and 
PcFiml 8.0. Full references and explanations for each test are available in most standard 
econometric textbooks, as well as in PcGive and PcFiml manuals.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has investigated theoretical and empirical issues related to aid 
effectiveness and the Indonesian economy. In various occasions, we have also 
emphasised the need for a careful methodological discussion. We have modelled and 
tested empirically the impact of aid on government behaviour. The statistical 
properties of the Indonesian real exchange rate (RER) have then been investigated 
and a model of RER determination has been discussed and tested econometrically. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the logical link between the fiscal response model 
and the analysis of RER behaviour is given by the emphasis on the macroeconomic 
effectiveness of aid. The methodological issues raised throughout the thesis are 
instrumental to pointing out the need for a more rigorous treatment of data, 
definitions and empirical specification of otherwise well defined theoretical models. 
This concluding chapter presents the main results from the individual approaches, i.e. 
fiscal response model and RER behaviour, and attempts to draw a summarising 
lesson.
Fiscal Response Model
The general lesson we draw from our analysis is threefold. On the aid issue, we 
conclude with a positive assessment of aid giving, provided it is given in loans. The 
burden of repayments prevents the misuse of external finances and stimulates a
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commitment to a ‘virtuous’ fiscal behaviour. Loans are found to encourage tax 
collection, public and private investment and consumption so that the whole economy 
benefits. On the contrary, total combined aid, grants, multilateral and bilateral aid 
negatively affect all fiscal variable as well as income and consumption. However, they 
reduce public consumption more than investment, thus exhibiting a pro-investment 
bias.
The second consideration is one of rethinking the modelling approach. The lack 
of consensus on aid effectiveness which emerges from the existing fiscal response 
literature is an indicator that this modelling approach presents some weaknesses. 
Further research should move towards a more realistic extension of the model which 
includes the monetary sector in the theoretical framework, in order to take into account 
interest rates, inflation and monetary policy issues. Another important theoretical 
contribution would be the introduction of an asymmetric objective function for the 
government consistent with utility maximisation when targets are met. Further 
investigation is also needed to explain the nature of the budget constraint, that is 
whether it is linear or kinked, single or dual.
We have stressed the importance of static feedback effects and of dynamic 
linkages. It is our contention that their role is a crucial one in understanding aid 
effectiveness and must not be underestimated. For instance, if an investment project is 
financed by foreign aid, the effects of this inflow will necessarily distributed over time 
and will have also feedback effects on the economy via the Keynesian multiplier.
260
Finally, the disaggregation of aid into grant and loan and into bilateral and 
multilateral aid has shown different impact of each aggregate, when compared to total 
combined official aid. It is thus important to take into account the forms and the nature 
in which aid is given. There is a variety of alternative aid disaggregations. One of the 
most significant ones refers to the distinction between tied versus untied aid and is 
related to the issue of the conditions attached to aid inflows the receiver has to fulfil. 
This has interesting policy and political implications, especially in terms of 
international relationships.
The final consideration focuses on methodological aspects. In implementing 
empirically the fiscal response model, we have used various specifications dependent 
on the choice of aid’s disaggregation procedure. We have also used two different 
datasets for aid and government data, given the differences between the official 
international and national data. The fact that our results change across the models and 
depending on the dataset used is likely to be an indicator that they are not too robust. 
The issue of the choice of data is shown to be a source of potential misinterpretation of 
results. At the same time, the estimation method is also important. The poor 
performance of our model when estimated simultaneously, with 3SLS estimation 
techniques, is probably due to the lack of degrees of freedom. What is cause for 
concern is the poor discussion of both issues in the existing literature. It is worth 
stressing how results heavily depend on the datasets used and on the estimation 
techniques employed. Moreover, results are comparable only if similar data 
conventions are adopted.
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RER Behaviour and Determination
The investigation on RER behaviour and determination has been carried out 
at two distinct but complementary levels. First, we have presented an overview of the 
main problems related to the definition and measurement of the real exchange rate. 
We have then modelled RER behaviour and studied the impact of its fundamental 
and non-fundamental determinants.
A set of real effective exchange rate (REER) indexes for the Indonesian 
rupiah has been computed and their statistical properties analysed. Unit root testing 
has been extensively used to test for stationarity. The issue of RER stationarity is 
closely related to the purchasing power parity (PPP) debate. In the PPP context, if the 
RER shows no tendency to return to its mean or trend, long run PPP cannot be 
confirmed. On the contrary, a tendency of the RER to return to its mean value is 
regarded as a necessary condition for PPP to hold.
We have started with simple ADF tests, followed by rolling, recursive and 
sequential ADF tests. The possibility of breaks has been tested using Perron’s 
methodology, which we have slightly extended to include a break in the mean and in 
the trend at different years. As a conclusion, we have consistently rejected the 
hypothesis of REER stationarity except in those cases in which the full sample series 
have been used and/or two breaks have been allowed. In those cases results show 
stationarity, but we should treat them more as indicative than as definitive. A much 
longer time series would be most appropriate, and results from a test based on a 
much larger sample size would be less suspicious.
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Further research could bring a comparative perspective in order to determine 
whether the behaviour of the Indonesian REER matches other countries REERs.
The analysis of the determination of the Indonesian RER is based on 
Edwards’ (1989) approach and on its extension in terms of an ECM model. Central 
to the analysis is the role economic fundamentals, and in particular aid inflows and 
the price o f oil, have in determining RER behaviour. Exchange rate management has 
played a significant role in Indonesia as an instrument to ensure competitiveness 
during and after the oil boom.
We have tested the two models, i.e. Edwards’ model and the ECM extension, 
and emphasised misalignment and short run disequilibrium issues. As in the fiscal 
response case, simulation exercises have been carried out to study the influence of 
external shocks and policy options on the RER.
Recent discussion among development economists has emphasised the role of 
correct real exchange alignment, that is a sustainable level of the RER which reflects 
the economic fundamentals of the country. Edwards has also developed the concept 
of an equilibrium RER which reflects internal and external equilibrium and which is 
allowed to vary in response to changes in the fundamentals. Real overvaluation is 
particularly harmful to competitiveness and may hamper the development of the 
export oriented sector, thus preventing an export-led growth process. In addition, 
RER stability is important to reduce uncertainty and contribute to business 
confidence in investing in the country.
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The Indonesian RER appears to have suffered from misalignment during the 
period under investigation (1968-1993), especially during the oil boom era and until 
the early 1990’s. The results from the empirical estimation of RER behaviour show, 
among other things, that aid and the real price of oil do matter. Both act as fundamental 
determinants of RER behaviour and most importantly contribute to RER stability and 
the simulation exercise confirms this finding. An interesting feature of aid’s impact is 
that aid inflows appear to influence RER in differences and not in levels. This 
implies that a constant flow of aid monies does not appear to modify the RER, while 
accelerating aid inflows lead to real depreciation. Similarly, government 
consumption influences the RER in differences and not in levels, although the sign of 
its impact is negative. Ever growing public consumption causes real appreciation. 
This result indicates the importance of cautious fiscal management and of monitoring 
public consumption for the RER. Also, we find that a worsening in the terms of trade 
leads to real depreciation, a result which is in line with most empirical studies. 
Unsurprisingly, we find trade controls to hamper competitiveness. Domestic 
investment, on the contrary, appears to restore competitiveness. We do not find 
empirical evidence of a Bela-Balassa effect on the RER, that is technological 
progress linked to real appreciation, although this may be due to the use of real 
growth as a proxy to technological progress. Finally, our findings show that nominal 
devaluations have a relatively long-lasting effect on the RER in contrast to the view 
that nominal devaluation does not influence RER behaviour.
Exogenous shocks such as oil price sharp movements or aid inflows influence 
competitiveness but can hardly be influenced by policy makers. However, the
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Indonesian government can use fiscal policy, trade measures and investment incentives 
as a tool to influence and stabilise the RER. Correct RER alignment and stability have 
positive effects on competitiveness, on the domestic and foreign business community 
and on the overall economic prospects. The floating of the rupiah in August 1997 adds 
a new challenge to the Indonesian government. Nominal devaluation cannot be relied 
upon anymore to influence competitiveness. Therefore, it is on the fundamentals that 
policy makers should rely in order to attain competitiveness, RER stability and thus 
credibility on the international markets. The positive side-effects of the financial 
turmoil of recent months is thus the growing emphasis on the real economy.
These results cannot be generalised and further research is necessary to compare 
the Indonesian case with other experiences in order to possibly draw a general lesson. 
In particular, the relationship between aid and the RER has not been widely studied. 
The widespread concern has been on the Dutch disease effect of aid or other external 
shocks. Our analysis has not be focused on this, but rather on more aggregated 
economic features of the Indonesian economy.
A Summing Up
Indonesia faces medium to long run prospects of growth and development, 
provided stable macroeconomic foundations ensure increases in efficiency and 
productivity. The development strategy of the government for the medium run is 
focused on reducing regional differences through decentralisation of development
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planning at a regional level; increasing the role for the private sector through further 
deregulation; continuing the globalisation policies of the 1990’s to boost foreign 
investment further; improving health and education and investing in human capital; 
and following a sustainable resource management, which protects the environment. 
Growth is projected at an average 7.1% per annum by the end of Repelita VI (1999). 
Main sources of growth are expected to be high domestic demand on the expenditure 
side, while on the production side the main contribution will come from the 
manufacturing and infrastructure related sectors, notably telecommunications and 
power generation on the production side.
Foreign direct investment is projected to continue the rising trend of the past 
few years; consequently, capital inflows should remain high and mainly destined to 
finance activities in the private sector. Therefore, the issue of RER management and 
stability is crucial in order to increase certainty and business confidence on Indonesian 
prospects.
As world economic growth recovers, Indonesian non-oil exports are expected to 
increase, in response also to persistent government efforts towards trade liberalisation, 
restored competitiveness and expanded domestic capacity.
After the floating of the rupiah in August 1997, a challenge for the Indonesian 
government is represented by dealing with the impact of the new regime on the rupiah 
through sound macroeconomic policies. The early stages of a floating exchange rate 
system are generally characterised by substantial fluctuations and speculation.
266
The main lesson from this thesis is that aid may be fruitfully used to support 
both private and public investment: we found that aid exhibits a pro-investment bias 
and that it contributes to RER stability. In this respect, the results from the fiscal 
response study complement the findings from the RER analysis in pointing out a role 
not only for aid but also for government intervention. Aid is found to affect both fiscal 
behaviour and RER movements. Therefore, policy makers need to take into account the 
implications of fiscal policies and aid management.
The new developments in the East Asian markets point out the need to focus 
more on the economic fundamentals in order to prevent speculative disruption. As for 
Indonesia, after the floating of the rupiah in August 1997, the role of government 
policies - and also of its political conduct - becomes even more important not only for 
internal purposes, but also with respect to international competitiveness and credibility. 
Aid can help not only in the development process, but also in providing financial 
‘cushion resources’ to stabilise the RER. In this respect, further research should 
investigate the relationship between government behaviour and exchange rate 
management in the presence of aid.
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